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Background and Purpose 
     A debate over the practice of physician self-referral has been ongoing in health care 
since the 1980s. At issue is the practice of physicians who refer patients to facilities in 
which they share a financial interest, a phenomenon known as referral for profit. 
Physician investment or ownership interest in ancillary (e.g., physical therapy) services 
has been shown to have an impact on utilization rates, costs, access to care, and quality of 
care. What has not been identified in previous research is the influence of physicians‘ 
selective referral on competing clinics, particularly the hospital-based outpatient centers 
that share their health care markets. The purpose of this research was to examine the 
relationship between the emergence of orthopaedic physician owned physical therapy 
  
services (POPTS) and changes in physical therapy referrals made to two groups of not-
for-profit, hospital-based outpatient physical therapy (OPPT) centers in one health care 
market.  
Methods 
     This study examined the referrals made by orthopaedic physicians to two large 
hospital systems in the Orlando, Florida, outpatient physical therapy market between 
1999 and 2007. This study was conducted using existing proprietary databases 
maintained by the Orlando Regional Healthcare System (ORHS) and Florida Hospital 
System (FHS), as well as phone surveys conducted by the primary investigator. 
Information regarding the orthopaedic physicians‘ ownership status and the patients‘ 
payer types was combined into analyses to determine if physician status was related to 
the number of physical therapy patients from each payer type referred, or the number of 
total referrals made to the hospital-based outpatient physical therapy facilities.    
     Comparisons were made between physicians who became owners of physical therapy 
services during the study period and physicians who never became owners of physical 
therapy services. Mixed Linear Models (MLM) were used to test for the effects of 
physician ownership and the combined influence of physician ownership and payer type 
on referrals for OPPT. Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals were calculated for 
the mean differences between Group 1 and Group 3 physicians for changes in OPPT 
referrals over time. The analyses were conducted first with samples of physicians who 
met a minimum criterion of ten referrals within the first year of data included in the data 
sets. Use of this criterion resulted in a small pool of physicians who qualified for 
  
inclusion in the testing. Data were compared between years 1 and 5 and then between 
years 1 and 2 versus 4 and 5. The criterion for physicians‘ inclusion was revised for post 
hoc analysis in an attempt to increase the sample size. All of the statistical tests were 
repeated in post hoc with the larger samples of physicians who met the minimum 
criterion of an average of ten referrals per year for years 1 and 2 rather than just the 
referral count for year 1. 
Results 
     Overall, there was no statistically significant change in the total referrals as a result of 
a change in physicians‘ ownership status. Tests for the influence of payer type, physician 
group, and ownership status on referrals also revealed no significant differences between 
the two physician groups. Point estimates of the differences between Group 1 and Group 
3 for changes in mean referrals supported the hypothesized relationships between 
physicians‘ ownership status and total referrals, referrals of commercially insured 
patients, and referrals of underinsured patients; however, the 95% confidence intervals 
for the point estimates were consistent with the non-significant MLM results. The 
hypothesized relationship between POPTS and referrals of Medicare patients was not 
supported in any of the analyses. In post hoc testing of the combined influence of payer 
type, physician group, and ownership status on referrals, a three-way interaction between 
physician group, payer type, and status was found (p=0.034, α<0.05). Including a larger 
sample size in the post hoc analyses led to outcomes that were different than those seen in 
the initial statistical tests.  
  
Conclusion 
     This research outlines a novel approach to analyzing the influence of physician 
ownership and payer type on referral behaviors. The findings suggest that physicians‘ 
ownership of physical therapy services was not a predictor of their referrals to hospital-
based OPPT services. Specifically, there was no significant effect of physician ownership 
of OPPT services on the total volume of referrals made to two hospital-systems‘ OPPT 
clinics. There also was no significant relationship between physician ownership, payer 
type, and referrals made to the hospital-based clinics. The theory predicting that POPTS 
physicians would work to eliminate market competition by reducing referral volumes and 
retaining patients with more lucrative reimbursement for their own practices was not 
supported. However, post hoc analysis with a larger sample size provided some evidence 
that a larger sample may have revealed the hypothesized relationships between physician 
ownership, payer type, and referrals for OPPT. Future research utilizing larger samples 
and data tracking physicians‘ OPPT referrals from their origins to their final dispositions 
are needed to clarify the relationships between physicians‘ ownership of OPPT services 
and the referrals they make for those services.  
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
     A debate over the practice of physician self-referral has been ongoing in health care 
since the 1980s. At issue is the practice of physicians who refer patients to facilities in 
which they share a financial interest, a phenomenon known as referral for profit. The 
types of facilities that typically receive such referrals include, but are not limited to, 
specialty hospitals, imaging centers, clinical laboratories, medical equipment suppliers, 
orthosis and prosthesis suppliers, and rehabilitation centers. While it is legal for 
physicians to invest in ancillary services, some researchers suggest that ownership 
interest in these facilities or services may provide financial incentives for some physician 
investors to generate referrals and increase utilization beyond identified patient needs 
(Mitchell & Scott, 1992b, 1992c; Mitchell & Sunshine, 1992).  
     Health care markets have evolved out of atypical relationships between providers and 
consumers of goods and services, meaning that there is an uneven distribution of 
information between the patients and their health care providers. In particular, physicians 
are unique in that they may serve both as the patients‘ agent and the provider of services. 
As patient agent, the physician may recommend to a consumer that they pursue a 
particular treatment to reduce or eradicate disease or symptoms. If the physician is 
motivated to make recommendations based upon anything other than the patients‘ best 
interests, the physician may encourage them to pursue additional treatment even when 
2 
 
additional treatment is not needed. This is known as physician inducement of 
consumption of medical services. This behavior is possible in the health care market 
because the distribution of information between physicians and their patients is often 
imperfect. Typically, patients must rely on the physicians‘ recommendations for 
treatment, and most patients likely assume that the physicians are making these 
recommendations based upon the patients‘ welfare.  
     In most cases patients‘ reliance upon physicians‘ recommendations and referrals 
empowers physicians as gatekeepers to ancillary services such as physical therapy. Since 
the physician may also assume the role of provider of these services (e.g., via the 
ownership of a physical therapy practice), however, a potential conflict of interest arises. 
Self-referring physicians may have the financial incentive of enhanced income as a 
motivator to induce need for the services they provide or invest in, whether or not they 
produce additional health benefit to the patient.  
     Physicians may be motivated to invest in ancillary services for a variety of reasons. A 
2005 report to Congress on physician-owned specialty hospitals suggests that physicians 
are motivated to own and participate in these facilities to increase their direct control of 
operations and to augment their incomes (MedPAC, 2005). A position statement 
generated by the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons in 2004 supports POPTS 
stating that they give ―…physicians a greater role in the physical therapy services 
provided to patients. In-office therapy allows therapists and physicians to work together 
as a team, exchanging information and sharing ideas. The frequency and immediacy of 
feedback allow for the fine-tuning of therapeutic protocols that serves to improve patient 
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outcomes‖(American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 2004). Physicians‘ job 
satisfaction also has been closely tied to their professional autonomy and their 
compensation (Grembowski et al., 2003; Mitchell, Hadley, Sulmasy, & Bloche, 2000). 
However, managed care and changes in fee schedules have slowed the growth of 
physician incomes in almost all specialty areas (Medical Group Management 
Association, 2009; Tu & Ginsburg, 2006) (Appendix B: Part 1 and 2). Tu and Ginsburg 
reported that between 1995 and 2003, ―…surgeons‘ real income declined by 8.2 percent‖ 
(Tu & Ginsburg, 2006). Managed care‘s capitated payment schemes provide set 
reimbursement for services for specific patient groups, irrespective of the quantity or 
intensity of care needed to achieve desired health outcomes. These payment rates are 
typically lower than the rates paid to physicians under traditional fee-for-service 
programs, meaning that each patient encounter has become less profitable (Shih & Singh, 
2007). In addition, the numbers of underinsured or uninsured patients who continue to 
access the health care system are increasing, further reducing reimbursement to health 
care providers and institutions for the treatment they provide (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007).       
     Receipt of less revenue per patient may motivate physicians to increase the quantity or 
scope of services they render to patients in an attempt to supplement their incomes or to 
offset reductions from other causes (Bert, 2008; Duxbury, 2008; McGuire & Pauly, 1991; 
Nguyen, 1994). The loss of revenue under current payment schemes also may provide 
incentives for these practitioners to selectively self-refer patients with better insurance. 
As a result of the variations in insurance coverage, the same modality or procedure 
provided to one patient can prove more lucrative than when provided to another. Since 
4 
 
certain payer groups provide higher compensation than other groups, physicians 
motivated by income may choose to send patients with limited reimbursement or patients 
with less lucrative reimbursement to outside facilities while retaining patients with better 
reimbursement for their own practices (Ahern & Scott, 1992). 
     Payment schemes are not the only potential motivator for selective self-referral. Since 
one potential incentive for physicians to self-refer is increased income, these clinicians 
may target less complex patient populations for selective self-referral, because the costs 
of caring for these individuals are less than the costs of caring for more medically 
involved patients. Less complex patients are likely to require less of the physicians‘ time 
and services, allowing him or her to increase overall patient volumes for the services they 
provide, including physical therapy. If potential revenue exceeds the cost of production, 
however, physicians may wish to retain these patients for their own practices, because 
they would be able to charge for the additional services the patients received.  
     Though selective self-referral may prove beneficial to physicians who serve as both 
gatekeepers and providers of services, the consequences of such referral practices, if they 
exist, could prove detrimental to the outside providers of similar services. For example, 
hospitals that provide a broad spectrum of services may experience case mixes that are 
skewed toward patients who are more medically complex or who have little or no 
insurance (Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education, 2005). To promote 
financial stability, many hospitals provide or are expanding into other business lines, 
including pain management, cardiology, neurosurgery, imaging, and rehabilitation 
(MedPAC, 2006). Physicians are also expanding into these potentially more profitable 
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lines, leading to additional competition for patient resources (Bert, 2008; B. Hillman, 
Olson, Griffith, Sunshine, Joseph, Kennedy, Helson, et al., 1992; MedPAC, 2006; 
Mitchell, 2007; Mitchell & Scott, 1991, 1992a, 1992b; Scott & Mitchell, 1994).   
     The relationship between physician ownership and ancillary health care service 
utilization has been the focus of previous research. The body of evidence includes 
investigations of the relationship between physicians‘ ownership or investment interests 
and utilization of specialty hospitals (Government Accountability Office, 2003; Medicare 
Payment Advisory Committee, 2005, 2006), radiological services (Childs & Hunter, 
1972; Government Accountability Office, 1994; B. Hillman et al., 1990; B. Hillman, 
Olson, Griffith, Sunshine, Joseph, Kennedy, Helson, et al., 1992; Mitchell, 2007; 
Mitchell & Scott, 1991, 1992c; Mitchell & Sunshine, 1992), laboratory services (Ahern 
& Scott, 1992; Danzon, 1982), and physical therapy services (Mitchell & Scott, 1992b; 
Swedlow, Johnson, Smithline, & Milstein, 1992). Specific to physical therapy, 
physicians‘ ownership interests have been shown to influence service utilization rates and 
costs for workers‘ compensation programs for outpatient physical therapy (Mitchell, 
2007; Mitchell & Scott, 1992b; Mitchell & Sunshine, 1992; OIG, 1994; Olshin, Ciolek, 
& Hwang, 2002; Swedlow, et al., 1992). These studies are discussed in greater detail in 
the review of literature in Chapter II.  
     The present research examined the relationship between physician-owned physical 
therapy services and the community hospitals that share their health care markets. Prior to 
this, no research was found that examines the relationship between physician ownership 
interest and the patterns of referrals made to hospital-based outpatient rehabilitation 
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centers for physical therapy services. Based upon the available evidence, it is unclear if 
selective referral for physical therapy exists and is influencing current practice (American 
Hospital Association, 2005; Mitchell & Sass, 1995; Mitchell & Scott, 1991, 1992a, 
1992b, 1992c; Mitchell & Sunshine, 1992). This dissertation focused on the question of 
whether orthopaedic physician owners of physical therapy service (POPTS) may be 
selecting patients within certain payer groups (e.g., Medicare or underinsured) to send to 
hospital-based outpatient physical therapy clinics and not selecting other groups (e.g., 
commercially insured) for referral to external providers of OPPT. Understanding the 
issue of selective referral may help guide policy development in order to safeguard 
patients, hospitals, and market competitors from the potential jeopardy inherent in 
physicians‘ self-referral practices.  
     The purpose of this study was to examine whether the emergence of orthopaedic 
physician owned physical therapy services (POPTS) in a health care market was related 
to changes in physical therapy referrals received by the hospital-based outpatient 
rehabilitation centers that share that market. For this research, databases from two large, 
hospital-based outpatient rehabilitation providers were used to track orthopaedic 
physicians‘ referral patterns from 1999 to 2007. The Orlando Regional Healthcare 
System (ORHS) and Florida Hospital System (FHS) provided access to their databases 
tracking the total numbers and types of referrals made to their physical therapy clinics. 
The ORHS data also included information on patients‘ insurance types, which allowed 
for the analysis of the influence of physician ownership status and patients‘ insurance 
types on referrals for hospital-based OPPT services. 
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CHAPTER II: BACKGROUND AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
 
 
     The following chapter is divided into five sections. The first section provides 
background information on the economics underlying selective self-referral. The second 
section is a literature review providing empirical evidence of the impact of self-referral. 
The Review of the Literature provides an exploration of the evidence regarding physician 
ownership interest and its relationship to ancillary health care service utilization and 
costs. Included are reports and articles that highlight issues pertaining to physicians‘ dual 
agency. The studies presented in this section are critiqued in order to identify gaps in the 
existing knowledge base and clarify the methodological and theoretical frameworks that 
were used to guide this research. The discussion begins with the introduction of the self-
referring or entrepreneurial physician and examines the influence that physicians‘ 
ownership interest in ancillary services appears to have on health care utilization, access, 
and quality. These details are then tied to the specific research questions and hypotheses 
that guided this investigation.  
     The third section of this chapter clarifies public policy responses to physician self-
referral practices. Prompted by escalating health care costs, policymakers and payers are 
more closely scrutinizing the entrepreneurial practices of physicians as a possible source 
of health care market inefficiencies. Included in this segment is a model of physicians‘ 
behaviors that helps to explain their entrepreneurial responses to market incentives, 
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including annexation of ancillary health care services. For this research, particular 
attention is paid to physicians with ownership interest in outpatient physical therapy 
services.  
     The fourth section is an overview of the background of the study setting, Orlando, 
Florida. The fifth and final section of this chapter presents the potential problems with 
self-referral that this study addressed.      
Background on Physician Ownership Interest in Ancillary Services 
 
     Physician investment in health care services is not a new phenomenon, but recently, 
several issues are prompting policymakers and payers to more closely monitor physician 
investors‘ behaviors. Investigations of the influence of ownership interest on market 
competitors, service utilization, health care costs, and access to care have raised concern 
among policymakers and payers that physician ownership may be influencing the 
consumption of health care resources. Before exploring these concerns, however, a 
distinction between types of physician ownership interest must be made.    
     Among the many types of physicians‘ ownership arrangements is the joint venture 
practice. Joint venture practices provide ancillary services (e.g., physical therapy 
services) and are owned by physician investors (Mitchell & Scott, 1992b). Mitchell and 
Scott define a joint venture as ―…any ownership or investment interest between referring 
physicians (or any health care professional who makes referrals) and a business providing 
health care goods or services‖ (Mitchell & Scott, 1992c, p. 27). Facility investments may 
include notes, bonds, debentures, and real property investment (e.g., landlord/tenant 
relationships) with the physician, their immediate family member, a trust, or another 
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entity related to the investor. These relationships partly tie physicians‘ incomes to the 
revenues of these facilities, providing incentives for the physicians to work to ensure their 
success. 
     Joint venture practice proponents contend that, because of the close working 
relationship between the physicians and the ancillary facilities, these practices provide 
economies of scale, increase the practice‘s ability to compete in the health care market, 
diversify physicians‘ investment risks, improve access to financing, improve quality, and 
provide access to underserved regions (Mitchell & Scott, 1992a). However, evidence 
suggests that these types of arrangements may provide a potential conflict of interest by 
increasing incentives to promote utilization and generate charges, which would 
eventually lead to improved physician investor incomes. In addition, physicians 
participating in these kinds of arrangements have been accused of purposely retaining 
patients with better reimbursement for their own practices via a captive referral system, 
subsequently limiting competition by other providers (Mitchell & Scott, 1992a). For the 
purposes of this research, this phenomenon will be termed selective referral.  
     Physician investors in joint venture practices tend to participate in ancillary services 
that they utilize regularly. For example, according to a survey of Florida physicians 
conducted by Mitchell and Scott in 1992, internal medicine physicians were likely to 
invest in clinical laboratory services (50.6%), diagnostic imaging (35.2%), durable 
medical equipment (36.1%), home health agencies (32.8%), radiation therapy (36%), and 
acute care hospitals (33.7%) (Mitchell & Scott, 1992a). Orthopaedists, on the other hand, 
were the most likely of all physician groups surveyed to own or participate specifically in 
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physical therapy (31.7%), services to which their patients‘ outcomes are closely tied 
(Mitchell & Scott, 1992a). In addition to these ownership trends, physician investors in 
joint venture practices have demonstrated a tendency to refer more often to the services 
they partly own and to serve lower proportions of Medicaid and uninsured patients, 
lending credence to the notion of selective referral patterns (Ahern & Scott, 1994).   
    Specific to physical therapy are physician owned physical therapy services, or POPTS. 
POPTS services are provided within physicians‘ offices or facilities, whether by the 
physicians themselves or by non-physician providers, physical therapists, and physical 
therapist assistants in their employ. As is true for joint venture practices, the ownership of 
POPTS practices is most common for orthopaedic providers. A 2003 survey of American 
Physical Therapy Association (APTA) Private Practice Section (PPS) members 
conducted by the Association mirrored the findings of Mitchell and Scott (1992). Survey 
results showed that 33% of POPTS participants identified were orthopaedists and that 
other providers (e.g., chiropractors, physiatrists, family practice physicians) were 
increasingly developing their own POPTS practices (Graham, 2003). This trend suggests 
there may be an incentive for referring practitioners to invest in ancillary services to 
which they make referrals. 
The Economics of Self-Referral 
     Over the past few decades, government agencies and payer groups have attempted to 
curb the exponential growth of health care costs. One of the areas these groups have 
focused on is physicians‘ efficiency. In the 1980s, two significant payment changes 
began putting pressure on physicians to improve their efficiency in providing treatment. 
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These programs included Medicare reform and managed care programs that provided 
capitated or salaried fees (Ahern & Scott, 1992; Office of the Actuary, 2010). The 
rationale behind the imposition of the fee capitations was that reduced reimbursement 
would provide incentives for physicians to improve the efficiency of their patient care 
through the judicious application of tests and procedures. In spite of these policy and 
program changes, however, health care cost inflation continued, in part due to increased 
quantities of outpatient services being ordered (Gabel, Jajich-Toth, de Lissovoy, Rice, & 
Cohen, 1988). So why did these policies fail to curb spending? They failed, in part, 
because physicians responded to the financial incentives and price signals of the health 
care market.  
     Essential to understanding the issue of self-referral is the idea that physicians are 
potentially entrepreneurial, working to either maximize their practices‘ profitability or to 
achieve a desired income (Dobson & Haught, 2005). With few exceptions, the 
introduction of managed care practices has led to significant changes in most physicians‘ 
compensation patterns over the past 15 years. Many physician incomes have plateaued or 
declined relative to rates of inflation and costs of living. This is particularly true for 
physicians, such as orthopaedists, who provide specialty services. Trends on physician 
compensation through 2003 are included in Appendix B: Part 1 (Tu & Ginsburg, 2006). 
More recent data for physician incomes are also included in Appendix B: Part 2 (Medical 
Group Management Association, 2009). The decline in income, along with an erosion of 
professional autonomy, has led to reduced physician job satisfaction (Mitchell, et al., 
2000; Warren, Weitz, & Kulis, 1998). Evidence suggests that, along with these changes 
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in compensation, physicians are exploring other means of improving their incomes, such 
as by increasing the scope of services provided or investing in other services. As a result, 
physicians‘ motivation to improve their incomes may sometimes be at odds with the 
efforts of payer groups to contain health care costs. Discounted fee schedules, capitated 
payments, salaried compensation arrangements, and evolving government policies are 
harbingers of the growing conflict between payers and entrepreneurial physicians over 
increasingly scarce health care resources.      
     A basic model of physicians‘ behaviors that highlights physicians‘ responses to 
financial incentives was proposed in 1991 by McGuire and Pauly. These researchers 
described the literal target income (LTI) model, which suggests that when profit margins 
are reduced (e.g., reduced fee payment schedules), physicians may induce the need for 
additional services in order to achieve their LTI or to maximize their profitability 
(McGuire & Pauly, 1991). Following their investigations, McGuire and Pauly concluded 
that large changes in profit margins, such as in the case of shrinking reimbursement, were 
predictive of physicians seeking a target income. In such a case, payers‘ total 
expenditures were likely to increase as a result of the increased demand for services 
induced by the physicians (McGuire & Pauly, 1991). The authors‘ evidence suggests that 
the LTI strategy may have been assumed by physicians in response to the fee-schedule 
policies of the 1980s.  
     Additional support for McGuire and Pauly‘s work came soon after their publication. 
In a working paper developed for the World Bank in 1994, Nguyen discussed how, in 
health care markets, volume increases may offset the savings produced by price controls. 
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The author utilized data from the U.S. Medicare program from 1989 and 1990, examining 
physicians‘ behavioral responses to fee reductions. The period from which he extracted 
his data highlighted the effects of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 
(OBRA89) on physician behaviors. Nguyen concluded that providers, in particular 
physicians, will work to provide more health care goods and services to recapture the 
revenues that were lost as a result of the implementation of price controls (Nguyen, 
1994). These findings are consistent with the model of physician behavior proposed by 
McGuire and Pauly (1991). 
     While it may be sufficient to explain the physicians‘ behaviors in the 1980s, McGuire 
and Pauly‘s model falls short in explaining other strategies that physicians may employ to 
improve their practice revenues. Trends in referral and utilization patterns also may serve 
as indicators of physicians‘ profit-maximizing strategies. For example, evidence for 
physicians increasing the scope of services may include their annexation of ancillary 
health care programs or facilities. Maximization of compensation may be evidenced by 
selective referral practices, where patients with poorer reimbursement are referred to 
outside clinics while patients with better reimbursement are retained in physician 
practices or joint ventures. Physicians are able to influence these factors because of their 
gatekeeper status.  
     Gatekeepers are able to control how many and what types of referrals are made to 
ancillary services, because they have a captive referral source. Federal and state laws and 
insurance regulations often mandate that patients receive a referral from a physician 
before they can access ancillary health care services. Subsequently, physicians are in 
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control of the referrals made to their own practices and to outside providers. Gatekeeper 
status may therefore have a significant impact on the health care industry‘s ability to 
function as a consumer-directed market, potentially leading to inefficiencies and 
imperfect competition.  
Imperfect Competition 
     The economics literature describes a spectrum of market structures ranging from those 
that are perfectly controlled by one member (e.g., monopolies) to those markets in which 
all competitors are essentially equal (e.g., perfectly competitive markets). The following 
section provides a brief description of monopolistic competition and highlights the flaws 
that may result in market inefficiencies. This discussion is specific to health care and the 
production and consumption of ancillary services. This information is presented here 
because understanding the influence that physician ownership and gatekeeper status have 
on market dynamics may help in ascertaining if, why, and how selective referral occurs. 
Monopolistic Competition 
     Monopolistically competitive markets share the following characteristics: there are 
many sellers of the product of interest, the products that each firm provides are or appear 
slightly different (meaning they are not readily substituted), and firms are able to freely 
enter or exit the market (Mankiw, 2004). In a monopolistically competitive environment, 
advertising or marketing is essential to firm survival. Providers of services must work to 
ensure that consumers are convinced of the differences between the quality of their 
products or services and those of their competitors (Mankiw, 2004).  
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     When competing for business, providers who have direct access to consumers are 
afforded a distinct advantage. For example, a referring physician with gatekeeper status 
may recommend to a patient that he/she receive physical therapy. If the patient has no 
previous experience or preference for these services, the physician is able to influence the 
patient‘s pursuit of these services and choice of providers. The physician may either 
guide the patient to the physician‘s own ancillary services or to another competing clinic. 
As a function of their gatekeeper status, physicians are able to hold their referrals captive 
so that other providers who lack gatekeeper status are unable to equally compete for 
consumers. Other providers, who lack gatekeeper status, rely instead upon reputation and 
outcomes to lure patients into their practices. However, these strategies may prove 
ineffective if physicians are influencing their patients‘ choices of where to pursue their 
care.   
     According to the monopolistic competition model, charges for services are likely to 
increase as firms work to improve their profitability. The entrance of competitors into the 
market would drive down prices until they approached marginal costs. Therefore, it is in 
the best interest of the monopolistically competitive firm to limit the numbers and types 
of competitors who enter their market, making the existing market more closely resemble 
an oligopoly, where prices will likely exceed the marginal cost for service production. 
The phenomenon of profit maximization in a monopolistically competitive market is 
demonstrated in Figure 1 (Mankiw, 2004).  
     In order to maximize profitability in a monopolistically competitive market, a 
physician would need to decrease referrals to outside providers and retain referrals, and 
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Figure 1. Graph of long-term monopolistic competition (Mankiw, 2004, p. 348).    
 
subsequent revenue, for his or her own practice. However, only if the physicians‘ 
referrals generate payments that exceed production costs does their firm achieve a profit. 
Therefore, according to this model, monopolistically competitive physicians would be 
likely to selectively refer patients with poorer reimbursement, which may not cover costs 
of production, to outside providers while retaining cases with better reimbursement 
potential for their own practices or joint ventures.  
     To summarize, health care markets are not perfect, meaning that they are also 
inefficient. The relationships between payers, providers, and consumers are often 
muddied by competing interests. Ideally, health care would be produced in a perfectly 
competitive market, where societal welfare is maximized. Instead, it is produced in a 
climate where, increasingly, profit-maximization concerns may lead to providers taking 
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advantage of asymmetrical information. Physicians who serve as both gatekeepers and 
providers are able to steer patients toward particular goods or services, influencing both 
the quantities of services demanded and where they are purchased. Imperfect information 
subsequently leads to an imperfect marketplace, where competitors can and likely are 
being eliminated. Clearly understanding how and why physicians influence patients‘ 
health care choices is critical to understanding how they may affect health care utilization 
and market competition. 
Physician Incentives 
     As a result of implementation of structured managed care and reduced physician fee 
reimbursement, physicians have seen a marked decline in their incomes and erosion of 
their professional autonomy (Mitchell, et al., 2000; Office of the Actuary, 2010; Tu & 
Ginsburg, 2006). This decline in income and professional autonomy has led to reduced 
physician job satisfaction (Mitchell, et al., 2000; Warren, et al., 1998). Constraints 
induced by legislation and the current health care market provide incentives to physicians 
to pursue more profitable ventures in order to improve their incomes and subsequently 
their job satisfaction. This situation has facilitated the emergence of the entrepreneurial 
physician (Dobson & Haught, 2005). In previous economics research, McGuire and 
Pauly (1991) speculated that in the presence of economic constraints (e.g., limited 
reimbursement for services), physicians will work to maximize their profitability through 
reducing costs of service delivery, increasing the scope of services provided, and 
increasing or maximizing the compensation for services that are delivered. It is 
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physicians‘ unique roles as both referral sources and providers of services that allow 
them to influence patients‘ choices and their utilization of health care services. 
Agency 
     One of the concepts that may help to explain how physicians influence health care 
utilization is agency. Agency is a concept that has been used by scholars and researchers 
for decades as a means of exploring risk-sharing behaviors between individuals and 
groups. ―Specifically, agency theory is directed at the ubiquitous agency relationship, in 
which one party (the principal) delegates work to another (the agent), who performs that 
work‖ (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 58). For example, in referral for outpatient rehabilitation 
services, physicians and patients frequently have a relationship where the patient 
(principal) is delegating decision making to the physician (agent) (Folland, Goodman, & 
Stano, 2004a). Patients‘ knowledge about their conditions, the treatments needed to 
address their symptoms and impairments, and the types and locations of services 
available are generally superseded by the knowledge the physician possesses. As a result, 
the patients rely on their physicians for guidance pertaining to the types and quantities of 
care necessary to help them achieve optimal health outcomes. The physician is therefore 
contracted as the patients‘ agent, making recommendations on their behalf.  
     Agency theory highlights two problems that occur in principal (patient)/agent 
(physician) relationships. The first problem results from conflicting goals between the 
principal and agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). For example, a patient may seek care from a 
physician in order to attain a desired health outcome. Physicians motivated by self-
interest (e.g., income), may alter their referral or treatment of patients so as to maximize 
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their revenues rather than making these judgments based solely upon the patients‘ best 
interests. If the patients have limited information as to what courses and quantities of 
treatment are best or appropriate, they are unable to monitor the behaviors of their 
physicians. Agency theory assumes that information (i.e., knowledge about health 
condition, impairments, and possible treatment(s) is a commodity which can be 
purchased by the principals (patients), allowing them to make informed decisions about 
their care (Eisenhardt, 1989). The more information the principal has, the less likely it is 
that the agent will be able to freely manipulate the parameters of their treatments.   
     A second problem that arises from principal/agent relationships comes from risk 
sharing. Agency theory makes three assumptions about human beings: that they are 
averse to risk, they are motivated by their own self-interests, and that they are boundedly 
rational (Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency theory assumes that individuals involved in 
principal/agent relationships will work to avoid risk when possible, generating contracts 
or agreements that help to ensure agents behave appropriately on behalf of principals. 
According to this theory, if agents and principals are given appropriate information, they 
will rationally work to promote their own self-interests. Positivist research of conflicting 
goals between agents and principals identifies the sources of conflict and the regulatory 
mechanisms designed to limit the self-serving behaviors of the agents (Eisenhardt, 1989).      
Additional information on the topic of agency theory is provided in the Theoretical 
Framework section (Chapter III) of this dissertation.
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Supplier Induced Demand  
     If physicians are motivated by anything other than the patients‘ best interests, they 
may induce the demand for services by their recommendations, a phenomenon known as 
supplier induced demand (SID). ―SID suggests that health care providers have and use 
their superior knowledge to influence demand, taking advantage of the ‗information gap.‘ 
SID is possible through the physician‘s dual role as advisor to the patient and as the 
provider of services‖ (Folland, Goodman, & Stano, 2004b, p. 202). With SID, the 
physician, acting as agent on behalf of the patient, may encourage the patient to pursue 
services that may or may not yield additional benefit with regard to the patient‘s expected 
health outcomes (McGuire & Pauly, 1991). SID has not been demonstrated in previous 
research on the utilization of physical therapy services; however, utilization rates appear 
greater when physical therapy services are provided by physicians who have a financial 
interest in the services being rendered (Mitchell & Sass, 1995; Mitchell & Scott, 1992b, 
1992c; Swedlow, et al., 1992). While SID may be a factor in selective referral practices, 
it was not the focus of the present research. The goal of this research was not to 
determine the appropriateness of the physical therapy referrals made by physicians but 
rather the types and quantities of referrals made by physicians with ownership interest.  
     From an economic perspective, the success of the agent relationship is dependent upon 
patients‘ trust that the agent is working only for their betterment and is not motivated by 
other factors, such as financial gain. ―The problem for the principal is to develop a 
contract or relationship to ensure that the agent is acting in the principal‘s best interest‖ 
(Folland, et al., 2004a). Due to asymmetrical information and restrictions on access to 
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ancillary health care providers, such as physical therapists, patients must often rely upon 
physicians to make appropriate recommendations and referrals for these services. As 
professionals, the physicians, in turn, are expected to abide by ethical codes outlined by 
the American Medical Association and by legislation enacted at federal and state levels 
regarding the practice of self-referral. Improved patient access over the past two decades 
to medical information via public library resources, the news media, and the Internet 
could help to reduce the asymmetry of information between providers and the person(s) 
under their care, thereby helping to put in check some of the health care market‘s 
imperfections.  
     However, because information asymmetry exists between most patients and their 
physicians, patients may not be aware of the scope, quality, and types of health care 
resources available to them. In addition, they may not fully appreciate how physicians‘ 
investment interests can influence their care. The information asymmetry can only be 
reconciled by a physicians‘ full disclosure of information to the patient, pertaining not 
only to their care but to the physicians‘ interests, as well (Morreim, 1989). If physicians 
fail to disclose their investment interests, then their patients are unable to make fully 
informed decisions. This may affect both the quantity of services utilized by the patients 
and their choices of providers. For example, a physician may refer a patient directly to a 
particular clinic or provider instead of giving that patient a comprehensive list of 
providers from which they may independently choose. There are several reasons why a 
physician may choose to preferentially refer, such as familiarity with the clinicians 
providing the services, but it may also be to ensure that revenues from the patients‘ 
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treatments are retained by the physicians‘ practices. Even if they fully disclose their 
investment interests to their patients, however, the physicians may exert a social 
influence on the patients. Morreim explains how she anticipates that patients may 
respond to the physicians‘ disclosures of ownership interest: 
 Once the patient realizes that this disclosure constitutes a warning, not a  
 reassurance, his trust may be wounded. Yet it may be socially awkward  
 for him to act accordingly. If he wishes to remain in the care of this 
 physician, he may be  reluctant to insult the physician‘s integrity by 
 asking to be referred elsewhere or to harm his physician economically 
 by ―buying from competition‖; or he may fear that his refusal to 
 patronize the physician‘s facility may force the physician to raise his 
 professional fees (Morreim, 1990, pg. 394). 
Morreim‘s comments suggest that, even when financial arrangements are fully disclosed, 
a physician‘s ownership interest compromises his or her relationship with patients. For 
the fiduciary relationship between physicians and their patients to succeed, patients must 
rely upon physicians‘ integrity and willingness to disclose all pertinent information that 
may influence decisions about their care. Morreim argues that, ―To meet this challenge, 
physicians must reinvigorate their long-held obligation to professional altruism to 
promote patients‘ interests, even above their own‖ (Morreim, 1989, pp. 393-394).  
     The issue of agency and the potential for abuses has been acknowledged by physician 
groups, including the American Medical Association (AMA). In 1986, the AMA‘s 
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs first issued ―safeguards‖ to prevent abuses of self-
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referral. In 1989 they refined these safeguards. Finally, in 1992, the Council revisited this 
topic, noting persistent self-referral practices in the physician community (Council on 
Ethical and Judicial Affairs, 1992). The Council concluded that self-referral should only 
be made ―…if there is a demonstrated need in the community for the facility and 
alternative financing is not available‖ (Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, 1992, p. 
2368). The AMA Council agreed, however, that it would not enforce restrictions on self-
referral but rather leave that responsibility to state and federal government.  
     The behaviors of entrepreneurial physicians may have implications for both patients 
and for other providers who share the physicians‘ health care markets. If physicians are 
able to induce the demand for services, control the numbers and types of referrals 
generated, and exert an influence on where patients seek treatment, they have the 
capacity to eliminate their market competition. The economic consequences of 
entrepreneurial physicians‘ behaviors may, therefore, include a decrease in the quantities 
and types of services to which patients have access. Eventually, reduced access to 
essential health care services could influence patients‘ health outcomes.  
     Since physicians act as gatekeepers for referrals to physical therapy services, they are 
able to influence the numbers and types of patients their firms treat and those who are 
referred to other providers, such as hospital-based rehabilitation centers. In this manner, 
some physicians‘ monopolistically competitive behavior works to eliminate competitors 
who lack gatekeeper status from their market. Referral for profit activity subsequently 
results in market inefficiencies. Contractual arrangements between payers and particular 
facilities may help to reduce the impact of self-referral practice by funneling patients 
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toward certain providers, but the increased competition for and relative distribution of 
societal resources may eventually drive institutional providers such as the hospital-based 
centers out of the market.  
     The position of the American Hospital Association (AHA) is that physicians‘ abilities 
to choose the services they provide and the patients they serve are anti-competitive 
(AHA, 2005). In proceedings from its 2005 annual meeting, the AHA stated:  
Physician owners have at least three ways in which they can financially 
reward themselves by selectively referring or ―cherry picking‖ patients. 
First, they can simply avoid treating uninsured, Medicaid and other 
patients for whom reimbursement is low. Second, they can selectively 
refer patients to different facilities, sending well-insured patients to the 
facilities they own and poorly insured or uninsured patients elsewhere, 
often to the local full-service community hospital. And third, they can 
selectively refer healthier, lower cost, lower risk patients to facilities they 
own, leaving more severely ill patients to be treated by local full-service 
community hospitals (AHA, 2005, p. 2).     
It seems plausible that, if physicians practice selective referral and shuttle patients with 
poorer prognoses and reimbursement consistently to outside providers, without additional 
aid or subsidy, these providers will eventually be unable to achieve payment sufficient to 
cover their service costs. Subsequently, their patients may experience a negative impact 
on their access to care and on the quality and scope of services available in their 
communities. 
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Review of the Literature on Self-Referral 
   The following section provides a review of the empirical evidence pertaining to 
physician self-referral and ownership interest in ancillary services. The section starts with 
a discussion of the physician entrepreneur and highlights research pertaining to self-
referral practices.  
The Physician Entrepreneur 
     Economic principles suggest that entrepreneurial physicians can be expected to 
respond to financial incentives, working to either maximize their profits or achieve a 
target income (McGuire & Pauly, 1991). Previous research supporting this notion comes 
from Epstein, Begg, and McNeil (1986) who examined the influence of payment type on 
medical testing by internists. The study compared medical testing on patients with 
uncomplicated hypertension. This testing was ordered by 10 physicians in fee-for-service 
groups and 17 doctors in prepaid groups. The results suggested that the inherent financial 
incentives in fee-for-service insurance encouraged physicians to order more lucrative 
tests relative to capitated fee schedule insurance (Epstein, Begg, & McNeil, 1986). Fee-
for-service practitioners ordered 50% more electrocardiograms and 40% more chest x-
rays than prepaid doctors. Both of these tests were associated with higher profits 
(Epstein, et al., 1986). Still, we cannot determine from these data the physicians‘ 
motivations for ordering tests, and the generalizability of these results remained limited 
due to the study‘s sample size and the fact that possible differences between the groups of 
patients were not addressed.   
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     Hillman, Pauly, and Kerstein (1989) examined the influence of financial incentives on 
physicians‘ operating performance in health maintenance organizations (HMOs). The 
authors used stepwise regression to analyze data from a survey of HMOs conducted 
between 1987 and 1988. A total of 595 HMOs were surveyed, with 337 responses (a 
response rate of 57%). The researchers examined the relationship between financial 
incentives and rates of hospitalization, numbers of outpatient visits, and the break-even 
status of the HMO. In the regression models the researchers also controlled for market-
area characteristics that might have influenced the results. The authors found that 
capitation payments and salaries were related to lower hospitalization rates and outpatient 
visits. However, the authors warned that physicians‘ responses to incentives are complex 
and that it is likely that many of the factors influencing physicians‘ decision making were 
not included in the regression models (A. Hillman, Pauly, & Kerstein, 1989). The authors 
chose not to speculate on some of the other factors that may influence physicians‘ 
decision making. They also did not report on the issue of possible selection bias 
introduced by the 57% survey return rate.       
     Another study examined practice patterns of physicians who were provided bonuses 
based upon gross revenues generated for their practices (Hemenway, Killen, Cashman, 
Parks, & Bickness, 1990). Practice patterns of 15 physicians employed at different 
locations of a chain of ambulatory walk-in clinics were compared over two years (1984 to 
1986). The study included 20 centers that were each staffed by two physicians who 
worked approximately 40 hours per week. In 1985, a new compensation plan was 
implemented that provided bonuses to doctors based upon the gross revenues they each 
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generated for the clinics. The facilities under investigation had both laboratory and x-ray 
facilities located on the premises. The investigators examined data on each physician‘s 
gross charges, number of patient visits, number of hours worked, numbers of x-rays 
ordered, and the number of laboratory tests ordered each month. Inflation was accounted 
for by price indexing. Each physician acted as his or her own control for the study. Paired 
t-tests and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were utilized to determine the significance of the 
changes in the physicians‘ patterns of practice. Under the new payment system, the 
physicians who received bonuses increased laboratory testing by 23%, x-rays per visit by 
16%, and charges by 20%. Their total volumes of patients also increased. Results 
indicated that monetary incentives may induce changes in physicians‘ practice and 
referral patterns, leading to increased utilization of office visits and diagnostic tests. 
Changes in rates of diagnostic testing and charges per patient exceeded national averages. 
Hemenway and colleagues explained that generalizability of these findings is limited, due 
to the small, homogeneous sample; however, the evidence apparently points toward the 
influence that compensation can have on physicians‘ practice patterns (Hemenway, et al., 
1990).  
     These studies did not examine the degree to which physicians are aware of these 
factors and how they influence their practices. A 2006 pilot study investigated primary 
care physicians‘ perceptions about the influence of their patients‘ insurance types on their 
clinical decisions (Meyers et al., 2006). Twenty-five physicians from a Washington, D.C. 
practice-based research network participated in this study. The participants completed 
survey instruments after each patient encounter during two half-days of treatment 
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conducted in 2002. A total of 409 cards for 411 visits (99.5% response rate) were 
completed. The independent variable was the patient‘s insurance type, and the dependent 
variable was whether or not the physician perceived that the patient‘s insurance status 
had an effect on the physician‘s clinical decision making during that day‘s visit. The 
participants were also asked to rank on a visual analog scale to what degree they felt their 
patients‘ insurance influenced their clinical decisions. The authors reported that in 24% 
of patient encounters, the physicians perceived the influence of insurance on their clinical 
decisions and, as a result, altered their treatment strategies. The greatest degree of 
influence came in considering treatment for persons without insurance, with 41.6% of 
visits having been altered in some way by insurance concerns. Physicians were also more 
likely to speak to their patients about insurance when the insurance constraints limited 
their abilities to prescribe preferred methods of treatment (Meyers, et al., 2006). The 
generalizability of these findings is limited by a small sample size, the self-report 
structure of data collection, the lack of independent verification, and demographics of the 
patient population and physician group practice; however, it is a demonstration of the 
influence of insurance on the clinical decisions that physicians make on behalf of their 
patients. It is possible that insurance may have an even greater influence than what is 
reported here, because these results hinge on the physicians‘ awareness of these issues 
and willingness to report on them. The impact of the physicians‘ decisions on the 
patients‘ treatment or health outcomes was not reported.  
     Since entrepreneurial physicians theoretically will work to either maximize their 
profitability or to attain a target income, there is the potential for a conflict of interest 
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when they serve as both service provider and gatekeeper, a role known as dual agency. 
The conflict arises when physicians are motivated to generate referrals not just by their 
patients‘ well-being but also by the potential for enhancing their own incomes. Such a 
conflict has been known to alter the number and types of referrals that physicians 
generate to services in which they have a financial stake. The following section provides 
a summary of the evidence supporting the influence of physicians‘ ownership interest on 
utilization. 
Utilization 
     One of the arguments in favor of physician ownership of ancillary services pertains to 
efficiency. Proponents of physician investments suggest that ownership interests allow 
physicians to better control service utilization and, subsequently, health care costs. It 
appears that ownership interest does indeed influence service utilization, but the evidence 
demonstrates that physicians‘ ownership interest is associated with increased utilization 
of ancillary services and subsequent increases in the cost of care (Childs & Hunter, 1972; 
Epstein, et al., 1986; B. Hillman, et al., 1990; Mitchell & Sass, 1995; Mitchell & Scott, 
1992a, 1992b, 1992c; Scott & Mitchell, 1994; Swedlow, et al., 1992). For example, a 
1972 study by Childs and Hunter analyzed claims data from an elderly California 
population to examine patterns of use of diagnostic x-ray among non-radiologist 
physicians and physicians who refer to radiologists outside of their offices. The authors 
were interested in the influence of physician characteristics on the patterns of utilization. 
The study was conducted over a six month period beginning in September of 1965 using 
a sample of residents from Alameda County, California. Approximately 7,300 residents 
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met the study‘s inclusion criteria. Claims from the subjects‘ medical care (about 120,000, 
per the researchers) during this period were reviewed. In addition, the subjects‘ 
demographic data were examined, along with files recording their physicians‘ 
characteristics (e.g., medical specialty and years in practice). These data were merged 
into individual service files for each subject. The files were then sorted into two groups 
based upon whether or not their physicians provided direct x-ray services (Group 1) or 
referred to outside providers for these services (Group 2). The two groups were relatively 
homogeneous, based upon the demographic data (Childs & Hunter, 1972).  
     Four chest x-ray procedures were identified and studied, comprising 38% of the total 
x-ray procedures performed during the study period (Childs & Hunter, 1972). These 
included a complete series, postero-anterior and lateral views, single posterior-anterior 
views, and fluoroscopy. A total of 1,220 x-ray procedures were analyzed. Compared to 
physicians who referred to radiologists, non-radiologist physicians who owned or 
invested in in-office x-ray equipment were twice as likely to order these services for their 
patients, despite trends which suggested they had limited knowledge of best radiological 
practice (e.g., ordering less complex or inappropriate tests). One-fifth of all non-
radiologists were providing direct x-ray services, and utilization rates among Group 1 
physicians‘ patients were 65% higher than for the Group 2 physicians‘ patients 
(P<0.001). This difference held true across physician specialties and years of experience. 
Results suggested that younger physicians and specialists were also more likely to order 
these tests. The authors concluded that non-radiologists who have financial interest in 
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radiologic services are more likely to utilize these services than those who refer to 
radiologists (Childs & Hunter, 1972).  
     One drawback to this research was the fact that other variables that may influence 
physicians‘ behaviors were not included in the study, such as practice variation produced 
by individual training and clinicians‘ fears of litigation. The authors argued that patterns 
of x-ray utilization did not seem to vary by patient characteristics and that, statistically, 
physicians‘ utilization of these services was best explained by physicians‘ ownership 
interest (Childs & Hunter, 1972). Perhaps another statistical method, such as regression 
followed by analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), might have helped the authors to 
determine what percentage of the variance in utilization patterns was accounted for by the 
physicians‘ ownership interest.  
     In an unpublished government report from 1989, the Office of the Inspector General 
(OIG) analyzed laboratory and diagnostic testing services data from two health surveys of 
eight states (OIG, 1989). Results indicated that Medicare patients of physicians who have 
a financial interest in laboratory services were 45 % more likely to receive clinical lab 
services and that they were 34 % more likely to receive these services from facilities in 
which the physicians invested. Patients of physician investors in diagnostic imaging were 
13 % more likely to receive these services than the overall population (OIG, 1989; Scott 
& Mitchell, 1994).        
     Comparable conclusions were drawn in a 1990 study that examined the frequency and 
costs of imaging examinations provided in physician offices relative to those who 
referred patients to radiologists outside of their offices (B. Hillman, et al., 1990). The 
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authors purchased access to a database containing insurance claims data for 403,458 
employees and dependents of several large American corporations. The insurance 
coverage provided comprehensive outpatient imaging services without co-payments. 
Private insurance claims data from 65,517 outpatient procedures and 6,419 physicians 
were analyzed for this study. Four clinical presentations were selected for study based 
upon frequency of their management in outpatient clinics: acute upper respiratory 
symptoms, pregnancy, low back pain, and (in men) difficulty urinating. The 
corresponding imaging tests selected for study were chest radiography, obstetrical 
ultrasound, radiography of the lumbar spine, and excretory x-rays or ultrasonography. 
Claims data collected between January 1, 1986 and June 1, 1988 were included. Episodes 
were excluded if the only physician involved was a radiologist. Physicians were 
classified as self-referring, radiologist-referring, and physicians who did not utilize 
radiological services.  
     To estimate the frequency of imaging, the authors employed this physician 
categorization and upward- and downward-biased estimations of imaging frequency. The 
correct adjustment for the frequencies, however, remained uncertain because of the 
possible variation in utilization patterns not explained by ownership interest. Analyses 
focused on differences in proportions of patient care episodes involving imaging, the 
charges for each of these individual procedures, and the average imaging charges per 
episode of care. The results indicated that doctors who owned radiologic equipment were 
4.0 to 4.5 times more likely to order tests than radiologist-referring physicians (p<0.0001 
for all four procedures) and that the costs associated with some of these tests were 
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significantly greater for self-referring clinics (p<0.0001 for chest radiography, obstetrical 
ultrasonography, and lumbar spine radiography). The more frequent and costlier imaging 
procedures provided by self-referring physicians resulted in costs 4.4 to 7.5 times greater 
per episode of care (B. Hillman, et al., 1990).  
     Differences among specialties were also apparent with rates ranging from 3.0 to 17.1 
times higher, depending upon the specialty and patient‘s clinical presentation (p<0.01). 
The authors suggested that the growth in cost and frequency of testing may not have been 
tied to any additional health benefit for the patients (B. Hillman, et al., 1990). The 
strength of this study is derived not only from the numbers of patients and physicians 
included but also its emphasis on particular clinical situations and episodes of care, which 
allowed the investigators to focus on the influence of ownership. The potency of the 
authors‘ argument regarding the influence of physician ownership interest is increased, 
because results were uniformly sustained across patients‘ clinical presentations and 
physicians‘ specialties. However, the authors were not able to draw inferences about the 
physicians‘ motivation to increase utilization of these services. 
     In 1992, Hillman and colleagues assessed differences in physicians‘ utilization and 
charges for diagnostic imaging based upon whether or not the physicians were self-
referring (B. Hillman, Olson, Griffith, Sunshine, Joseph, Kennedy, Nelson, et al., 1992). 
As before, the authors developed episodes of care from a medical claims database for 
each of 10 common clinical presentations. The authors examined the frequency of 
imaging referrals, the mean cost of imaging per episode of care, and the charges 
associated with the self-referring or outside referring physicians. Confirming previous 
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results, the authors found that self-referring physicians generated 1.7 to 7.7 times more 
referrals for imaging studies (p<0.01 for all 10 clinical presentations) and that self-
referral was associated with increased utilization of imaging services by all physician 
specialty groups. Mean charges were 1.6 to 6.2 times greater for self-referring physicians. 
The researchers concluded that self-referring physicians who operate diagnostic imaging 
equipment in their offices perform these types of examinations more frequently and at a 
greater cost (B. Hillman, Olson, Griffith, Sunshine, Joseph, Kennedy, Nelson, et al., 
1992). Again, the authors were not able to draw inferences about the physicians‘ 
motivation to increase utilization of these services, nor were they able to conclude 
anything about whether or not these procedures were unnecessary for achieving optimal 
patient outcomes.  
     In a study of the costs and rates of use in the California Workers‘ Compensation 
System, a large database of workers‘ compensation claims from October 1990 to June 
1991 was examined to determine the frequency and cost of physical therapy, psychiatric 
evaluation, and magnetic resonance imaging in self-referring and outside-referring 
physician practices (Swedlow, et al., 1992). The study evaluated the cost per case, the 
frequency of physical therapy initiation, the cost and frequencies of psychiatric testing, 
and the medical appropriateness of ordered magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). Results 
indicated that physicians who self-referred were 2.3 times more likely to make referrals 
for physical therapy, and the mean cost per case was lower for this group. In their sample, 
91% of all physical therapy was performed by providers who were self-referring. The 
authors failed to speculate on the reasons why the costs per case were less. One 
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possibility is that the patients‘ severity of injuries may have played a role in these costs, 
though this factor was not accounted for in the study. In addition to the apparent 
differences in physical therapy service utilization, psychiatric services were 26.3 % 
costlier in the self-referring group ($3,222± 1,451 vs. $2,550± 742, P< 0.01). Finally, 
38% of MRI scans requested by self-referring physicians were deemed inappropriate. The 
authors concluded that, overall, self-referral leads to increased costs of medical care 
covered by workers‘ compensation in each of the services they studied (Swedlow, et al., 
1992).   
     These findings were corroborated by work conducted in 1989 under mandate from the 
Florida Legislature (Florida Chapter Law 89-354) on behalf of the Florida Health Care 
Cost Containment Board (Mitchell & Scott, 1991). For this study, surveys were 
developed to obtain financial, ownership, and utilization data from Florida health care 
providers regarding the fiscal year 1989 from 10 different types of health care facilities. 
Questionnaires were designed to obtain information on freestanding facilities to which 
physician owners could refer but in which they did not practice. Over 3,500 freestanding 
health care facilities were surveyed. Overall, the response rate was 82.4%, with a 
disproportionate number of non-responders being involved in joint venture practices. It is 
possible therefore, that selection bias may have influenced the study results.  
     For this study, joint ventures were defined as ―…any ownership or investment interest 
between referring physicians (or any health care professional who may make referrals) 
and freestanding facilities or businesses providing physical therapy services‖ (Mitchell & 
Scott, 1992c). From their results, the authors estimated that at least 40% of physicians 
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involved in patient care in Florida invest in joint venture health care facilities and refer 
patients to these facilities (Mitchell & Scott, 1991). In addition, none of the joint venture 
facilities were located in rural or medically underserved areas, suggesting that the 
potential benefit of geographic proximity to services and new technologies was not being 
realized in these areas.  
     The authors analyzed effects of joint venture status on access, costs, charges, and 
utilization patterns in acute care hospitals, nursing homes, ambulatory surgery centers, 
durable medical equipment providers, home health agencies, radiation therapy centers, 
clinical laboratories, diagnostic imaging, and physical therapy rehabilitation facilities. 
The authors tested the null hypothesis that there were no differences (or that differences 
were beneficial to consumers) in average values for joint venture and nonjoint venture 
facilities. The authors controlled for the type of service provided and geographic factors. 
Joint venture relationships had no apparent negative effects on access, costs, charges, and 
utilization for acute care hospitals and nursing homes. Some issues with surgical centers, 
durable medical equipment suppliers, home health agencies, and radiation therapy centers 
were found, but the analysis of the impact of physician ownership was not conclusive. 
The results did, however, indicate that ownership status had a negative effect on access, 
cost, charges, and utilization in clinical laboratory, diagnostic imaging, and physical 
therapy centers (Mitchell & Scott, 1991).       
     Mitchell and Sunshine (1992) used the Florida data to investigate the consequences of 
physicians‘ ownership of health care facilities that provide radiation therapy. The types of 
diagnoses treated at these facilities were not specified in their report. The authors looked 
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at the effects of ownership on access, use of services, costs, and quality. Data from 
Florida joint ventures were compared with data from non-joint venture facilities in 
Florida and with the rest of the United States, due to the disproportionate number of 
physician joint ventures represented in Florida. The results showed that no joint venture 
facilities were located in inner-city or rural locations, though 11% of free-standing or 
hospital-based facilities were located in these regions. Costs and frequency for radiation 
therapy in free-standing facilities were 40 to 60% higher in Florida, though clinicians 
spent 18% less time with each patient. On average, joint venture facilities charged 
$173.00 per treatment versus nonjoint facilities that charged $116.00 per treatment. The 
average revenue for joint venture facilities was over $5,000.00 per patient and for 
nonjoint ventures it was $4655.00. No further health benefit from the additional services 
was apparent. Mortality rates among the patients in Florida were comparable to the 
national average. The authors concluded that joint ventures do not add value to quality 
and access to care while increasing costs substantially (Mitchell & Sunshine, 1992). It is 
unclear whether the level of mortality is the only or best outcome measure for health 
outcomes for the patients seen at these centers, since the diagnostic categories of the 
patients served at these clinics were not provided for the study. 
     Mitchell and Scott (1992) also used the Florida survey data to examine the influence 
of physician ownership of physical therapy services on utilization, charges, profits, and 
service characteristics. A total of 313 eligible clinics were surveyed. There were 262 
respondents to the survey. The majority of non-respondents (32 of 51) were joint venture 
arrangements. Data from 19 centers were not analyzed, because they only provided 
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occupational therapy and speech therapy. Another 62 facilities were excluded for reasons 
including: lack of utilization/financial information, they operated less than three-fourths 
of the sample year, they rendered fewer than 1000 patient visits in the sample year, they 
treated only children, or they were owned by a not-for-profit. 
     The authors compared a sample of 43 joint venture PT only clinics, 75 nonjoint 
venture PT only clinics, 26 joint venture comprehensive rehabilitation facilities, and 37 
nonjoint venture comprehensive rehabilitation facilities. Physician practices providing 
physical therapy within their practices were not surveyed. Approximately 40 % of the 
rehabilitation/physical therapy facilities that completed the research questionnaire had an 
ownership relationship with physicians who served as referral sources. The rehabilitation 
facilities were classified into two groups: physical therapy services only and 
comprehensive rehabilitation facilities providing multiple disciplines. The ownership 
categories were: joint venture (with one or more physician owners) and nonjoint venture 
(no physician owners).  
     The authors first compared physician joint venture rehabilitation facilities with the 
comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation facilities (CORF) on several variables. These 
included the number of visits per patient, the average revenue per patient, the percent 
operating income, the percent markup for services, the profits per patient, the time a 
licensed therapist spent with the patient per visit, and the time both licensed and 
unlicensed medical workers spent with the patient per visit. The results indicated that on 
average the number of visits per patient were 39 to 45% higher (14.3 versus 10.3; 
p=0.0005), gross revenues were 30 to 40% higher ($1318.00 versus $937.00; p=0.05), 
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and mark-up was greater (69.0% versus 23.4%; p=0.006) in joint venture facilities. These 
facilities also tended to generate much of their revenue from patients with well-paying 
insurance. Joint venture comprehensive rehabilitation facilities generated significantly 
more revenues from Blue Cross and commercial insurers (44% versus 24.8%; p<0.05) 
and from managed care payers (8.4% versus 1.7%; p<0.05) than the nonjoint venture 
CORF‘s. Nonjoint venture CORF‘s generated more revenue from Medicare (40% versus 
20.5%; p<0.05) and self-pay patients (8.4% versus 1%; p<0.05). The study also found 
that PTs and PTAs employed in non-joint ventured facilities spent on average 
approximately 60% more time with patients than their joint ventured counterparts and 
that joint ventures had fewer licensed clinicians per patient on average (Mitchell & Scott, 
1992b).  
     For the PT only clinics, about 53% of patients treated at joint venture PT clinics were 
referred by physicians who had an investment interest in those facilities. Nonjoint venture 
PT clinics received significantly more of their revenues from Medicare patients than joint 
venture PT clinics (22.6% versus 15.5 %; p<0.05). The nonjoint venture PT clinics also 
generated more of their revenue from commercially insured patients as opposed to the 
joint ventured clinics (48% versus 37%; p<0.05). The joint ventured clinics generated a 
larger share of their revenues from workers compensation patients (nearly 31 %), and 
nonjoint ventured clinics generated 20 % from patients with workers compensation 
insurance (p<0.05) (Mitchell & Scott, 1991). The authors stated, ―For these three types of 
health care facilities, we found that joint venture facilities cream-skim patients with good 
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insurance and treat relatively few patients with limited ability to pay‖ (Mitchell & Scott, 
1992c, p. 38). 
     Joint venture PT only clinics provided an average of 7967 visits per year compared to 
the 5344 visits for nonjoint venture PT clinics (p=0.0005). The patients who received PT 
at the joint venture clinics also received more visits than patients who were treated at 
nonjoint ventured PT facilities (16 versus 11.2 per patient; p=0.0005). This increase in 
visits translated to an increase in revenue, where joint ventured facilities generated 
$839.00 per patient on average in comparison to the $640.00 generated by the nonjoint 
ventured PT clinics (p=0.001). Mitchell and Scott concluded that utilization rates and 
charges were significantly higher for joint venture practices relative to similar nonjoint 
venture counterparts (Mitchell & Scott, 1992c).  
     Although joint venture PT only facilities spent less on wages for licensed physical 
therapists (32.7 % versus 47.6 %; p=0.0005), their clinics saw far more patients per day 
(averaging 20 patients per day as opposed to 12 patients per day for nonjoint ventured 
clinics). Time per visit with a licensed physical therapist was less for joint ventures than 
nonjoint ventures (28.5 minutes versus 49.0 minutes; p=0.0005). The time per visit with 
other licensed medical workers was also less for joint ventures (37.4 minutes versus 60.1 
minutes; p=0.0005). The authors stated, ―These findings suggest that nonlicensed 
workers are substituted for licensed workers in the provision of physical therapy services 
in joint venture facilities‖ (Mitchell & Scott, 1991, p. IX-5).  
     For both the comprehensive rehabilitation facilities and the PT only clinics, Mitchell 
and Scott concluded that utilization, charges per patient, and profits are greater in joint 
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ventured physical therapy arrangements while the amount of time spent with each patient 
is less (Mitchell & Scott, 1992b). The authors took steps to ensure that their results were 
valid by examining competing explanations for their findings. They were able to rule out 
the influence of regional demographics by examining Medicare diagnosis related group 
discharges and comparing them to national averages. Although18% of the Florida 
population was elderly at the time of this study (as opposed to the 12.5% national 
average), this demographic did not appear to influence the demand for physical therapy 
services. Discharges per 1000 beneficiaries were actually lower in their sample. The 
authors also considered the influence of occupational injury rates and discovered that 
Florida‘s rates were also lower than national averages, suggesting that these were not 
sufficient explanations for the apparent differences between joint ventured and nonjoint 
venture facilities (Mitchell & Scott, 1992b). 
     Scott and Mitchell (1994) reexamined the Florida data to investigate how ownership 
of clinical laboratories affected physicians‘ utilization of these services, charges, and 
facility profitability. For comparison, laboratories were grouped into three categories:  
general purpose labs, specialty service labs owned by pathologists, and all other specialty 
service labs. Joint venture and non-joint venture labs were compared based upon 
utilization, charges, and profitability. Data from 52 general purpose laboratories were 
analyzed. The authors reported that utilization rates were significantly higher for 
laboratories with referring physician owners (3.2 procedures in joint venture laboratories 
as compared to 2.1 in non-joint venture laboratories). Similarly, gross revenue per patient 
and average net revenue per patient were higher (26%) in the joint venture settings, with 
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an average mark-up of 39.8% in joint venture labs relative to 16.6% in non-joint ventures 
(Scott & Mitchell, 1994). 
     It is important to note that these studies were conducted only in Florida and may not 
be generalizable to other health care markets; however, the large sample size bolsters the 
researchers‘ arguments. Also, because the researchers were relying on clinicians self-
reporting, they were unable to ensure the integrity of the data they were provided. 
Finally, a follow-up with joint ventured practices may have helped to reduce some of the 
potential issues of selection bias that may have influenced the results. Since these data 
were also used for additional studies, the same limitations regarding generalizability, 
selection bias, and data integrity applied to each.   
     The studies conducted by Mitchell and colleagues provide insight into the growing 
issues of physician ownership and self-referral. However, as mentioned previously, there 
are concerns regarding selection bias that may have influenced the authors‘ findings, as 
well as an inability of the authors to confirm the integrity of the data they were provided. 
In addition, patient characteristics not accounted for in the research may have influenced 
the physicians‘ decision making. It is therefore difficult to ascertain the physicians‘ 
motivators. It would be beneficial to replicate the work of Mitchell and her colleagues 
with contemporary providers to investigate if, under the latest government and payer 
policies, physicians respond any differently to financial incentives than their 
predecessors.  
     In more recent work, Mitchell published a report examining the prevalence of 
physican self-referral for diagnostic imaging in 2004 (Mitchell, 2007). She and her 
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colleagues conducted this study using billing records from a large insurance carrier in 
California which serves upwards of 5.8 million people. For this study, the researchers 
correlated physician-specific information with their billing for radiological services. The 
researchers also used phone follow-up surveys to ascertain physicians‘ ownership interest 
in these services. The research showed that approximately 33% of physicians who billed 
for radiological services were non-radiologists who were small to medium-sized 
physician groups and who were involved in self-referral. The majority of the self-
referring physicians who billed for magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) (61%) and 
computed tomography (CT) scans (64%) had lease, time-share, or pay-per-click 
arrangements rather than having the diagnostic equipment within their practices. Seventy 
percent of self-referring physicians utilizing positron emission tomography (PET) scans 
had these machines on site. This study documented the prevalence of physician 
ownership arrangements despite public policy efforts to curb self-referral practices. 
Unfortunately, the study is limited to one state, and the data set primarily included 
patients too young to be protected by the federal self-referral laws established for 
Medicare beneficiaries (Mitchell, 2007).  
     Another example of tailored referral behavior in today‘s health care markets comes 
from the study of specialty hospitals. Specialty hospitals are physician-owned hospitals 
that provide care for patients with specific diagnoses. These types of facilities are not 
new to the health care landscape, but rapid growth in the number of these facilities in 
recent years has raised questions among health care providers and policymakers. The 
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most recent growth in the number of specialty hospitals has included facilities that focus 
on cardiac care, orthopaedics, and surgery (MedPAC, 2005). 
     Advocates of specialty hospitals argue that these facilities provide improved 
satisfaction for their patients and physicians, improved patient outcomes, improved 
efficiency of care delivery, and increased incentive for competing hospitals to enhance 
their own quality of care in response to the specialty hospitals‘ competition (MedPAC, 
2005). Detractors of these facilities suggest that they selectively self-refer the most 
profitable patients and fail to share the burden of caring for the communities‘ poor or 
uninsured patients (MedPAC, 2005). 
     Researchers working on behalf of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
have begun to provide evidence on the performance and impact of specialty hospitals. In 
2003, as a part of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act 
(MMA), the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission received a mandate from the 
Congress to compare specialty hospitals‘ performance to hospitals that share the same or 
similar health care markets. Thus far, in response to this mandate, MedPAC has 
examined Medicare and Medicaid claims data from 2002 and 2004. The researchers have 
concluded that specialty hospitals exhibit higher costs per day (up to 20% higher) with 
shorter lengths of stay, that they tend to treat patients who have fewer co-morbidities and 
better reimbursement, and that they tend to treat significantly fewer patients with 
Medicaid insurance (up to four times less likely) than community hospitals that share 
their markets (MedPAC, 2005, 2006). Findings regarding the impact of specialty 
hospitals on the Medicare margins of community hospitals have shown that, while 
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specialty hospitals do appear to be selectively referring patients, the changes in hospitals‘ 
margins have been absorbed by their cost-shifting and expansion into more lucrative 
service lines, including rehabilitation (MedPAC, 2006). The MedPAC researchers 
suggested that the negative impact on community hospitals is likely to increase as the 
numbers of specialty hospitals multiply and existing facilities expand their own service 
lines (MedPAC, 2006). One of the major concerns of patients, policymakers, and 
providers is how these changes in the market may influence communities‘ access to care.  
Selective Referral 
     A report generated in 2002 for the CMS investigating the utilization of outpatient 
therapy services provides some evidence of the phenomenon of selective referral and its 
impact on institutional facilities (Olshin, et al., 2002). An institution may be operationally 
defined as an established organization or foundation dedicated to one cause. In the case 
of hospitals, their institutional objective is to provide health care to persons in their 
communities. In their report, Olshin and colleagues concluded that overall, ―Outpatient 
therapy services are shifting toward non-institutional provider settings‖ (Olshin, et al., 
2002, Executive Summary, p. 13). Though their study demonstrated a global shift toward 
non-institutional providers (e.g., private practices, physician offices, and joint ventures), 
certain special populations continued to be consistently referred to hospital-based centers 
and remained dependent upon these systems for their care. These included women, 
minorities, and the elderly, all persons for whom care tended to be more involved and 
costly. The authors also highlighted the issue that fee schedules markedly affect 
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payments to institutions, which in turn affects the demographic groups that rely upon 
these institutions for their care (Olshin, et al., 2002).  
     In 2006, Ciolek and Hwang‘s report to CMS reinforced these findings. Their study 
found that, between January 2003 and June 2005, hospitals‘ share of outpatient 
rehabilitation services had diminished beyond what had been reported previously. For 
example, the number of hospital-based outpatient rehabilitation facilities decreased 4.9% 
from 5,601 in 2000 to 5,326 in 2004, while physical therapy private practitioners 
increased 190.5% (from 11,602 to 33,704), and non- physician providers increased 51.7% 
(from 588 to 892) (Ciolek & Hwang, 2006). The data from this report reflect the shift of 
outpatient rehabilitation patients away from hospital-based providers to private practices 
owned by physical therapists, physicians, and/or non-physician providers. Interestingly, 
between 2000 and 2004, the number of physician providers of physical therapy services 
decreased from 34,803 to 32,205 (-7.5%) (Ciolek & Hwang, 2006).  
     It seems unlikely that physicians who are motivated by the desire for increased 
autonomy and financial gain would abandon ownership of physical therapy services, 
leading to an overall decrease of the physician providers of these services. A competing 
explanation for these CMS statistics may be a change in their data collection process. 
Beginning in 2003, CMS began to issue physical therapy private provider (PTPP) 
numbers to therapists employed by or under contract with health care providers who 
billed Carriers insurance. Prior to this, therapists who were employed by or contracted 
with physicians and non-physician providers had used the physicians‘ identifier for 
billing purposes. Subsequent to the CMS changes, PT providers employed by physicians 
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were now represented as private providers, though these persons may not have held any 
ownership in the PT practices (Ciolek & Hwang, 2006). This information sheds new 
light, then, on the dramatic increase in the number of private physical therapy 
practitioners (PTPP) from 2000 to 2004. These numbers may be a reflection of true PT 
private practice growth and/or the growth of POPTS and joint ventures. The latter 
explanation would be more consistent with the trends of escalating PT service provision 
by non-physician providers as well (e.g., physician assistants, nurse practitioners, and 
clinical nurse specialists). These providers are increasingly sharing the workload of 
physicians, treating patients and generating revenue at a lower cost to the physician 
practices while increasing the volume of patients seen. Since these clinicians practice 
under the supervision of a physician, the fees they generate lead to increased income for 
their practices and the providers who share ownership interest.   
     In a 2006 report to the Congress, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 
(MedPAC) highlighted the selective referral practices of physicians in specialty hospitals. 
According to MedPAC reports, the physicians who practiced in these facilities tended to 
treat patients who had fewer co-morbidities and who had better insurance (MedPAC, 
2006). While representatives from competing hospitals contended that favorable selection 
of patients was being motivated by financial concerns, specialty hospital physicians 
expressed that they were practicing ―responsible medicine‖ by referring complex patients 
to the community hospitals where consulting specialists are more readily available 
(MedPAC, 2006). In either case, the end result appeared to be the relegation of patients 
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who required more costly care and had poorer funding sources to the community 
hospitals.     
Access and Quality 
     Proponents of POPTS and joint venture practices suggest that physician-ownership 
helps to facilitate care in underserved areas by allowing doctors to provide a full-
spectrum of services (Mitchell & Sass, 1995; Mitchell & Scott, 1991, 1992a, 1992b, 
1992c; Mitchell & Sunshine, 1992). Though the opportunity to provide these services in 
rural areas exists, the distribution of physicians remains most heavily concentrated in 
urban and suburban environments, excluding inner city facilities (Ahern & Scott, 1994). 
This suggests that the incentives current policies provide for joint ventured physicians to 
serve typically underserved populations are not effective. Using data from the Florida 
Health Care Cost Containment Board survey, Ahern and Scott found that joint ventured 
physicians were more likely to not treat in underserved areas or to see patients with 
Medicaid reimbursement (Ahern & Scott, 1994). Their findings suggested that physicians 
were selecting the populations they serve and that typically underserved persons were 
consistently deselected. Questions regarding the referral patterns of physicians who own 
ancillary services are also raised by findings from the 2002 CMS study on outpatient 
therapy utilization (Olshin, et al., 2002). As stated previously, the results of this study 
suggested that more patients with Medicare reimbursement are referred to hospitals for 
their care than to POPTS or joint venture practices.        
    In addition to issues of access to care, concerns regarding the utilization patterns and 
quality of care provided by physician owned and joint venture practices have also been 
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raised- specifically in POPTS (Mitchell & Scott, 1992c). A 1994 study conducted by the 
Office of the Inspector General (OIG) on behalf of the United States Department of 
Health and Human Services (U.S.D.H.H.S.) examined the nature and extent of outpatient 
physical therapy services provided to Medicare beneficiaries in physicians‘ offices 
relative to those provided in other outpatient settings (OIG, 1994). A stratified random 
sample of 300 beneficiary cases was selected for study, comprised of 100 cases from 
independently practicing physical therapists‘ offices and 200 cases from physicians‘ 
offices. Results of the study indicated that four out of five cases reimbursed as physical 
therapy in physicians‘ offices did not represent true physical therapy services, because 
they tended not to be restorative or complex and not to have treatment plans, goals, or 
objective evaluations (OIG, 1994). In contrast, independently practicing physical therapy 
clinics routinely had plans of care, goals, objective evaluations, and restorative 
interventions. The OIG recommended that the CMS conduct focused medical reviews, 
increase physician education activities, and translate guidelines for physical therapy 
across all practice settings (OIG, 1994). 
In 2002, the Office of the Inspector General revisited the topic, initiating work with 
CMS to determine if physical therapy services provided in physicians‘ offices were 
meeting program requirements. The researchers reviewed a random sample of claims for 
physical therapy services submitted by physicians‘ offices from January 1 to June 30, 
2002, 2003, and 2004. The researchers requested complete medical records from each of 
the physicians for each of the sample claims submitted during this time period. Four 
requests for records were made, and 54 (79%) of the physician offices responded. The 
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researchers contracted licensed physical therapists to conduct a more comprehensive 
review of the physical therapy services that were billed based upon the CMS coverage 
requirements and guidelines. When the requested medical records were not submitted, the 
individual cases were referred to the appropriate Medicare carrier for resolution under 42 
CFR § 424.5(a)(6) (Wright, 2006). 
The researchers analyzed Medicare Part B physical therapy claims and examined the 
total allowed amounts of physicians‘ physical therapy, physical therapy per physician and 
beneficiary, geographic dispersion of physical therapy services billed to Medicare, and 
relationships between the physicians. They also conducted personal interviews with a 
sample of Medicare Part B carriers who had previously conducted their own reviews of 
physicians‘ physical therapy claims (Wright, 2006).   
According to the OIG findings, physical therapy billed directly by physicians‘ offices 
during 2002 to 2004 was $158 million of the total $528 million spent on physical therapy 
by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. In the random sample of 70 physical 
therapy line items billed by physicians in the first six months of 2002, Wright and 
colleagues found that 91% of the physical therapy items billed by physicians did not meet 
program requirements. In fact, 26% of these services were deemed by the reviewers to be 
medically unnecessary, and 34% were undocumented. Plans of care were incomplete or 
absent in 57% of the cases examined, and, because of incomplete plans of care, the 
reviewers had difficulty or were unable to review the quality of the therapy services 
provided. Most of the medical records failed to indicate the skill level of the person or 
persons who rendered the therapy services. Only thirty-three percent of cases provided 
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any documentation regarding who provided the services. Overall, the researchers 
estimated that Medicare had made $136 million in improper payments in the first six 
months of 2002 alone (Wright, 2006). Analysis of data from 2002 to 2004 showed 
―…aberrances in physicians‘ billing patterns and unusually high volumes of 
claims‖(Wright, 2006, p. 1). Criteria for review, including medical necessity, plans of 
care, and other documentation, were applied in a standardized manner. The authors did 
not report on the possibility of self-selection bias for respondents and non-respondents; 
however, their review of the claims data was consistent with the processes conducted by 
Medicare carriers.  
     Growth in the number and diversity of physician owned facilities and joint ventures 
provides evidence that physicians respond to market incentives, annexing health care 
services and engaging in selective referral to recapture lost revenue (Graham, 2003; 
McGuire & Pauly, 1991; Miller, 2004; Mitchell, 2007; Nguyen, 1994). These behaviors 
may result in the long-term erosion of the financial security of the hospital-based 
providers that rely in part on referrals from these physician entrepreneurs. If physicians 
are consistently sending patients with poorer or no reimbursement to these institutions, 
the institutions will likely be unable to continue to serve their communities‘ rehabilitation 
needs. As a result, the quality of the services being provided may suffer unless public 
policy changes or significant subsidization is provided.  
Background on Public Policy Pertaining to Self-Referral 
     This section provides a discussion of the federal and state policy responses to 
physician self-referral. In addition, the contribution of payment policies for hospitals and 
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physicians is reviewed. As stated previously, the government‘s initial cost-containment 
efforts and private insurers‘ capitated fees failed to achieve the desired result of cost 
containment. Instead, physicians‘ responses to the payment changes included increased 
service utilization, as was predicted by McGuire and Pauly‘s model of physician behavior 
(1991). Subsequently, policymakers looked to other sources of health care system 
inefficiencies to promote cost savings. One suspected source of inefficiency was the 
practice of self-referral, which was already being investigated as a cause of over 
utilization and inefficient care delivery. New federal and state legislation was prompted 
by reports from the Office of Inspector General, other agencies, and independent 
researchers that suggested self-referral may encourage excessive use of designated health 
services, leading to waste of public resources (Ahern & Scott, 1992; Childs & Hunter, 
1972; GAO, 1994; B. Hillman, et al., 1990; B. Hillman, Olson, Griffith, Sunshine, 
Joseph, Kennedy, Helson, et al., 1992; Mitchell & Sass, 1995; Mitchell & Scott, 1992b, 
1992c; Mitchell & Sunshine, 1992; Office of Inspector General, 1994; OIG, 1989; 
Olshin, et al., 2002; Scott & Mitchell, 1994).  
     In response to the findings of this research, and in an attempt to curtail the practice of 
physician self-referral, Congress passed the Ethics in Patient Referral Act, a bill 
sponsored by Congressman Pete Stark that was subsequently known as the Stark Law 
("Omnibus Reconciliation Act," 1989). This law prohibited physicians from referring 
patients with Medicare reimbursement to clinical laboratory services in which they have a 
financial arrangement. Section 1877 of this law was amended in 1990 to clarify reporting 
procedures and definitions, as well as to provide additional exceptions to the rules. 
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Members of the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), which has since been 
renamed the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), commented that Stark 
laws merely provided a threshold for acceptable financial relationships between 
physicians and the entities to which they make referrals. Although the original Stark Law 
addressed issues of abuse of laboratory services, it failed to reduce the financial burden 
and issues of over-utilization associated with other ancillary services (Memel & 
Grosvenor, 2003).   
     As a consequence of these policy shortfalls, the Stark Law was amended in 1993 with 
the passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act and its Comprehensive Physician 
Ownership and Referral Act, known as Stark II ("Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act," 
1993). This new amendment expanded the list of designated health services, in addition 
to laboratory services, where physician self-referral would be prohibited and 
uncompensated by federal programs to include the following: a) physical therapy; b) 
occupational therapy; c) durable medical equipment and supplies; d) prosthetics, 
orthotics, and prosthetic devices; e) radiology; f) home health services and supplies; g) 
parenteral and enteral nutrients, equipment, and supplies; h) outpatient prescription drugs; 
and i) inpatient and outpatient hospital services ("Criminal penalties for acts involving 
Federal health care programs," 1993). This legislation also extended the restrictions on 
self-referral to include the Medicaid program, but it did not extend to commercial payers. 
Legal exceptions to these laws were made in the cases of physicians practicing in rural 
areas and for those practices that provided designated health services in physicians‘ 
offices incident to the physicians‘ seeing the patient for a procedure or office visit. 
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Additional statutory amendments were made to the laws in 1994, finalizing the list of ten 
designated health services and altering reporting requirements and compliance dates. 
After final regulations were promulgated by HCFA and public comments were received, 
the first phase of the final rule was published in the Federal Register on January 4, 2001, 
including the aforementioned changes to the original legislation. The new laws were 
gradually phased in, in order to allow affected financial arrangements between physicians 
and their partners to be restructured. The Stark II laws have been in effect since 1995, 
with Phase I being implemented in 2002 and Phase II in 2004.  
     The self-referral law, as explicated by the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services in 2001, ―…prohibits physicians from referring Medicare patients for certain 
health services to entities with which the physicians or their immediate family members 
have a financial relationship‖ (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2001). 
The Stark laws restrict self-referral for profit activity, though physicians are still able to 
self-refer for targeted services under certain conditions. In order to legally self-refer, the 
physicians‘ compensation must be the same or less than it would be if the services were 
provided by a facility or group that did not have a financial relationship with the 
physician (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2001). In other words, 
physicians are allowed to self-refer for targeted services, as long as the cost to society is 
not greater than it would be if they referred to outside providers. The government‘s 
means of tracking this information is through database research, where information on 
average costs, numbers and types of treatments, and outcomes is utilized to help 
determine remuneration for services. Though the CMS database captures information on 
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the numbers and types of codes billed and paid for services rendered under federal 
programs, it fails to capture data on other potential costs of these policies, including 
reduced access to services for special populations.   
     In addition to providing restrictions on self-referral practices, legislation has been 
designed to affirm the federal government‘s expectations that health care services will be 
provided in an efficient manner, based upon the best available evidence ("Social Security 
Act," 1993). Efficiency, in this instance, may be better understood as economies of scale. 
Economists suggest that economies of scale are achieved in health care delivery when 
costs are minimized and health benefits are maximized (Folland, Goodman, & Stano, 
2004c). If physicians provide services that are costly, or that do not produce additional 
health benefits for their patients, they sacrifice economies of scale. Since health care 
costs are increased when physicians induce the need for services, and, because these 
services may not produce additional health benefits for the patients, reduced economies 
of scale result from physicians‘ inducement of demand for health care services. 
Inducement is therefore deleterious to efficiency.  
     The impact of the Stark legislation on health care costs and self-referral practices has 
not yet been ascertained. It is important to note that the Stark laws do not apply to 
physicians who opt out of the Medicare and Medicaid programs. These physicians are not 
bound by Section 1877 of the Act and may therefore refer to entities in which they have a 
financial relationship, unless state law prohibits such practice. As a result, the liability 
statutes outlined in Stark I and II have developed in conjunction with federal and state-
level intent-based anti-kickback, self-referral, patient brokering, and fee-splitting 
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legislation.  The federal laws, including the criminal and civil statutes, are outlined in 
Appendix C.  
     Federal anti-kickback laws prohibit ―…any knowing and willful solicitation or receipt 
of remuneration in return for the referral or furnishing of any item or service for which 
payment may be made under a federal health care program, unless a ‗safe harbor‘ 
applies‖ ("Criminal penalties for acts involving Federal health care programs," 1993, 
Public Law 1320a-7b, Section 1128B). State laws also address the issue of physician 
kickbacks. Unlike the federal self-referral and anti-kickback laws, which apply only to 
patients with Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement, state laws apply to all patient 
populations, regardless of their payer source. However, because they are intent-based, 
these anti-kickback laws are difficult to enforce, and burden of proof lies with the 
government at what is conceivably great expense (Prom et al., 2002). This is because 
enforcement of states‘ intent-based legislation requires evidence that those persons or 
firms found in violation of the laws knowingly and willfully intended to disobey the laws 
[42 USC § 1320a – 7b(b)(2)]. In contrast, the Stark laws are more readily enforceable, 
with the consequences of lawbreaking manifest in, among other punishments, denial of 
payment for services ("Civil monetary penalties," 1993). 
Legal Exceptions  
     The language of the Stark laws as written provides limited protection from some of 
the potential negative consequences of self-referral practices. Amendments to this 
legislation have resulted in several loopholes that are being exploited. For example, an 
exception to the rules promulgated by HCFA ―…generally permits physicians to refer to 
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entities with which they have a compensation relationship, as long as compensation paid 
to the physician is no more than would be paid to someone who provided the same 
services but was not in a position to generate business for the entity‖ (U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2001, p. 1). Specific to rehabilitation, physicians and 
physical therapists may share financial interests in a practice if the relationship is of fair 
market value and is independent of the number of referrals generated by the physician 
investor ("Ethics in Patient Referral," 1993). In these joint ventures or physician-owned 
practices, compensation arrangements must be set in writing, signed by both parties, and 
must not violate state anti-kickback statutes. In-office ancillary services (e.g., physical 
therapy services) may be provided in physicians‘ offices with the following three 
qualifications:  a) direct supervision, as outlined by applicable Medicare and Medicaid 
payment coverage rules; b) building requirements, where the physician or group must 
furnish services unrelated to the designated health service in the same building; and c) 
billing requirements, where billing codes for services are submitted under the physician‘s 
license number ("Ethics in Patient Referral," 1993). This exception provides physician 
investors with the opportunity to invest in ancillary services if the care they provide costs 
essentially the same as it would at another provider. However, this exception fails to 
account for the potentially increased societal costs associated with physicians‘ selectively 
referring patients who are more medically complex or who have poorer or no 
reimbursement to institutional providers.  
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Safe Harbors 
     Other exceptions to the Stark and anti-kickback legislation pertain to provision of 
designated health services in rural or medically underserved areas. In order to encourage 
development of physician practices in rural and underserved environments, and to foster 
comprehensive care in these communities, exception is given for self-referral to joint 
owned designated health services by physicians in these regions ("Ethics in Patient 
Referral," 1993). Rural practices and practices in underserved areas are excluded from 
the anti-kickback legislation, falling instead under the provisions of the federal 
legislation‘s safe harbors.  
     Including the rural exception, there are currently 22 designated safe harbors, which 
may be described as certain payment and business practice schemes that exist in 
exception to the anti-kickback laws.  The list of safe harbors was published in the Federal 
Register in 1999. For the purposes of this research, it is important to note that physicians‘ 
investments in small health care joint ventures, including physical therapy services, are 
considered exceptions under these safe harbors. Though physical therapy is only one of 
ten designated health services included in the Stark legislation, it is the focus of this 
dissertation and is therefore the service highlighted throughout the remainder of this 
paper. In addition to joint venture investments, the safe harbor exceptions also provide 
for physical therapists and physicians to have contractual space and equipment rental 
arrangements that are based on fair market value, set out in writing and signed, that cover 
all the premises and equipment rented by the physical therapist and the intervals for its 
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use, that cover the terms of the rental agreement, and that provide for reasonable 
aggregate rental charges and spaces (Table 1) ("Ethics in Patient Referral," 1993). 
Table 1. Federally designated safe harbors. 
Safe Harbors 
a) Investments in large publicly held health care companies 
b) Investments in small health care joint ventures 
c) Space rental 
d) Equipment rental 
e) Personal services and management contracts 
f) Sales of retiring physicians‘ practices to other physicians 
g) Referral services 
h) Warranties 
i) Discounts 
j) Employee compensation 
k) Group purchasing organizations 
l) Waivers of Medicare Part A inpatient cost-sharing amounts 
m) Investments in underserved areas 
n) Practitioner recruitment in underserved areas 
o) Obstetrical malpractice insurance subsidies for underserved areas 
p) Sales of practices to hospitals in underserved areas 
q) Investments in ambulatory surgical centers 
r) Investments in group practices 
s) Referral arrangements for specialty services 
t) Cooperative hospital service organizations 
u) Shared risk arrangements 
 
     Current health care legislation governing self-referral affords distinct advantages to 
physicians who invest in POPTS, because, as mentioned previously, these policies only 
partially limit physicians‘ abilities to selectively self-refer patients. In the current medical 
model, physicians tend to control the referrals made to physical therapy services. Though 
some control over referrals practices is exerted by individual states and federal law, if an 
entrepreneurial physician investor wishes to maximize his or her profitability, he or she 
may relegate the costliest or least lucrative patient cases to competing providers of 
ancillary services, such as hospital-based centers, while retaining the most lucrative 
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patient cases for their own practices or facilities. Policy, as it is written, does not prevent 
physicians from discriminately referring. In fact, it may be indirectly encouraging these 
practices.      
State Legislative Efforts and Self-referral 
     The Stark laws only apply to federally funded programs. In addition, this legislation 
does not address the issue of physicians‘ selective referral, nor is there an established 
means of identifying this practice. Subsequently, individual states have developed 
legislation designed to protect the public‘s interest, helping to preserve health care 
resources under all payment schemes, be they public or private.  
     Though physicians are the focus of federal legislation governing self-referral, the 
practitioners to whom they refer must also be considered in policy development. In the 
case of physical therapists (PT), several states have developed practice acts that govern 
the relationship PTs may have with their referral sources. For example, in Delaware, the 
Physical Therapy Practice Act prohibits physical therapists from dividing, transferring, 
assigning, rebating, or refunding fees received for professional services with any person 
who refers a patient or with relatives or business associates of the referring person 
("Physical Therapy Practice Act," 2002). The therapist also cannot receive a payment or 
compensation that has monetary value from the referring provider. The rules suggest that 
a physical therapist engaged in these acts may have their license suspended or revoked 
("Physical Therapy Practice Act," 2002). Similar physical therapy legislation has been 
enacted in Arizona (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32-2044), Arkansas (Ark. Code Ann. § 17-
93-308), Florida (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 486.125), Louisiana (La. Rev. Ann. § 37:2413), South 
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Carolina (S.C. Code Ann. § 40-45-10), Tennessee (Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-13-312), and 
Wyoming (Wyo. Stat. § 33-25-11). Since the proposed research will utilize data from the 
Florida region, the specifics of Florida law governing physicians‘ self-referral practices 
will be highlighted in this review.  
Florida Law 
     To protect patients and payers beyond the scope of existing federal law, Florida 
lawmakers have enacted legislation governing physicians‘ self-referral practices, with 
particular focus on financial arrangements and kickbacks. This legislation takes many 
forms and comes in response to studies demonstrating a relationship between physicians‘ 
ownership interest, service utilization rates, and health care costs (Mitchell & Sass, 1995; 
Mitchell & Scott, 1991, 1992b, 1992c; Mitchell & Sunshine, 1992; Scott & Mitchell, 
1994; Swedlow, et al., 1992). The Patient Self-Referral Act (Fla. Stat §456.053) is 
essentially analogous to the Stark legislation and restricts self-referral to each of the ten 
designated health services. Florida‘s Anti-Kickback statutes [Fla. Stat §409.920(2)], 
Patient Brokering Act (Fla. Stat §817.505), and Fee-Splitting laws (Fla. Stat §458.331) 
are roughly equivalent to the Federal Fraud and Abuse laws ("Civil monetary penalties," 
1993). The Florida laws apply to physicians‘ conduct regardless of their patients‘ payer 
sources. Details of the Florida Statutes are included in Appendix D to facilitate 
comparison with federal laws. 
     In a report by the ad hoc Legislation Committee of the Florida Bar Association (2002), 
members critiqued the Florida laws to determine if they address the issue of patient self-
referral and if they are superfluous to preexisting federal legislation. According to the 
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committee, while the federal and state laws are roughly analogous, they ―…are in 
numerous instances inconsistent‖ (Prom, et al., 2002, Summary of Findings, p. 3). The 
committee found that the Florida Anti-Kickback Law (Fla. Stat §456.054) was overbroad, 
failing to include the safe harbors that were outlined in federal laws [42 USC s. 1320a-
7b(b)]. The Patient Brokering Act (Fla. Stat §817.505) was found to be duplicative of the 
federal laws with regards to health care items or services that are federally funded. Both 
the federal and state laws apply to ownership interest in facilities to which physicians 
refer their patients; however, Florida law does not apply to arrangements outside of 
investment interests (i.e., employment or independent contractor arrangements). The 
scope of services addressed by each of the laws is also different. The federal act applies 
only to designated health services reimbursed under federal programs, while under the 
Florida laws, all health care services are subject to its provisions, regardless of the 
patients‘ payer source. The ad hoc committee concluded that the fee-splitting prohibitions 
(Fla. Stat §458.331) fail to operationally define ―fee-splitting‖, leaving too much room 
for interpretation by the Florida Board of Medicine (Prom, et al., 2002). The committee 
made suggestions for the revision of the existing Florida legislation. These revisions have 
not yet been fully incorporated into new legislation, though changes have been made to 
Florida‘s Medicaid anti-kickback laws. These laws now include language that addresses 
individual physicians‘ knowledge about and willingness to break the law, establishing the 
intent-based nuance of the state legislation (Appendix D).  
     In spite of Florida‘s efforts, ―…few (if any) physicians have been disciplined directly 
for violation of Florida laws prohibiting patient self-referral/anti-kickback so that the cost 
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of enforcing these laws is minimal compared to the costs incurred by health care 
professionals to obtain legal advice as to relationships and activities‖ (Prom, et al., 2002, 
Summary of Findings, p. 3). Part of the reason for the lack of enforcement appears to be 
the complexity and sometimes contradiction in the wording of the legislation. In the 
opinion of the Florida Bar ad hoc committee members, these laws ―…are not enforced, 
because few, if any on the enforcement side fully understand them‖ (Prom, et al., 2002, 
Summary of Findings, p. 3).   
     In summary, the legislation pertaining to physicians‘ self-referral practices at the 
federal and state levels is complex. With the addition of numerous safe harbors and 
exceptions, the legislation may have become diluted, resulting in policies that fail to 
adequately curb the practice of physician self-referral for profit. 
Reimbursement and the Financial Health of Hospitals 
     The amount of reimbursement a facility receives for the health care services it 
provides helps to determine its financial viability. Recent decades have witnessed 
dramatic changes in how providers are reimbursed for health care services. Some of these 
changes in reimbursement, alluded to previously in reference to Olshin and colleagues 
(2002), stem from the altered CMS payment structure developed for the Balanced Budget 
Act (BBA) ("Balanced Budget Act," 1997). Unlike physician offices that provide 
physical therapy services, hospitals and comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation facilities 
(CORFs) have been subjected to substantial fee changes and increase in the paperwork 
burden associated with revisions made to the CMS Prospective Payment System (PPS) 
("Balanced Budget Act," 1997). These changes serve as financial and administrative 
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obstacles for these institutions, and their influence on the economic viability of these 
institutions must be considered among other factors when examining institutional 
revenues and facility closures.  
Payment Policies and Their Consequences 
     In the late 1990s, as the federal deficit grew and budgetary concerns came to the 
forefront, government officials more closely examined the cost-effectiveness of the 
health care being rendered under the Medicare and Medicaid programs. At the time, the 
fastest growing areas in health care were outpatient services, including ambulatory 
surgery and ancillary health care (e.g., rehabilitation). As part of the Balanced Budget 
Refinement Act (BBRA), Congress requested a CMS study on utilization patterns of 
outpatient services covered by Medicare following implementation of the BBA and 
BBRA (Olshin, et al., 2002). The study analyzed claims data from the entire universe of 
more than 15 million outpatient therapy claims per calendar year from 1998, 1999, and 
2000. Results showed that, following imposition of therapy fee schedules for institutional 
providers, the number of outpatient therapy patients dropped 2.5%, in spite of growth in 
the number of Medicare eligible beneficiaries (Olshin, et al., 2002). In calendar year 
2000, when these fee schedules were suspended, the number of outpatient therapy 
patients increased by 3.6%, which was consistent with national trends. However, the 
number of patients being treated in comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation facilities 
(CORFs) and other institutions remained reduced due to the new fee schedule payment 
methodology, highlighting the influence of reimbursement on service utilization patterns. 
In particular, patients who were more likely to be treated at institutions (i.e., women, 
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elderly, and minorities) had more significant payment reductions, which was consistent 
with the reductions in institutional provider payments (Olshin, et al., 2002). These 
persons who received treatment at institutions also tended to be the highest cost users of 
outpatient services and were likely to surpass their outpatient therapy payment caps. 
These patients might, therefore, be selected for referral to hospital-based PT clinics once 
outpatient benefits have been exhausted. Non-institutional providers of therapy services 
(e.g., private or corporate physical therapy practices, physician joint ventures, and 
POPTS) tended to treat less complex orthopaedic conditions, relative to the costly and 
complex patients treated by institutional providers (Olshin, et al., 2002). The authors of 
this study suggested that payment policy changes, such as the Medicare fee schedule, 
may affect a disproportionate number of at-risk individuals who require more costly 
outpatient services than the general population (Olshin, et al., 2002).   
     It seems reasonable that the impact of fee schedules, regulations, and paperwork 
burden on institutional providers may reduce the numbers and types of services these 
facilities are able to offer to certain patient populations. However, reduced remuneration 
and numerous administrative obstacles are not the only issues facing these institutional 
providers. If patients are also being selectively referred to institutions by physicians who 
then retain patients with better reimbursement for their own practices, the institutions‘ 
economic viability may be further compromised. An unforeseen corollary of current 
policy may be an increased incentive for physicians to selectively self-refer patients with 
better reimbursement and to shuttle all other patients to institutional providers. Drastic 
changes in hospital-based facilities‘ case mixes may subsequently result in their inability 
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to recover revenues from other more lucrative insurance compensation arrangements, a 
phenomenon known as cost shifting.  
Cost Shifting 
     Developments in health care financing have renewed policymakers‘ interest in 
providers‘ cost-shifting. Ginsburg described the phenomenon of cost shifting where 
―…changes in administered prices of one payer lead to changes in prices charged to other 
payers‖ (Ginsburg, 2002, W3-473). In order to examine cost shifting, economists assume 
that the provider or facility is working to maximize profits. Ginsburg argued that when 
you examine health care organizations, particularly large not-for-profit ones, profit 
maximization is not a good working assumption. He stated that profit maximization is 
often counter to the mission of these facilities and that hospitals and physicians are 
expected to provide a standard level of care, regardless of their patients‘ ability to pay 
(Ginsburg, 2002). Ginsburg observed that when the bulk of private payers reduce 
compensation for services and become aligned more closely with federal compensation 
programs, the health care providers‘ ability to price discriminate is reduced or eliminated. 
In this case, the facilities and providers lose their market power, the ability to manipulate 
the terms that dictate their ability to provide their services. When these providers no 
longer have market power, and the payers cannot be swayed to adjust their fee schedules, 
no provider cost shifting can occur. Ginsburg suggested that this will ―…limit providers‘ 
ability or willingness to provide uncompensated care, and, over time, reduce providers‘ 
capacity to provide services‖ (Ginsburg, 2002, W3-474). To paraphrase, reduced 
reimbursement for services serves as a disincentive for institutions to continue providing 
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care to patient populations with the greatest need. This is counter to the mission of safety-
net providers who work to ensure adequate health care for all members of their 
communities. For these providers, a reduction or elimination of services is likely to result 
from their insolvency. When services are eliminated, the community‘s access is 
restricted, particularly for those individuals who depend upon the hospitals for their care.  
Background on the Study Setting 
    Orlando, Florida, served as the backdrop for this study of the relationship between the 
emergence of POPTS and the numbers and types of referrals received by two groups of 
hospital-based outpatient rehabilitation centers that share their health care market. Due to 
the growing numbers of persons with publicly funded insurance (e.g., Medicare and 
Medicaid) in the region, Orlando was well-suited for an investigation of the relationship 
between current federal and state health policies governing physician self-referral and the 
survivability of hospital-based outpatient rehabilitation providers. In this section, the 
market forces affecting the hospital-based outpatient physical therapy providers in 
Orlando, Florida, are highlighted. A description of the demographic and economic 
characteristics of the Orlando region, with a comparison to national, regional, and state 
level data is also incorporated, and the rationale for the selection of this region for this 
research is explicated. 
Florida 
     The U.S. Census Bureau‘s South region, comprising 16 states and the District of 
Columbia, is leading the nation in population growth, with a projected population 
increase of 52.4%, or nearly 43 million, by 2030 (Appendix E) (U.S. Census Bureau, 
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2005). The South Atlantic region, in particular, is expected to increase its population by 
32.0% overall within this time frame. Florida accounts for the greatest percentage of this 
growth, with population estimates for 2030 nearing 28.7 million (an estimated 79.5% 
increase) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2005). Florida experienced a 16% increase in its 
population between April 1, 2000 and July 1, 2009 and was home to 18,537,969 people 
according to the 2009 census (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010).  
     The Orlando, Florida, metropolitan statistical area (MSA) is also one of the largest and 
fastest growing in the state, encompassing three counties: Orange, Osceola, and 
Seminole. The U.S. Census Bureau ranked Osceola County 16th in the list of fastest 
growing counties in the nation, while Orange County was ranked the 35th largest county 
in the nation (U.S. Census Bureau, 2005). Between April 1, 2000, and July 1, 2004, 
Orange, Osceola, and Seminole counties‘ growth rates exceeded their state‘s average (see 
Table 2). In effect, the Orlando region is among the fastest growing in a state that is 
among the fastest growing in the nation. Not only is the Florida census growing, 
however, it is also changing demographically. 
     According to census data from 2004, in Orange, Osceola, and Seminole counties, the 
majority of the citizens are Caucasian (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006). The second largest 
demographic group consists of persons of Hispanic or Latino origins, though this group is 
the fastest growing in the region. The third largest group consists of black or African-
American persons. These trends are consistent with the make-up of the Florida 
population in general, except for higher concentrations of Hispanic or Latino persons in 
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Orange and Osceola Counties and Caucasian persons in Osceola and Seminole Counties 
(Table 2). 
Table 2. Florida census information: population estimates, race, income, and poverty 
levels. 
2004 
Population 
Estimate 
Percentages  
(Δ 2000 to 
2004) 
Caucasian 
(Δ 2000 to 
2004) 
Latino/Hispanic 
(Δ 2000 to 
2004) 
Black/African
-American  
(Δ 2000 to 
2004) 
2003 
Median 
Household 
Income  
(Δ 2000 to 
2003) 
2003 
Persons 
Below 
Poverty 
Level  
(Δ 2000 
to 2003) 
Orange County 
1,023,023 
(↑ 14.1%) 
52.7% 
(↓ 15.9%) 
22.2% 
(↑ 3.4%) 
20.5% 
(↑ 2.3%) 
$40,604 
(↓ $707) 
13.2% 
(↑ 1.1%) 
Osceola 
County 
231,578 
(↑ 34.3%) 
51.9% 
(↓ 25.3%) 
36.1% 
(↑ 6.7%) 
9.7% 
(↑ 2.3%) 
$38,954 
(↑ $740) 
13.1% 
(↑ 1.6%) 
Seminole 
County 
401,619 
(↑ 10.0%) 
72.1% 
(↓ 10.3%) 
 
13.2% 
(↑ 2.0%) 
 
10.6% 
(↑ 1.1%) 
$49,199 
(↓ $127) 
9.1% 
(↑ 1.7%) 
Florida 
17,789,864 
(↑ 11.3%) 
62.8% 
(↓ 15.2%) 
19.0% 
(↑ 2.2%) 
15.7% 
(↑ 1.1%) 
$38,985 
(↑ $166) 
13.0% 
(↑ 1.5%) 
 
     Each of the three counties of the Orlando region has a higher percentage of persons 
who are minors and relatively fewer elderly persons, when compared to state averages. 
The make-up of Orange, Osceola, and Seminole counties with regards to sex is congruent 
with state averages. Available data on median household incomes and the relative 
percentages of persons below poverty level show that Seminole County appears to be 
relatively more affluent than Orange and Osceola counties, as well as Florida on the 
whole. At last report (2003), median household income for the Orlando region exceeded 
the state averages, and poverty levels were lower than state averages. Still, median 
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household incomes in this region have declined since the last census, and poverty levels 
have increased (Table 3).  
Table 3. Florida census information: citizen age and sex.  
Region 
Persons Under 
Five Years Old 
(2004) 
Persons Under 18 
Years Old (2004) 
Persons 65 Years 
Old and Older 
(2004) 
Female 
Persons 
(2004) 
Orange 
County 
7.5% 26% 9.6% 50.3% 
Osceola 
County 
7.2% 26.4% 11.0% 50.3% 
Seminole 
County 
6.1% 24.6% 10.7% 50.8% 
Florida 6.3% 23% 16.8% 51.0% 
    
A correlate with the 2000 to 2003 increasing poverty levels in this region may be the 
numbers of Medicaid enrollees, which have increased in two of the three Orlando 
counties. Data on Medicaid enrollees in the three counties are included in Table 4. 
Table 4.  Numbers and percentages of Medicaid enrollees by Florida county and year. 
Year Orange Osceola Seminole 
2004 130,192 (13.2%) 40,490 (18.4%) 29,489 (7.5%) 
2006 
 
168,503 (16.1 %) 
 
35,859 (14.7%) 
 
49,369 (12.1%) 
 
     The number of Medicaid enrollees has grown in the last few years, and the Orlando 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) has seen a dramatic increase in its unemployment 
rates with current estimates for the Orlando region at 11.8% (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2011). Since more citizens in the Orlando region are currently employed or retired 
without benefits, there is an increasing demand for federally funded health care services 
(e.g., Medicare and Medicaid). Estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau reported between 
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13.3 and 18.7% of Orlando residents were uninsured (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007). This 
suggests that either employers are not able to provide adequate health insurance for their 
employees and their families or that there are increasing numbers of impoverished 
persons or children currently living in or migrating to the region.  
Managed Care in Orlando  
     Several plausible explanations for changes observed in the hospitals‘ rehabilitation 
market should be considered when investigating the influence of physicians‘ self-referral 
activities on hospital-based outpatient physical therapy providers. One of the alternative 
explanations for changes in referrals is managed care penetration. Managed care provides 
for an intermediary between the patient and the physician, allowing companies such as 
insurers, health maintenance organizations, or physician-hospital networks to exert an 
influence over the numbers and types of procedures performed or requested by 
participating physicians (Shih & Singh, 2007). The intent of these arrangements is to 
maximize profitability while maintaining a standard of care that leads to satisfactory 
patient outcomes.  
     Managed care organizations are motivated to reduce health care costs, because 
lowered costs allow these companies to retain a greater proportion of subscriber fees as 
profit. Managed care companies influence not only the quantities of services their 
patients receive but also at which facilities they receive them. This influence is a result of 
exclusive contracts that allow managed care companies to negotiate lower fees in 
exchange for channeling their subscribers to certain providers (Shih & Singh, 2007). The 
result for providers is a likely decrease in per patient revenue but a relatively steady 
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influx of new patients. Subsequently, providers may have the opportunity to recover lost 
revenue if the total volume of patients is increased and costs of care are minimized. 
     Over the past four decades, the influence of managed care on health care markets has 
been substantial, but some of these organizations, particularly health maintenance 
organizations (HMO), appear to be losing their dominance. Data from 2000 to 2005 
reflect a significant decline in the penetration of HMOs into Orlando‘s three-county area 
(Fig. 2). For this dissertation, HMO penetration was calculated by using data from 
Florida‘s Agency for Health care Administration (AHCA) and Florida‘s Office of 
Insurance Regulation (FOIR), including Florida residents‘ enrollment in HMOs from 
2000 to 2005 (Agency for Health Care Administration, 2007; Florida Office of Insurance 
Regulation, 2007). HMO enrollment for each Orlando county was determined from these 
data. County population data were derived from the U.S. Census Bureau‘s archived state 
and county quick facts information (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006). Enrollment data were 
divided by the population for the county for each year and multiplied by 100 to yield a 
percentage or penetration value. These data are represented in Figure 2. The graph shows 
a downward trend in HMO penetration for all three Orlando counties. 
     The influence of managed care organizations depends not only on their market 
penetration but also their facility contracts. From the data presented in Figure 2, it would 
seem likely that the number of HMO contracts available to facilities, such as hospitals, 
should have decreased between 2000 and 2005 and that the relative proportions of HMO 
clients seen by those facilities should have also decreased as the managed care 
companies‘ penetration of the market declined. 
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Figure 2. Penetration of HMOs in Orlando. 
 
     While many Orlando region HMOs are experiencing a decline in their enrollment, 
federal managed care enrollment continues to climb. Figures 3 and 4 provide a summary 
of Medicaid and Medicare HMO enrollment for all three Orlando counties. Again, this 
information is based upon reports from the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation 
(Florida Office of Insurance Regulation, 2007). Over 2000 to 2005, Medicaid managed 
care enrollment escalated from 8.9% of all managed care contracts to 32.5% (Florida 
Office of Insurance Regulation, 2007). These data suggest an increasing demand for 
HMO services associated with impoverished individuals. Medicare HMO enrollment 
decreased over the same time period (Figure 4).  
The Orlando Physical Therapy Market 
     The Orlando region contains approximately one hundred outpatient facilities 
providing physical therapy services. These services were identified through the phone 
book and Internet, the Physical Therapy Provider Network (PTPN) group, and a 2002  
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Figure 3. Medicaid HMO enrollment for Orlando region. 
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Figure 4. Medicare HMO enrollment for Orlando region.      
 
Orlando Regional Healthcare System (ORHS) market survey of physical therapy 
providers. The facilities identified included hospital-based outpatient rehabilitation 
centers, physician-owned physical therapy (PT) practices, corporately owned physical 
therapy providers, and physical therapy private practices. The list of PT providers, 
current as of January 1, 2009, is included in Appendix F.  
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     In order to support its population‘s health care needs, the Orlando region relies upon a 
hospital safety-net to provide health care services to those individuals who have little or 
no insurance. The Institute of Medicine (2000) defines safety net providers as 
―…providers that organize and deliver a significant level of health care and other related 
services to the uninsured, Medicaid, and other vulnerable patients‖ (Institute of Medicine, 
2000). These providers are legally mandated or have adopted as their mission an open 
door, offering access to services regardless of patients‘ abilities to pay (Institute of 
Medicine, 2000). Though they receive some limited government subsidization for their 
efforts, these safety-net providers must function within an increasingly competitive 
market, while continuing to absorb revenue losses associated with participation in the 
federally-funded health care programs and indigent care. As market competition 
intensifies, the balance between meeting the safety-net organization‘s mission and 
maintaining its economic viability becomes more tenuous (Ernst & Young & HCIA-
Sachs, 2002).  
     Orlando Regional Healthcare System. ORHS is a not-for-profit hospital system that 
has been serving the greater Orlando area since 1918. This hospital system cares for 
upwards of 2 million Florida residents and 6,000 international patients each year (ORHS, 
2006). ORHS is one of two safety-net providers in its region, and it serves over 3,800 
outpatient physical therapy patients annually (Jagger, 2005, personal communication). As 
part of their mission, and as mandated by federal law, not-for-profit hospitals such as 
ORHS serve uninsured persons and provide communities with uncompensated care. 
Specifically, the ORHS mission is, ―To improve the health and quality of life of the 
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individuals and communities we serve‖ (ORHS, 2006). For the uncompensated care they 
provide, safety-net facilities like ORHS receive support through Medicaid and subsidies 
from state and local governments. However, the support often falls short of the costs of 
providing care. As reported by the American Hospital Association, hospitals received 82 
cents for every dollar spent in caring for charity care and Medicaid patients in 2000 
(AHA, 2002). In their 2006 Community Benefits report, ORHS shareholders recorded a 
$91,678,591 Medicaid/Medicare shortfall and a total value of costs in excess of payment 
of $124,954,591 (Orlando Regional Healthcare System, 2006). Since no endowment 
funds or philanthropic ventures are tied to the outpatient rehabilitation services provided 
by ORHS, the only remuneration received for services comes from federal, state, or 
private insurance programs and privately paying patients (Jagger, 2005, personal 
communication).  
     At present, ORHS supports seven outpatient physical therapy (OPPT) clinics. During 
the period of 1999 to 2005, ORHS was operating eleven OPPT clinics, but four of the 
clinics were closed during that time due to a reported lack of referrals and increased 
competition from POPTS and other physical therapy providers (Jagger, 2005, personal 
communication). 
     Florida Hospital System. The second and only other not-for-profit system in the 
Orlando region is the Florida Hospital System (FHS). Founded in 1908 by the Adventist 
Church, FHS is the oldest and largest system of health care providers in central Florida 
serving over 1,000,000 people per year (Florida Hospital System, 2007). FHS currently 
supports 14 OPPT clinics. During the period of 1999 to 2007, FHS had 13 OPPT clinics; 
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however, according to hospital officials, they closed two of their facilities due to loss of 
contracts and increased market competition (Moore, 2007, personal communication). In 
their 2006 Community Benefits report, FHS administrators recorded $125,787,447 in 
unreimbursed care for patients with Medicaid or self-payment (Florida Hospital System, 
2006). They also recorded $83,513,184 in unreimbursed care for patients on Medicare 
(Florida Hospital System, 2006). No endowments were associated with these programs.  
Market Penetration of POPTS and Joint Ventures 
     There are many reasons why the outpatient physical therapy market share for ORHS 
and FHS may be changing. One possible contributor to this market shift is the emergence 
of POPTS practices in the region. In these practices, physicians and their employees may 
serve both as providers of rehabilitation services and gatekeepers of referrals for these 
services. It is plausible, under these circumstances, that competing providers of 
rehabilitation services may experience a reduction in referrals received from these 
practices due to a captive referral source, though this has not been explored in previous 
research (Ahern & Scott, 1992). 
     A second explanation for the changes reported by the hospital administrators could be 
an overall reduction in the number of persons referred for physical therapy services by 
practitioners in the region. This is an unlikely competing phenomenon, however, because 
the overall population in the territory is growing rapidly and becoming demographically 
skewed toward a cohort that would be expected to utilize physical therapy services more 
frequently than the average consumer (i.e., more elderly persons) (Ciolek & Hwang, 
2006).  
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     A third possibility may be the emergence of other competitors in the region. As stated 
previously, nearly 100 physical therapy providers have been identified in the Orlando 
region, and this number does not include providers of alternative medical services that 
sometimes serve as adjuncts or substitutes for physical therapy services, such as 
chiropractic or massage therapy services. It is possible that the overall changes in referral 
patterns observed by the hospital administrators are a result of referrals being sent to 
these other providers, rather than to the physician owned physical therapy practices. It 
was therefore critical to this research that the timing of the entrance of these competitors 
into the market was elucidated. Surveying the development of these market competitors 
yielded some pertinent data that helped to clarify the relationship POPTS practices have 
with other providers in the surrounding rehabilitation markets.  
     Some additional factors in the utilization of physical therapy services may include the 
introduction of new technologies or therapies that attract clients or referrals. There also 
may be changes in insurers‘ policies that limit or expand coverage for these services. 
The Problem 
     The evidence to date suggests that physician investment or ownership interest in 
ancillary (e.g., physical therapy) services may have a negative impact on utilization rates, 
costs, access to care, and the quality of care rendered (Ahern & Scott, 1992; Aronovitz, 
1994; Childs & Hunter, 1972; GAO, 1994; B. Hillman, et al., 1990; B. Hillman, Olson, 
Griffith, Sunshine, Joseph, Kennedy, Nelson, et al., 1992; Mitchell & Sass, 1995; 
Mitchell & Scott, 1992b, 1992c; Mitchell & Sunshine, 1992). The literature supports the 
notion that physician ownership interest in ancillary services consistently leads to 
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increased health care costs. It is important to note, however, that the majority of the 
studies on this topic were conducted in the 1990s. What has not been identified in 
previous research is the influence of physicians‘ selective referral on hospital-based 
outpatient centers who share their health care markets. Of particular concern are safety 
net hospital providers because of the financial exposure they experience serving the 
uninsured and underinsured. When payer case-mixes become skewed toward insurance 
programs that provide less reimbursement for services, facilities such as ORHS and FHS 
are less able to recover lost revenue through cost-shifting to payers with higher 
reimbursement rates. This may lead to budgetary shortfalls that could potentially impact 
the solvency of some of the providers‘ programs. The purpose of this research was to 
examine the relationship between the emergence of orthopaedic POPTS and joint venture 
practices and changes in physical therapy referrals made to two groups of safety net, not-
for-profit, hospital-based OPPT centers in one health care market.  
     One of the difficulties in trying to understand the POPTS practice phenomenon is the 
lack of concrete data. Neither the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) nor 
third-party payer databases capture information regarding the referral patterns of POPTS 
or joint venture clinics, nor is there an established mechanism for identifying selective 
referral practices. Physician referral records are proprietary and are not readily available 
for study by health policy researchers.  
     For this research, two proprietary databases assembled and maintained by two safety 
net hospital systems were utilized. These databases included claims data, market data, 
and financial data from the period of 1999 to 2007. Access to these types of databases 
80 
 
was critical for this study, because it captured the essence of the hospital-based outpatient 
rehabilitation facilities‘ performances in an evolving health care market. Details 
regarding the design and methodology of this study are outlined in the Methods section 
(Chapter IV) of this dissertation. 
Research Questions and Significance 
     This research was a retrospective analysis of the two hospital system databases using 
an ex post facto design and an analysis of phone survey data from orthopaedic physician 
and physical therapy providers in the Orlando region. The research questions that were 
developed for this study are:  
1. Does the number of referrals per physician made annually to hospital system 
OPPT clinics change as a result of orthopaedic physicians‘ transition to POPTS 
practices? 
2. Does the number of commercially insured patient referrals made to the hospital 
system OPPT clinics change as a result of orthopaedic physicians‘ transition to 
POPTS practices? 
3. Does the number of Medicare insured patient referrals made to hospital system 
OPPT clinics change as a result of orthopaedic physicians‘ transition to POPTS 
practices? 
4. Does the number of underinsured patient referrals made to hospital system OPPT 
clinics change as a result of orthopaedic physicians‘ transition to POPTS 
practices?   
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     Understanding the influence of POPTS practices on hospital-based OPPT clinics is 
essential for policymakers who design regulations regarding physician self-referral 
practices. Rehabilitation services account for a growing proportion of the scope of 
physician self-referred services and overall health care spending. The amount of 
Medicare‘s annual spending on rehabilitation services has increased from $1 billion in 
2000 to $4.27 billion in 2004 (Ciolek & Hwang, 2006; Olshin, et al., 2002). In an era of 
budget crises and exorbitant health care costs, various opportunities to improve efficiency 
should be explored. Future demand for rehabilitation services is likely to increase as the 
American population continues to age, and most of these persons are likely to participate 
in federally funded insurance programs. This research provides a mechanism for 
understanding the influence of orthopaedic POPTS and joint venture practices on market 
competitors.
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CHAPTER III: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
      
     This section provides a summary of the theoretical constructs that were used to guide 
this investigation. In this chapter, relationships between physicians‘ compensation, their 
referral patterns, competing providers who share their health care markets, and the health 
outcomes for the communities they serve are hypothesized. The theoretical constructs 
presented here are based upon the economics principles outlined in the Review of the 
Literature (Chapter II).    
Theoretical Framework 
     Several theories have addressed the dynamics of health care markets, but the 
mechanisms behind the phenomenon of physician selective referral and its impact on 
other providers have not been sufficiently studied. Of particular interest to the present 
research is the relationship between physician ownership interest and referral patterns for 
physical therapy services made to two groups of hospital-based outpatient rehabilitation 
centers. For the purposes of this study, there are two forms of physician ownership 
interest in physical therapy services. These are joint ventures and physician owned 
physical therapy services (POPTS). In these practices, physicians serve not only as the 
patients‘ representative to the health care system but also as a provider or owner of 
services. This dual role, known as dual agency, places physicians in a unique position to 
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influence the quantities and types of health care services their patients consume (Folland, 
et al., 2004a).  
     The potential influence of dual agency on the relationship between physicians and 
their patients has been previously reported (Dranove & White, 1987; Eisenhardt, 1985, 
1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Pontes, 1995). An agency relationship exists when one 
individual or group (the principal) contracts with another individual or group (the agent) 
to perform some actions or services on the principal‘s behalf, delegating decision-making 
authority to this party (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). The theory assumes that 
both the principal and the agent are motivated by their own self-interests, meaning that 
when their goals are not aligned, they may come into conflict (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). Using the physician/patient relationship as an example, a 
patient may be motivated to pursue the least costly form of care that produces a desired 
health outcome, while an entrepreneurial physician may be motivated to increase health 
care service utilization to maximize his or her profitability.  
     The selection of a course of treatment by the agent that is not aligned with the 
principal‘s goals of efficiency is termed a moral hazard. In this example, the problem for 
the principal (patient) is to ensure that the agent (physician) adheres to a standard of care 
that is both efficacious and efficient. The principal remains reliant upon the physician‘s 
judgment because of the information asymmetry between them. The patient is dependent 
upon the physician‘s content expertise to guide referrals and select the most appropriate 
course of treatment. Since there are significant variations between physicians in treatment 
paradigms and protocols, with best practice often remaining ambiguous, it is difficult to 
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judge the quality of the care the clinician is rendering (Phelps, 2000). A lack of clear 
evidence or adherence to practice and clinical guidelines or protocols may allow 
extraneous variables to have a greater influence on the selected course of treatment. If 
treatments yield similar outcomes and are easily substituted, physicians who are 
motivated by their own financial self-interests may have incentives to utilize more 
services or to select the more lucrative forms of treatment, such as procedures that are 
reimbursed at a greater rate and those that are less costly to produce. Dranove and White 
state ―…for a contract between a physician and a patient to be efficient, there must be no 
alternative to the action that the physician actually takes whereby he could have provided 
the same quality of care employing fewer resources‖ (Dranove & White, 1987, p. 406). 
     Physicians who are motivated by their own self-interests may not be inclined to self-
regulate their behaviors. Instead, external governance mechanisms, such as the Stark 
Laws and state laws regulating self-referral activities, are designed to protect principals 
(i.e., patients and their insurance companies), from the jeopardy inherent to physicians‘ 
dual agency roles. Due to the complexity of these laws and the difficulty of enforcing 
them, it does not appear that they are substantially influencing physicians‘ self-referral 
activities (Mitchell, 2007; Prom, et al., 2002). Issues of agency have consequences not 
only for the individual relationships between patients and their physicians. There may 
also be cumulative influence of these behaviors on health care markets, where the 
exploitation of resources for the promotion of self-interest may be related to the 
elimination of market competition and decreasing access to essential health services.     
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     Ahern and Scott provide a framework for understanding the relationship between 
payment schemes, physicians‘ ownership interest, utilization rates, access to care, and 
quality of care. These relationships are summarized in Figure 5, which has been revised 
to focus specifically on physical therapy services. 
 
 
Adapted from (Ahern & Scott, 1992). 
Figure 5. Ahern and Scott‘s theory on the effects of physician joint ventures on health 
care costs, access, and quality. 
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      According to Ahern and Scott‘s theory, fee-for-service arrangements provide 
incentives for physicians to increase service utilization in order to maximize their profits, 
and subsequently their job satisfaction (Mitchell, et al., 2000). In keeping with this idea, 
physicians operating under this payment scheme are likely to work to eliminate their 
competitors and to maximize their profits by reducing their production costs (e.g., hiring 
less trained and less expensive labor and spending less time with each patient). This 
strategy is consistent with agency theory, which suggests that physicians are self-
interested and will work to ensure the success and profitability of their practices (Folland, 
et al., 2004a). Some evidence of these approaches to patient care exists in the literature 
examining specialty hospitals, diagnostic imaging, and physical therapy practices 
(Chollet et al., 2006; GAO, 2003; MedPAC, 2005, 2006; Mitchell, 2007; Mitchell & 
Scott, 1992b). Specific to physical therapy, physicians‘ ownership interest has been tied 
to increased utilization, increased numbers of charges, and improved profits for physician 
practices (Mitchell & Scott, 1992b). 
     Physicians participating in specialty hospitals tend to refer patients who require more 
costly care and patients who have poorer reimbursement to community hospitals while 
retaining better paying patients and patients with better prognoses for their own facilities. 
These patterns exist in ownership arrangements with specialty hospitals suggesting that 
ownership status may influence referral patterns (Chollet, et al., 2006; GAO, 2003; 
MedPAC, 2005, 2006). Ahern and Scott‘s theory predicts that in a climate of increasing 
financial pressures and declining reimbursement, entrepreneurial physicians will work to 
retain patients with fee-for-service reimbursement and reduce or eliminate competition by 
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annexing ancillary services and creating a captive referral source. This means that 
physicians are able to control both the quantity and disposition of their referrals. This 
phenomenon may be studied by examining referral patterns made to hospital-based 
outpatient physical therapy services by physicians who become owners of these kinds of 
services. 
     There are many payment structures for physicians. For example, physicians may 
receive a salary, or they may receive a set reimbursement (e.g., capitated reimbursement) 
for seeing a patient regardless of the quantity of procedures performed or the time spent 
with the patient. They may also receive compensation for each procedure they perform 
(i.e., fee-for-service). Salaried or capitated systems seem to differ from traditional fee-
for-service arrangements in that they encourage physicians to utilize fewer services by 
rewarding them, for example, with shares of unspent health care premiums (A. Hillman, 
et al., 1989). According to Ahern and Scott‘s theory, physicians under these payment 
schemes are not as motivated to eliminate competition, though they may choose to 
develop or annex ancillary services to help recover lost revenue. The theory predicts that 
ownership status may influence physicians‘ referral behaviors, and it predicts that 
patients with more lucrative payment types are likely to be retained by self-referring 
practitioners. Though the model only addresses fee-for-service and capitated payment 
schemes, the concepts of entrepreneurialism and self-referral for profit can be 
extrapolated to other payment types and physician ownership arrangements. The critical 
concept is how the interaction of physicians‘ ownership of ancillary services and the 
patients‘ payer types influence the physicians‘ referral behaviors.    
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     For the purposes of this research, it was important to establish a hierarchy of 
reimbursement types. In order to test Ahern and Scott‘s theory, three distinct payment 
categories were created. Both the capitated and fee-for-service insured referrals were 
grouped into a category called Commercial Insurance. Reimbursement from both the 
fee-for-service and capitated reimbursement schemes was expected to exceed 
reimbursement from other payer types and therefore serve as an incentive for physicians 
to selectively refer. Medicare referrals are paid according to a fee-schedule, which is less 
lucrative than most commercial insurance but more lucrative than other programs, such 
as Medicaid and self-pay. Therefore, Medicare was made a second category of payment 
for this study. The third and final payment category included all other referrals (e.g., 
Medicaid, agencies and grants, and self-pay), which were classified as Other Insurance. 
The reimbursement for these payers was expected to be less than that of the commercial 
insurers and Medicare carriers; therefore, Ahern and Scott‘s theory predicts that 
physicians will not be motivated to retain these patients for their own practices. 
Subsequently, the quantities of referrals from this payer category made to the hospital-
based OPPT clinics were expected to increase along with population growth. Within the 
ORHS data set, individuals labeled as self-paying had either chosen to cover their own 
costs of care out-of-pocket, or they were unable to pay for the services they received. In 
either case, self-pay represented people who did not utilize insurance to cover the costs of 
their care.    
     In summary, since physicians are often the gatekeepers for ancillary services, they 
may control the quantities and types of referrals made to competing providers of health 
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care services. Physicians who serve both as gatekeepers and providers of services are able 
to influence the health care market promoting potentially monopolistic competition. 
Under these circumstances, market power could become concentrated in the hands of 
only a few joint ventures or POPTS, thus reducing market efficiency. According to Ahern 
and Scott‘s theory, this can be expected to lead to increased health care costs, reduced 
access to care, reduced quality of services, and poorer health outcomes. For example, if 
joint ventured or POPTS practices are no longer motivated by market competition to 
provide quality services, they may elect to utilize fewer skilled health care workers to 
provide the ancillary services at cheaper salaries, thus maximizing their profitability. 
Previous reports from the Office of the Inspector General suggest that this has already 
taken place in physical therapy and that it is an issue that requires the immediate attention 
of CMS administrators (Office of Inspector General, 1994; Wright, 2006).  
Purpose 
     The purpose of this research was to determine the relationship between the emergence 
of orthopaedic POPTS and changes in referrals made to hospital-based outpatient 
rehabilitation centers. The focus of this study was on orthopaedic physicians because of 
their tendencies to invest in physical therapy services (Graham, 2003). This research was 
designed to address the following questions and the associated hypotheses: 
1. Does the number of referrals per physician made annually to hospital system 
OPPT clinics change as a result of orthopaedic physicians‘ transition to POPTS 
practices?  
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 Hypothesis 1: The orthopaedic physicians were expected to reduce their 
 referrals per physician per year to the hospital system OPPT clinics once they 
 joined  POPTS as compared to the number of referrals per physician per year  
 made by non-POPTS orthopaedic physicians over the same time period. 
2. Does the number of commercially insured patient referrals made to the hospital 
system OPPT clinics change as a result of orthopaedic physicians‘ transition to 
POPTS practices? 
Hypothesis 2:  The hospital system OPPT clinics were expected to receive a 
significantly decreased number of referrals per year of commercially insured 
patients from orthopaedic physicians who transitioned to POPTS practices as 
compared to the number of commercially insured patients from non-POPTS 
orthopaedic physicians over the same time period.  
3. Does the number of Medicare insured patient referrals made to hospital system 
OPPT clinics change as a result of orthopaedic physicians‘ transition to POPTS 
practices? 
 Hypothesis 3:  The hospital system OPPT clinics were expected to receive a 
 significantly increased number of referrals per year of Medicare insured patients 
 from orthopaedic physicians who transitioned to POPTS practices as compared to 
 the number of Medicare insured patients referred from non-POPTS orthopaedic 
 physicians over the same time period.  
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4. Does the number of underinsured patient referrals made to hospital system OPPT 
clinics change as a result of orthopaedic physicians‘ transition to POPTS 
practices?   
Hypothesis 4: The hospital system OPPT clinics were expected to receive a 
significantly increased number of referrals per year of underinsured patients from 
orthopaedic physicians who transitioned to POPTS practices as compared to the 
number of underinsured patients referred by non-POPTS orthopaedic physicians 
over the same time period.  
     Information from physician practices regarding in-house referrals was not available; 
however, by studying the patterns of referrals made to market competitors, like ORHS 
and FHS, it was possible to identify changes in physicians‘ referral behaviors and 
ascertain the relationship between those changes and the physicians‘ participation in 
POPTS. This study utilized both gross and detailed analyses of physicians‘ referral 
practices to ascertain the potential influence of ownership interest on referrals. An 
analysis at the physician level helped to determine if selective referral to ORHS and FHS 
may have occurred between 1999 and 2007.
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CHAPTER IV: METHODS 
 
 
 
     This chapter outlines the methods that were used to conduct this study. Included is an 
outline of the materials, software, and data sources used; the procedure; and the statistical 
analyses conducted. This project was approved by Virginia Commonwealth University‘s 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) according to exempt review criteria.   
Research Design 
   This study was a longitudinal, retrospective analysis comparing referrals made to two 
groups of hospital-based outpatient PT clinics (OPPT). This research examined the 
relationship between orthopaedic physicians‘ physical therapy practice ownership status 
and physical therapy referrals made to the hospital-based OPPT centers between 1999 
and 2005 for Orlando Regional Healthcare System (ORHS) and 1999 to 2007 for Florida 
Hospital System (FHS). The research included information from the two hospital 
systems‘ databases and phone interviews of orthopaedic physician practices and physical 
therapy practiced, which helped to track changes in the Orlando OPPT market. The 
hospital systems that were selected for this study are the two not-for-profit systems that 
serve the Orlando region. These systems are a broadly representative sample of facilities 
for the region that provide care to persons with various forms of insurance as well as 
persons with little to no insurance coverage. These systems are potentially vulnerable to 
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changes in referral patterns because they rely on their abilities to cost-shift in order to 
offset the costs of care provided to persons with limited ability to pay for their care. 
Details about the outpatient physical therapy facilities are included in Table 5. The units 
of analysis for this study were the individual orthopaedic physicians who referred to 
ORHS and FHS during the study period. 
Sample from ORHS 
 
     Administrators with ORHS agreed to provide data regarding referrals made for 
outpatient physical therapy services by orthopaedic physicians between 1999 and August 
of 2005. Due to a database conversion that damaged ORHS facility records, information 
on orthopaedic referrals made to ORHS OPPT clinics from the last quarter of 2005 to 
2007 were unavailable for analysis. The referrals were made to ten outpatient physical 
therapy clinics located throughout the Orlando region. Additional information regarding 
the ORHS outpatient physical therapy clinics is included in Appendix G. A copy of the 
data usage agreement signed by the ORHS administrators is included in Appendix A.  
     ORHS administrators provided a list of orthopaedic physicians who made referrals to 
ORHS outpatient physical therapy clinics between 1999 and 2005 (N=134). Many of 
these physicians are represented in the current ORHS physician list, which highlights 
their continued ties to the ORHS facilities. The list of orthopaedic physicians affiliated 
with ORHS facilities as of July 24, 2007, was available through the ORHS ―Find a 
Physician‖ service at the following website:   
http://www.orlandoregional.org/orlandoregional/Find_a_Physician.aspx?Wid=1.  
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Table 5. Hospital-based OPPT providers and their data. 
Hospital 
System 
City Clinic Name Dates 
ORHS 
Clinics 
   
 Orlando, FL Orlando Regional Medical Center Campus Opened Prior 
to 1999 
 Orlando, FL Dr. Phillips Hospital (Formerly Sand Lake) Opened Prior 
to 1999 
 Longwood, FL Orlando Regional South Seminole Hospital Opened Prior 
to 1999 
 Orlando, FL Orlando Regional: Lucerne Medical Center Opened Prior 
to 1999 
 Orlando, FL Dr. Phillips: YMCA Opened 2006 
 St. Cloud, FL St. Cloud Regional Rehab Services Opened 2003 
 Orlando, FL Arnold Palmer Hospital for Children Opened 2003 
 Orlando, FL Orlando Regional Outpatient Rehabilitation: Orange Avenue 
Location 
Closed 2000 
 Wekiva, FL Orlando Regional Outpatient Rehabilitation: Wekiva 
Location 
Closed 2006 
 Winter Park, FL Orlando Regional Outpatient Rehabiltation: Winter Park 
Location 
Closed 2004 
 Oviedo, FL Orlando Regional Outpatient Rehabilitation: Oviedo 
Location 
Closed 2006 
FHS Clinics    
 Altamonte 
Springs, FL 
Florida Hospital Rehabilitation and Sports Medicine Opened Prior 
to 1999 
 Apopka, FL Florida Hospital Rehabilitation Center: Apopka Location Opened Prior 
to 1999 
 Celebration, FL Florida Hospital Rehabilitation and Sports Medicine: 
Celebration Health 
Opened Prior 
to 1999 
 Orlando, FL Florida Hospital Rehabilitation and Sports Medicine: East 
Orlando 
Opened Prior 
to 1999 
 Lake Mary, FL Florida Hospital Rehabilitation and Sports Medicine: Lake 
Mary 
Opened Prior 
to 1999 
 Orlando, FL Florida Hospital Rehabilitation and Sports Medicine: 
Maitland RDV Sportsplex 
Opened Prior 
to 1999 
 Ocoee, FL Florida Hospital Rehabilitation and Sports Medicine: Ocoee Opened Prior 
to 1999 
 Orlando, FL Florida Hospital Rehabilitation and Sports Medicine: 
Orlando – Lee Road 
Opened Prior 
to 1999 
 Orlando, FL Florida Hospital Rehabilitation and Sports Medicine: 
Orlando - Downtown 
Opened Prior 
to 1999 
 Oviedo, FL Florida Hospital Rehabilitation and Sports Medicine: 
Oviedo 
Opened Prior 
to 1999 
 Winter Park, FL Florida Hospital Rehabilitation and Sports Medicine: 
Orthopaedic Institute at Winter Park Memorial Hospital 
Opened Prior 
to 1999 
 Winter Park, FL Florida Hospital Rehabilitation and Sports Medicine: 
YMCA Crosby Wellness Center 
Opened Prior 
to 1999 
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This list allowed identification of the physicians (N=68) who provided referrals to ORHS 
for OPPT who also had privileges at the institution. For the purposes of this research, 
orthopaedic physicians were classified as physicians specializing in orthopaedics and 
who are trained as medical doctors (M.D.) or doctors of osteopathics (D.O.). Details 
regarding physician-level data are provided in upcoming sections.  
     The ORHS data were collected at the first visit of each outpatient physical therapy 
episode of care. The ORHS data provided for analysis included: date of initial visit, 
patient age, patient sex, name of referring physician, primary diagnosis by ICD-9 code, 
payer type, and facility where services were received. Information on patient race and co-
morbidities were not included in the ORHS OPPT database and therefore were not 
available for analysis. The data collected at intake were compiled in a hospital database 
that provided patient identifiers including medical record number and account number, 
the date of the initial visit, the type of rehabilitation service the patients were receiving, in 
this case physical therapy (coded by ORHS as PTX), and the facility where the services 
were rendered. For the purposes of this research, patient-specific identifiers were 
removed from the data by hospital database managers prior to the information being 
made available for analysis. De-identification of this information protected patient 
confidentiality. Information regarding the date of visit, name of referring physician, payer 
type, and facility where services were received was included in the statistical analyses. 
Rationale for the selection of these variables is explained later in this chapter. 
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Sample from FHS 
     Administrators with FHS provided data regarding referrals made for outpatient 
physical therapy services by orthopaedic physicians (N=91) between 1999 and 2007. 
Many of these physicians are represented in the current FHS physician list, which 
highlights their continued ties to the FHS facilities. Additional information regarding the 
current FHS outpatient physical therapy clinics is included in Appendix G. A copy of the 
data usage agreement signed by the FHS administrators is included in Appendix A.  
     The list of orthopaedic physicians who had privileges at FHS facilities as of 
November 1, 2007, was available through the FHS ―Physician Directory‖ service at the 
following website:  http://www.floridahospitalphysicians.com. This list allowed 
identification of the physicians (N=39) who provided referrals to FHS for OPPT who also 
had privileges at the institution. Several of the orthopaedic physicians have served as 
referral sources for nearly a decade. Many of these physicians are represented in the 
current physician list, which highlights their continued ties to the FHS facilities. Some of 
the physicians (N=29) in the FHS and ORHS databases are listed as having affiliations 
with both facilities.   
     Similar to the ORHS data, the FHS data were collected at the first visit of each 
outpatient physical therapy episode of care. The information collected by the intake 
personnel included patient name, patient sex, patient date of birth, primary diagnosis for 
which the patient is being referred by International Classification of Diseases (ICD-9) 
code, name of the referring physician, patient address, patient social security number, and 
insurance information. These data were then compiled into facility-specific databases that 
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provided patient identifiers, including medical record number and account number, the 
date of the initial visit, the type of rehabilitation service (e.g., physical therapy or speech 
therapy) the patient was receiving, and the facility where the services were being 
rendered. FHS had not yet centralized their collection of the patients‘ information. Data 
extraction was conducted by FHS information systems (IS) personnel on behalf of 
hospital administrators, but the data extractions were time-consuming and involved 
independent queries of each facility‘s database. Therefore, FHS administrators agreed 
only to provide de-identified information on the total number of referrals made by each 
individual orthopaedic physician for each year. Subsequently, the FHS data that were 
shared with the researcher included the year of each referral, the total number of referrals, 
and the name of each referring physician.  
Establishing the Status of Physician Practices 
     Surveys and interviews were conducted to investigate the Orlando, Florida OPPT 
market. The surveys and interviews included ORHS and FHS staff and administrators, 
physicians‘ offices, and OPPT clinics. Figure 6 outlines the strategy that was used to 
conduct these investigations. 
     The years in which the Orlando region‘s orthopaedic POPTS practices developed were 
determined through preliminary interviews with ORHS and FHS physical therapy staff 
and administrators and phone calls to individual orthopaedic practices. First, the lists of 
orthopaedic physicians who referred to the ORHS and FHS outpatient clinics between 
1999 and 2007 were reviewed. Then lists of orthopaedic physicians with privileges at 
ORHS and/or FHS from each facility‘s online list of physician providers were compiled 
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Figure 6. Establishing the status of POPTS and OPPT practices. 
to clarify their relationships with the two systems and to help determine which physicians 
may have left the local market (Florida Hospital, 2007; Orlando Regional Healthcare 
System, 2007). In January of 2008 the Florida Department of Health‘s website 
(http://ww2.doh.state.fl.us/IRM00PRAES/PRASLIST.ASP) also was utilized to confirm 
the physicians‘ status as well as the locations of their practices. This site provided data on 
physicians including, but not limited to, specialty certification, training, 
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proceedings/actions, affiliations, and locations of practice. Once the physicians‘ statuses 
were confirmed, the lists from ORHS and FHS were combined and then each of the 
physicians‘ offices was contacted to determine if they provided physical therapy within 
their offices or owned physical therapy practices. During the phone interview, the 
practice managers or office administrators were contacted. The scripted phone interviews 
for the physician offices are included in Appendix H. The physicians‘ practice managers 
or office administrators were asked the following questions: 
1. Does your practice currently invest in or own physical therapy services to which 
you make referrals? 
2. If yes, in what year did you invest in or take ownership of the physical therapy 
services? 
3. Has your practice previously invested in or owned physical therapy services to 
which you made referrals?   
4. If yes, in which years did you have these ties to physical therapy services? 
Establishing the Status of Competitive Providers of Outpatient PT 
 
     The next step in this research was to identify the presence of competitor OPPT 
providers in the region and to determine when they entered the market and became 
potential recipients of OPPT referrals. These data were not used in the direct hypothesis 
testing. However, the presence of additional competitors in the market during the study 
period would be important to consider during the discussion about any identified changes 
in referral patterns to the hospital-based OPPT clinics. 
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     A list of outpatient physical therapy providers for the Orlando region was compiled 
through an ORHS marketing survey from 2002 provided by ORHS administrators as well 
as a phone book and Internet review. This list was current as of January, 2009. The site 
managers of these facilities were contacted by phone to ask if they provide orthopaedic 
physical therapy, if they have physicians who have ownership interest, and in which year 
they developed their practices. Not all of the providers listed in the 2002 ORHS 
marketing survey are still in practice, so there was not 100% representation of the 
competing providers who were practicing in the area between 1999 and 2007 (responders 
N=71 OPPT clinic locations; unavailable N=15 OPPT clinic locations).There did not 
appear to be any systematic difference in non-responders/unavailables versus responders 
to the clinic surveys. The non-responders/unavailables had been located throughout the 
metro area. The researcher was unable to determine in which years facilities had closed. 
The list of providers from whom information was obtained is located in  
Appendix F.  
Materials and Procedures 
Data Sources 
     This study was conducted using the existing proprietary databases maintained by 
ORHS and FHS and information from the phone surveys of the physicians‘ offices and of 
other outpatient PT providers in the area. Per report, ORHS and FHS databases provided 
100% of their records of outpatient physical therapy encounters for the specified time 
period.  
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     Data were extracted from each facility‘s database by information systems (IS) 
personnel at ORHS and FHS. The data obtained from the IS database queries at each of 
the hospital facilities was compiled in Microsoft Excel
®
 to allow for data coding and 
manipulation. All data were stored on a password protected laptop or on portable storage 
drives kept in a locked cabinet accessible only to the researcher. The de-identified data 
elements from ORHS that were used in statistical analyses included: a) year of the 
referral, b) referring physician name, c) facility where services were received, and d) 
payer type. The data elements from FHS that were used for analysis included: 1) year of 
referral, 2) referring physician name, and 3) total number of referrals per year per 
physician. Information on payer type was not available from the FHS database. 
Information on patient race, socioeconomic status, and co-morbidities was not included 
in either of these databases and was therefore not available for the analysis.  
     The dates of the referrals and names of referring physicians were used to determine if 
the referrals were made when the physicians were or were not participating in POPTS 
practices, based upon information obtained from the phone interviews. Payer type was 
used in the analysis of physician status as it related to referral patterns to the ORHS 
OPPT clinics. Payer type and physician status data from ORHS were used to test the 
selective referral construct of Ahern and Scott‘s theory. Variables and the rationale for 
their inclusion are highlighted in Table 6. 
     A total of ten ORHS outpatient physical therapy facilities were represented in the 
ORHS database. Four of the facilities included in the data set have closed since 2000. 
ORHS has also opened, merged, and renamed some of its locations. Seven hospital-based 
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Table 6. Database variables and the rationale for their inclusion.  
Variable Heading Rationale 
Date of Referral by Year To establish if a referral was made when the physician was 
participating in a POPTS practice 
Referring Physician Name To track referrals made to each facility and establish which 
referrals were made by physicians participating in POPTS 
Facility to Which the 
Patient Was Referred 
To determine if patterns of referrals made to the ORHS or 
FHS facilities by matched pairs of physicians were similar.  
Payer Type 
To determine the payer case mix referred to ORHS. These 
data were not available for FHS. 
Practice 
To determine how many physician practices there were 
that made referrals. This was selected as a possible 
covariant, because physicians within a practice might refer 
similarly. 
 
OPPT facilities are open currently. All of the ORHS OPPT facilities, past and present, are 
listed in Appendix G.  
     The FHS database provided information on the number of referrals made by each 
orthopaedic physician each year. A total of 13 facilities contributed data to the data set 
between 1999 and 2007. Two of these facilities closed during the specified time period. 
Three new facilities opened since the study period. A list of the current FHS facilities is 
included in Appendix G.      
     Orthopaedic physician status- ORHS and FHS. Over the period of 1999 to 2005, 
ORHS OPPT clinics received referrals from 134 orthopaedic physicians. These 
physicians were categorized by the researcher based upon their ownership status for 
physical therapy services (Table 7). 
     Seventy-nine (58.9%) of the physicians were found to be non-POPTS physicians 
based on survey results. Forty-seven (35.1%) of the physicians joined POPTS between  
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Table 7. Physician group coding. 
 
Ownership Status Physician Group Code 
POPTS throughout Study Period Group 0 
Became POPTS during Study Period Group 1 
Left POPTS during Study Period Group 2 
Never POPTS Group 3 
 
1999 and 2005. Four (3.0%) of the physicians left POPTS between 1999 and 2005, and 
four (3.0%) were members of POPTS before and during the study period. 
Between 1999 and 2007, FHS OPPT clinics received referrals from 91 orthopaedic 
physicians. Forty-three (47.3%) of the physicians were found to be non-POPTS 
physicians, based on survey results. Thirty-nine (42.9%) of the physicians joined POPTS 
between 1999 and 2007. Four of the physicians left POPTS between 1999 and 2007 
(4.3%), and five (5.5%) were members of POPTS before and during the study period.   
        A total of 143 orthopaedic physicians made referrals to ORHS and FHS between 1999 
and 2007. Of these physicians 86 (60.1%) were non-POPTS between 1999 and 2007. 
Forty-eight (33.6%) joined POPTS between 1999 and 2007. Four of the 143 physicians 
(2.8%) left POPTS between 1999 and 2007, and five (3.5%) were members of POPTS 
before and during the study period (Table 8). Over the study period a total of 75 different 
orthopaedic practices referred to ORHS and/or FHS (Table 9). 
        Several of the physicians included in the data sets had a history of referring only one 
to two patients per year to either institution, and there was a large amount of variability in 
the referral patterns of the physicians. Looking for changes in referral relationships 
between physicians and the hospital OPPT clinics following physicians‘ transitions to 
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Table 8. Overall count of physicians who made referrals by group and institution.  
 
Physician 
Group 
ORHS Only FHS Only Both Total 
Group 0 0 1 4 5 
Group 1 9 1 38 48 
Group 2 0 0 4 4 
Group 3 43 7 36 86 
Total 52 9 82 143 
 
Table 9. Overall count of practices that made referrals by group and institution. 
 
Physician 
Group 
ORHS Only FHS Only Both Total 
Group 0 0 0 1 1 
Group 1 0 0 5 5 
Group 2 0 0 1 1 
Group 3 38 4 26 68 
Total 38 4 33 75 
 
POPTS presupposed that a relationship between the physicians and the hospitals existed 
before the POPTS transition was made. Therefore, only Group 1 and Group 3 physicians 
who had established themselves as reliable referral sources were included in the 
hypothesis testing for this study. A reliable referral source was defined based on a 
minimum annual volume of referrals of 10 patients per year. Using this criterion reduced 
the number of physicians available for comparison in the hypothesis testing (Table 10).   
Table 10. Physicians who met the inclusion criterion for the hypothesis testing. 
Physician 
Group 
ORHS FHS 
Group 1 17 28 
Group 3 8 19 
Total 25 37 
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Data Cleaning and Organization 
     Once the raw data from ORHS and FHS were compiled in Microsoft Excel 
®
, the data 
were reviewed to ensure that only referrals for outpatient physical therapy made during 
the specified time period were included. For the ORHS data a total of 454 occupational 
therapy referrals, 884 radiology referrals, two outpatient laboratory referrals, 64 speech 
pathology referrals, and 24 other types of outpatient referrals were identified and 
eliminated from the data set. The FHS data did not yield any referrals for other services   
aside from OPPT. In addition each case was reviewed to verify that the OPPT referrals 
were made by orthopaedic physicians, either M.D.‘s or D.O.‘s. For the ORHS data, the 
type of insurance associated with the referral was also reviewed. The ORHS and FHS 
data sets were then transferred to separate Microsoft Excel
®
 spreadsheets. To facilitate 
institutional and aggregate analyses, FHS and ORHS were assigned numeric codes by 
hospital system (HOSP). FHS was assigned the numeric code 0, and ORHS was assigned 
the numeric code 1.    
     Physician group classification- ORHS and FHS. Based upon the information obtained 
from the phone interviews, each of the orthopaedic physicians who referred to ORHS and 
FHS OPPT facilities was assigned a unique, numeric physician identifier (PHYSID). 
Another column was created to show which practice these physicians were involved in, 
and these practices were also assigned unique, numeric identifiers (PRACCD). Next the 
physicians were assigned to one of four groups based upon their ownership status: Group 
0 physicians remained in POPTS between 1999 and 2005, Group 1 joined POPTS 
between 1999 and 2005, Group 2 physicians were in POPTS in 1999 but transitioned out 
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of the POPTS practices before 2005, and Group 3 physicians did not participate in 
POPTS. Physicians who referred to FHS were classified in the same manner. The 
physician groups were coded in a separate column (PHYSCD) in each of the ORHS and 
FHS data Microsoft Excel
®
 spreadsheets.  
     The status of referrals. It was necessary to identify whether the referrals being 
examined had been made before or after the Group 1 physicians transitioned to POPTS. 
A dichotomous variable called STATUS was created that represented the before or after 
POPTS transition conditions. The information gleaned from the phone interviews was 
used to identify the years in which the Group 1 physicians transitioned to POPTS. 
Referrals made before that transition were assigned the PRE value of 0. Referrals made 
after the transition were assigned the POST value of 1. Years 1 and 2 versus 4 and 5 
were used to similarly classify referrals from the Group 3 physicians who were paired to 
the Group 1 physicians for comparison. This process of pairing the Group 1 and Group 3 
physicians is described in more detail later in this chapter.  
     Payer classification- ORHS data only. Payer type was recorded with each ORHS 
referral in the database under the column PAYCD. Traditional indemnity or managed 
care payer plans were coded COMMERCIAL= 0. Payers from MEDICARE were 
coded 1. All other payer groups, including Medicaid, agencies/grants, and self-pay, were 
coded OTHER = 2. Patients in Medicare and Medicaid HMO‘s were classified according 
to Medicare and Medicaid rather that managed care (commercial). By using these 
grouping systems, it was possible to statistically analyze for differences in  the referral 
patterns based upon payer type between physicians who originally did not participate in 
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POPTS but then later joined POPTS practices (Group 1) and physicians who never joined 
POPTS (Group 3). The coding scheme is included in Table 11. Group 0 and 2 physicians‘ 
data were not included in the direct hypothesis testing, because there were too few of 
these physicians to make comparisons. 
Table 11. Coding for data set. 
Data Coding Type of Data Definition 
PHYSID Scale Unique physician identifier 
PHYSCD Scale 1=Group 1; 3=Group 3 
PRACCD Scale Unique physician practice 
identifier 
REFNO Scale Sum of referrals per year 
and per payer category 
YEAR Scale Year of referral 
HOSP Nominal 0= FHS; 1=ORHS 
STATUS Nominal 0= PRE; 1=POST Group 1 
physician‘s transition to 
POPTS 
PAYCD Ordinal 0= Commercial insurance; 
1= Medicare; 2= Other 
      
Data Analysis 
Descriptive Analyses 
     Market competition. The analysis began with a description of the competitors who 
entered the Orlando OPPT market in the years included in this study. The list of 
competitors was compiled from the phone interviews conducted by the researcher. The 
entry and exit of competitors were examined to help facilitate discussion about factors 
influencing the volume of OPPT referrals made by orthopaedic physicians to the hospital 
system OPPT clinics. 
     Aggregate and hospital system-level descriptive analyses. Descriptive statistics for 
each system, ORHS and FHS, were generated independently and in aggregate regarding 
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total number of orthopaedic referrals and the average referrals per orthopaedic physician 
for all physician groups. The proportions of referrals to ORHS associated with each payer 
type were also calculated by dividing the number of referrals in each payer category by 
the total referrals made to ORHS by each physician group each year. The data from 
Group 0 and Group 2 were not used in hypothesis testing, but they are reported in the 
results as descriptive statistics to support discussion of the overall referral behaviors of 
physicians in these two groups. 
Hypothesis Testing 
     The subjects (units of analysis) of the hypothesis tests were the individual physicians. 
Group 1 and Group 3 physicians who met the minimum referral criterion in year one 
were randomly paired with each other using their physician identifiers (PHYSID) and the 
random number generating feature in Microsoft Excel ®. A total of 8 physician pairs 
were generated for ORHS and 19 pairs for FHS (Figure 7). 
     Once the groups of physician pairs were established, the data for the Group 1 
physicians‘ transition years and for their paired Group 3 physicians‘ corresponding years 
were deleted from the data used in the statistical testing (Figure 8). Only the data for 
years 1 and 5 or for years 1, 2, 4, and 5 were selected for analysis. These years were 
expected to capture possible changes in referrals due to the changes in physicians‘ 
ownership status. The transition year data were not included in the analyses, since the 
data for Group 1 were likely to be at least partially influenced by the Group 1 physicians‘ 
transitions to POPTS. The Group 3 data for these same years were also not included as an 
attempt to provide a historical control for comparison. 
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Figure 7. Pairing for analyses. 
      
      
 
 
Figure 8. Research model for years of data analyzed. 
 
     The exact timing of the Group 1 physicians‘ transition to POPTS could not be 
determined within year 3. It was possible the years adjacent to this transition might also 
have been influenced by the timing of the Group 1 physicians‘ conversion to POPTS. For 
example, if the transition to POPTS occurred late in year 3, the transition may have at 
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least partially masked any change in the following years‘ referral behaviors. If the 
transition occurred early in year 3, there may have already been changes in referral 
behaviors leading up to the transition. The years farthest removed from the transition year 
(i.e., years 1 and 5) were expected to be less influenced by the transition years.  
     The data were analyzed in SPSS ® using Mixed Linear Models (MLM). These models 
are an extension of the General Linear Model (GLM) and are used to predict relationships 
among events (Laird & Ware, 1982). The MLM allows the data to exhibit correlated and 
non-constant variability (Laird & Ware, 1982). In other words, the MLM allows the 
researcher to model means as well as variances and co-variances. Co-variances were a 
concern in this research design, because repeated measurements were taken on the same 
experimental units (PHYSID). Each physician‘s referrals were assessed PRE and POST, 
and it was expected that these pre and post measurements within a physician would have 
greater correlation than between pre and post measurements between physicians.  
     MLM includes both fixed and random effects. For this research the variable STATUS 
was treated as a random effect. STATUS had two levels, PRE and POST. STATUS 
provided the time element for this research which allowed the researcher to track changes 
in physicians‘ referrals. PHYSID also served as a random effect. The fixed effects were 
physician group (PHYSCD) with its two levels (Group 1 and Group 3) and insurance 
type (PAYCD) with its three levels (COMMERCIAL=0, MEDICARE=1, and 
OTHER=2). The number of referrals (REFNO) served as the dependent variable for all 
of the hypothesis testing. The α level for these tests was set at p<0.05. 
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     Full factorial analyses were conducted using the Type III Sum of Squares to determine 
the main and interaction effects of all of the independent variables on the dependent 
variable. These analyses were conducted to investigate the influences of physician 
ownership, payer type, and the combined influence of physician ownership and payer 
type on the referrals made to the hospital-based OPPT centers. Parameter estimates and 
estimated marginal means were selected for reporting. Comparisons of main effects were 
conducted post hoc using Bonferoni confidence interval adjustment.  
     For each of the analyses, the co-variance structure that provided the best model of the 
within-subjects variability was selected. This selection was made based upon the lowest 
Akaike‘s Information Criterion (AIC) score for each of the models generated (Akaike, 
1974). The AIC relies on the method of maximum likelihood which selects values of the 
model parameters that produce the distribution most likely to have resulted in the 
observed data (Akaike, 1974). The AIC allows several models to be ranked according to 
their goodness of fit. The lower the AIC number, the better the model fits the data 
(Akaike, 1974). The unstructured co-variance models, which assume that each correlation 
is non-zero but unique, resulted in the best fit for all of the MLMs generated for this 
study. 
     The relatively small sample size of paired physicians created the potential that the 
statistical tests would be underpowered to detect changes in referral patterns if present. 
As a result, the mean differences in referrals (POST-PRE) between Group 1 and Group 3 
physicians and 95% confidence intervals were calculated for each of the hypotheses.  
These calculations allowed the researcher to determine the direction of any changes in 
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referrals made by the Group 1 and Group 3 physicians PRE to POST, to uncover the 
influence of sample size on the precision of the analyses, and to provide point estimates 
of changes in referrals for comparison of the physician groups‘ referral behaviors.  
Analyzing Total Referrals: Hypothesis 1  
     Hypothesis 1 stated that the orthopaedic physicians were expected to reduce their 
referrals per physician per year to the hospital system OPPT clinics once they joined 
POPTS as compared to the number of referrals per physician per year made by non-
POPTS orthopaedic physicians over the same time period. The total referrals were 
examined for each institution independently and then for the two facilities in aggregate. 
The interaction of physician group (PHYSCD) and ownership status (STATUS) on 
number of referrals (REFNO) was tested. For this hypothesis the fixed effect of 
insurance type (PAYCD) was not included in the model. 
Referrals were first examined for years 1 and 5 only. The analyses were then repeated 
in a second model using data for years 1, 2, 4, and 5.  These tests with the additional 
years‘ data served as sensitivity analyses of the stability of the effects of physician 
ownership on the number of referrals made to the hospital-based OPPT clinics. It was 
anticipated that the data from years 2 and 4 may have been influenced by the Group 1 
physicians‘ transition to POPTS during year 3. These data were therefore expected to 
display greater variability than the data from years 1 and 5.   
Analyzing the Influence of Payer Type: Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 
     Further analyses were conducted only on the ORHS data set. These analyses were 
designed to test the following research hypotheses:  
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Hypothesis 2:  The hospital system OPPT clinics were expected to receive a 
significantly decreased number of referrals per year of commercially insured 
patients from orthopaedic physicians who transitioned to POPTS practices as 
compared to the number of commercially insured patients from non-POPTS 
orthopaedic physicians over the same time period.  
 Hypothesis 3:  The hospital system OPPT clinics were expected to receive a 
 significantly increased number of referrals per year of Medicare insured patients 
 from orthopaedic physicians who transitioned to POPTS practices as compared to 
 the number of Medicare insured patients referred from non-POPTS orthopaedic 
 physicians over the same time period.  
Hypothesis 4: The hospital system OPPT clinics were expected to receive a 
significantly increased number of referrals per year of underinsured patients from 
orthopaedic physicians who transitioned to POPTS practices as compared to the 
number of underinsured patients referred by non-POPTS orthopaedic physicians 
over the same time period.  
     MLMs were constructed in SPSS ® in the same manner as what was reported for 
testing of Hypothesis 1 except that for Hypotheses 2-4 PAYCD was included in the 
model. The numbers of referrals per physician (REFNO) were modeled as the dependent 
variable. For the first analysis, only data from years 1 and 5 were included. The second 
analysis added in the data for years 2 and 4 as well. Each of the statistical models was 
designed to determine the combined effects of physicians‘ ownership status and payer 
type on the referrals made to the hospital-based OPPT clinics. The second analysis with 
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the additional years of data was conducted in order to examine the stability of the 
combined effects of physician ownership and payer type on the number of referrals made 
to the hospital-based OPPT clinics. Findings from these statistical tests are reported in the 
Results (Chapter V).  
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CHAPTER V: RESULTS 
 
 
 
     This chapter contains the results of the descriptive and inferential analyses for the 
referral patterns from four orthopedic physician groups to the Orlando Regional 
Healthcare System (ORHS) and the Florida Hospital System (FHS). The physician 
groups are organized by their ownership status. The focus of this dissertation was on the 
referral behavior of physicians who became owners compared to the referral behavior of 
physicians who never became owners of physical therapy services. The role of ownership 
status was explored through analysis of referrals to both hospital systems. The additional 
influence of payer type on referral patterns was assessed using ORHS data only. 
Descriptive Analyses 
Orlando OPPT Market 
     A total of 32 Orlando businesses were identified that provided outpatient orthopaedic 
physical therapy services during the study time period (some with more than one 
location). For the phone interview, twelve of the OPPT practices were unavailable, 
insolvent, or unable to provide the researcher the year in which they began seeing 
patients. For the practices that were able to provide data, Figure 9 provides a depiction of 
their years of entry into the Orlando market. This figure also provides information on the 
numbers of POPTS practices in the Orlando region each year. These data show that the  
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Figure 9. OPPT practices in Orlando by year. 
 
number of OPPT clinics to which the orthopaedic physicians had access increased over 
the study period, which may have influenced the volume of referrals being sent to the 
hospital system OPPT clinics. 
Referrals to ORHS 
     Between January of 1999 and October for 2005, ORHS received a total of 25,640 
OPPT referrals (Table 12). Group 1 (N=47) accounted for 43.2% of the referrals and 
Group 3 (N=79) accounted for 46.8% of the referrals to ORHS. Group 0 physicians 
(N=4) contributed 7.8% of the referrals and Group 2 (N=4) contributed 2.2% of the 
referrals. Graphical analysis of the period 1999 to 2005 shows that both Group 1 and 
Group 3 physicians were increasing their total number of referrals to ORHS while 
referrals from Groups 0 and 2 remained relatively stable over time (Figure 10). The rate 
of increase in referrals was higher for all four physician groups between 2003 and 2004, 
with Group 3 physicians demonstrating the greatest increase. 
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Table 12.  Referrals to ORHS per physician group. 
PHYSICIAN 
CODE 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 (blank) 
Grand 
Total 
Group 0 87 201 136 109 148 657 649*  1987 
Group 1 850 1644 1806 1717 1621 2218 1230* 1
† 
11087 
Group 2 12 15 28 27 55 136 274*  547 
Group 3 283 781 1227 1317 1410 3921 3078* 2
† 
12019 
Grand Total 1232 2641 3197 3170 3234 6932 5231* 3
† 
25640 
*Data for 2005 for ORHS are incomplete. Only three-quarters of the year are represented. 
†Missing information on year of referral.  
 
 
Figure 10. Referrals made to ORHS by each physician group.  
The average number of referrals per physician for each year is displayed graphically 
in Figure 11 (data in Table 1 in Appendix I). The data show that the average number of 
referrals from all of the physician groups made to ORHS increased over time.  
     Distribution of patient age and gender for referrals to ORHS. The referrals made to 
ORHS varied by patient characteristics. All four physician groups referred a greater 
proportion of female patients than male patients to the ORHS hospital-based centers, 
which is consistent with national trends for the time of the study (Ciolek & Hwang, 
2006). The average age and distribution of referrals by sex is included in Table 13. 
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Figure 11. Average number of referrals to ORHS per physician by physician group. 
 
Table 13. Age and sex distribution of ORHS referrals by physician group. 
Physician Group 
Females Males 
Average 
Age 
% of 
Referrals 
Average 
Age 
% of 
Referrals 
Group 0 
(N = 4) 
54.3 years 
(S.D.=15.6) 
59.5% 
44.3 years 
(S.D.=15.5) 
40.5% 
Group 1 
(N = 47) 
49.0 years 
(S.D.=16.6) 
66.3% 
42.8 years 
(S.D.=17.8) 
33.7% 
Group 2 
(N = 4) 
55.3 years 
(S.D.=12.0) 
63.0% 
42.3 years 
(S.D.=14.0) 
37.0% 
Group 3 
 (N = 79) 
45.1 years 
(SD=21.9) 
59.7% 
36.0 years 
(S.D.=24.1) 
40.3% 
 
     Distribution of payer type for referrals to ORHS. The percentage of referrals by each 
physician group within each payer type is displayed in Figures 12, 13 and 14. These 
graphs illustrate variability in referral patterns among the physician groups over the study 
period. For example, the proportion of patients with commercial insurance referred by 
Group 1 physicians steadily declined while the proportion of patients with commercial 
insurance referred by Group 3 physicians dipped and then began increasing over the same 
Average Referrals per Physician to ORHS  
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time period (Figure 12). On the other hand, the percentage of Medicare and other 
insurance referrals made by both Group 1 and Group 3 physicians fluctuated over time 
(Figures 13 and 14). The variability in referrals made by Group 0 and Group 2 physicians 
in all payer groups likely was related to the small sample sizes of each group. Table 2 in 
Appendix I provides a breakdown of the referrals made to ORHS by physician group and 
payer type. Data from all of the physicians who referred to ORHS during the specified 
time period are included in this table. The percentages of total referrals by physician 
group and payer group are included in Table 3 in Appendix I.  
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Figure 12. Percentage of commercial referrals by physician group. 
 
Referrals to FHS 
 
     Between January of 1999 and October of 2007, FHS received a total of 38,724 OPPT 
referrals (Table 4 in Appendix I). Groups 1 (N=39) and 3 (N=43) accounted for 67.2% 
and 27.9% of the total referrals to FHS, respectively. Group 0 physicians (N=5) 
contributed 1.1% of referrals and Group 2 physicians (N=4) contributed 3.8% of 
referrals. Graphical analysis shows that the total referrals from Group 1 physicians made 
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Figure 13. Percentage of Medicare referrals by physician group. 
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Figure 14. Percentage of other referrals by physician group. 
 
to FHS increased from baseline to peak in 2002 and then essentially returned to baseline 
by 2007, while the total referrals from Group 3 physicians increased over the same time 
period (Figure 15). 
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Figure 15. Referrals to FHS by physician group. 
  
    When examining the average number of referrals per physician made to FHS each 
year, the decline in Group 1 physician referrals and the increase in Group 3 physician 
referrals also were apparent (Figure 16; raw data in Table 5 in Appendix I).   
 
Figure 16. Average number of referrals per physician to FHS. 
 
Number of Referrals to FHS by Physician 
Group 
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Aggregate Referrals to Both Hospital Systems 
 
     Data from a total of 143 orthopaedic physicians are included in the combined ORHS 
and FHS data sets. A breakdown of the number of physicians by group and institution is 
included in Table 14. As stated previously, many of the orthopaedic physicians are 
affiliated with both ORHS and FHS; however, some of the physicians are affiliated with 
only one of these two institutions. Specifically, the majority of the Group 1 physicians 
overlapped in making referrals to both systems whereas many of the Group 3 physicians 
exclusively referred to ORHS. 
Table 14. Number of physicians per group who referred to each institution. 
Physician Group  ORHS Only FHS Only Both Systems 
Group 0 (Always POPTS) 0 1 4 
Group 1 (Became POPTS) 9 1 38 
Group 2 (Left POPTS) 0 0 4 
Group 3 (Never POPTS) 43 7 36 
 
     A total of 64,361 OPPT referrals were recorded in the ORHS and FHS data sets 
combined for the years included in this study. Group 1 physicians were the most prolific 
and accounted for 57.6% of the OPPT referrals made to the two institutions. Group 3 
accounted for 35.4% of the referrals followed by Group 0 (3.8%) and Group 2 (3.2%). 
Figure 17 illustrates the aggregate referrals from each group of physicians made to both 
institutions. Raw data are located in Table 6 in Appendix I. 
     A t-test demonstrated that overall, there was no significant difference in the average 
number of referrals made by Group 3 physicians to the two hospital systems (p=0.250, 
α<0.05) despite the larger number of Group 3 physicians affiliated with ORHS. In 
contrast, a similar number of Group 1 physicians referred to both systems, but they 
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Figure 17. Referrals made to both hospital systems by each physician group over the 
study time period. *ORHS data for 2005 limited to three-quarters of the year. FHS data 
for 2007 limited to three-quarters of the year.  
 
referred significantly more frequently to FHS (p< 0.001, α<0.05). Therefore, a Group 1 
physician was more likely to refer to FHS than to ORHS whereas a Group 3 physician 
was equally likely to refer to either hospital system. 
Results for Hypothesis Testing 
     The threshold criterion for physicians‘ inclusion in this study was a minimum of ten 
referrals for year 1. The Group 1 and Group 3 physicians who met the inclusion criterion 
were randomly paired until the group with the fewest members was exhausted (Table 15).  
Table 15. Physicians who met the inclusion criterion for the hypothesis testing. 
 
Physician 
Group 
ORHS FHS 
Group 1 17 28 
Group 3 8 19 
Total 25 37 
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A total of 8 physician pairs for ORHS and 19 pairs for FHS were generated. These same 
physicians were included in the analyses for the combined hospital systems. The groups 
of physicians included in the aggregate systems‘ analyses were uneven, because some of 
the physicians referred to both systems and were represented twice in the pairings. As a 
result there were a total of 22 Group 1 physicians and 25 Group 3 physicians included in 
the aggregate data set. Tables 16-18 provide the total numbers of referrals from the paired 
physicians for years 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the study period. The data from the Group 1 
physicians‘ transition years and the paired Group 3 physicians‘ same years are not 
included. The data represented in these tables were used for the hypothesis testing. 
Table 16. Total Referrals: Aggregate data for ORHS and FHS. 
Aggregate Data Both 
Hospitals 
Number of Referrals 
Physician 
Group 
STATUS Year 1 vs. 5 Year 1 and 2 
vs. 4 and 5 
Group 1 
(N=22) 
PRE 2015 4956 
POST 2054 4895 
Group 1 Total 4069 9851 
Group 3 
(N=25) 
PRE 928 2519 
POST 1269 2839 
Group 3 Total 2197 5358 
Grand Total 6266 15209 
 
Table 17. Total Referrals: ORHS data. 
ORHS Data Number of Referrals 
Physician 
Group 
STATUS Year 1 vs. 5 Year 1 and 2 
vs. 4 and 5 
Group 1  
(N=8) 
PRE 341 875 
POST 316 691 
Group 1 Total 657 1566 
Group 3 
(N=8) 
PRE 200 859 
POST 373 843 
Group 3 Total 573 1702 
Grand Total 1230 3268 
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Table 18. Total Referrals: FHS data. 
FHS Data Number of Referrals 
Physician 
Group 
STATUS Year 1 vs. 5 Year 1 and 2 
vs. 4 and 5 
Group 1 
(N=19) 
PRE 1674 4081 
POST 1738 4204 
Group 1 Total 3412 8285 
Group 3 
(N=19) 
PRE 728 1660 
POST 896 1996 
Group 3 Total 1624 3656 
Grand Total 5036 11941 
 
Table 19 provides the within group mean differences in referrals from the PRE to POST 
time periods for the Group 1 and Group 3 physicians.     
Table 19. Changes in mean referrals (POST–PRE). 
Changes in Mean Referrals 
(POST - PRE) 
Changes in Mean  
Referrals 
Aggregate Data Both 
Hospitals 
 
Group 1 Year 1 vs. 5 5.46 
Group 3 Year 1 vs. 5 13.64 
Group 1 Year 1 and 2 vs. 4 
and 5 
-4.05 
Group 3 Year 1 and 2 vs. 4 
and 5 
12.80 
ORHS Data  
Group 1 Year 1 vs. 5 -3.13 
Group 3 Year 1 vs. 5 21.63 
Group 1 Year 1 and 2 vs. 4 
and 5 
-26.50 
Group 3 Year 1 and 2 vs. 4 
and 5 
-2.00 
FHS Data  
Group 1 Year 1 vs. 5 3.37 
Group 3 Year 1 vs. 5 6.05 
Group 1 Year 1 and 2 vs. 4 
and 5 
6.47 
Group 3 Year 1 and 2 vs. 4 
and 5 
17.68 
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Referral Patterns over Time 
     Hypothesis 1 stated that the orthopaedic physicians were expected to reduce their 
referrals per physician to the hospital system OPPT clinics once they joined POPTS as 
compared to the number of referrals per physician made by non-POPTS orthopaedic 
physicians over the same time period.  
Hypothesis 1- Analyses for Year 1 versus 5 
     These tests demonstrated that the interaction between physician group and status was 
not statistically significant (Tables 20 and 21). In other words, Group 1 physicians‘ 
conversion to ownership of physical therapy services did not produce a difference in 
referral patterns between the physician groups when compared to the referral patterns 
prior to the transition year. These results occurred when the analyses were performed 
using aggregate referrals to both hospital systems and with referrals to the individual 
hospital systems. Outputs for these tests are included as Tests 1, 2, and 3 in Appendix J.  
Table 20. Type III tests of fixed effects for year 1 versus 5. 
Years of 
Data 
Source Numerator df Denominator df F Significance 
Aggregate 
1 vs. 5 
Intercept 1 45.000 51.873 .000 
PHYSCD 1 45.000 6.567 .014 
STATUS 1 45.000 1.065 .307 
PHYSCD*STATUS 1 45.000 .632 .431 
ORHS 
1 vs. 5 
Intercept 1 14.000 43.055 .000 
PHYSCD 1 14.000 .201 .661 
STATUS 1 14.000 1.297 .274 
PHYSCD*STATUS 1 14.000 2.321 .150 
FHS 
1 vs. 5 
Intercept 1 36.000 40.304 .000 
PHYSCD 1 36.000 5.081 .030 
STATUS 1 36.000 .497 .485 
PHYSCD*STATUS 1 36.000 .100 .754 
Dependent Variable: REFNO. 
PHYSCD= Physician group 
STATUS= Pre or post year 3 (transition year) 
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Table 21. Estimated marginal means for physician groups for year 1 versus 5. 
 
     Confidence Interval 
 PHYSCD Mean Std. Error df Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Aggregate  
1 vs. 5 
Group 1 92.477 13.814 45.000 64.654 120.300 
Group 3 43.940 12.959 45.000 17.840 70.040 
ORHS  
1 vs. 5 
Group 1 41.063 8.284 14.000 23.294 58.831 
Group 3 35.813 8.284 14.000 18.044 53.581 
FHS  
1 vs. 5 
Group 1 89.789 14.761 36.000 59.853 119.726 
Group 3 42.737 14.761 36.000 12.800 72.673 
Dependent Variable: REFNO. 
PHYSCD= Physician group 
 
Hypothesis 1- Sensitivity Analyses 
     The addition of referral data from years 2 and 4 to the analysis produced similar 
results during statistical testing (Tables 22 and 23). There was a main effect for physician 
group; however, the interaction between physician group and status was not statistically 
significant. Outputs for these tests are included as Tests 4, 5, and 6 in Appendix J.   
Table 22. Type III tests of fixed effects for years 1 and 2 versus 4 and 5. 
Years of 
Data 
Source Numerator 
df 
Denominator 
df 
F Significance 
Aggregate 
1 and 2  
vs. 4 and 
5 
Intercept 1 45.000 54.030 .000 
PHYSCD 1 45.000 6.812 .012 
STATUS 1 45.000 .120 .730 
PHYSCD*STATUS 1 45.000 .446 .508 
ORHS 
1 and 2  
vs. 4 and 
5 
Intercept 1 14.000 34.840 .000 
PHYSCD 1 14.000 .020 .889 
STATUS 1 14.000 .695 .418 
PHYSCD*STATUS 1 14.000 .514 .485 
FHS 
1 and 2  
vs. 4 and 
5 
Intercept 1 36.000 42.163 .000 
PHYSCD 1 36.000 6.336 .016 
STATUS 1 36.000 .759 .390 
PHYSCD*STATUS 1 36.000 .163 .688 
Dependent Variable: REFNO. 
PHYSCD= Physician group 
STATUS= Pre or post year 3 (transition year) 
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Table 23. Estimated marginal means for physician groups for years 1 and 2 versus 4  
and 5. 
     Confidence Interval 
 PHYSCD Mean Std. Error df Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Aggregate  
1 and 2  
vs. 4 and 
5 
Group 1 225.159 32.973 45.000 158.748 291.570 
Group 3 107.160 30.931 45.000 44.861 169.459 
ORHS  
1 and 2  
vs. 4 and 
5 
Group 1 101.375 24.888 14.000 47.999 154.754 
 Group 3 106.375 24.888 14.000 52.996 159.754 
FHS  
1 and 2  
vs. 4 and 
5 
Group 1 218.026 34.220 36.000 148.625 287.427 
Group 3 96.211 34.220 36.000 26.809 165.612 
Dependent Variable: REFNO. 
PHYSCD= Physician group 
 
Point Estimation and Between Groups Comparisons for Total Referrals  
     Table 24 provides the between group mean differences and 95% confidence intervals 
for changes in referrals  between the Group 1 and Group 3 physicians. Each group‘s 
changes in mean referrals were calculated POST – PRE. These changes were then 
compared between Group 1 and Group 3 (Group 1 – Group 3 = mean differences).  
     The negative values of the mean differences in change scores (Table 24) indicate that 
the increase in the referrals for Group 1 was less than the increase in referrals for Group 3 
PRE to POST. This finding is consistent with research Hypothesis 1 which predicted a 
reduction in referrals to the hospital-based OPPT clinics once the Group 1 physicians 
transitioned to POPTS. The confidence intervals, however, show the relative imprecision 
of the statistical models which suggests that sample size may have influenced the models‘ 
abilities to detect differences between the physician groups for referrals to OPPT.  
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Table 24. Group1 – Group 3 differences for changes in mean referrals (POST–PRE) and 
the 95% confidence intervals. 
Group1 – Group 3 
Differences for Changes in 
Means 
Paired Differences 
Mean 
Differences 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence Intervals of the 
Differences 
Lower Upper 
Aggregate Data Both 
Hospitals 
    
Group 1 vs. 3 for Year 1  
vs. 5 
-8.19 15.17 -38.73 22.36 
Group 1 vs. 3 for Year 1 and 2 
vs. 4 and 5 
-16.85 25.22 -67.65 33.96 
ORHS Data     
Group 1 vs. 3 for Year 1  
vs. 5 
-24.75 16.25 -59.59 10.09 
Group 1 vs. 3 for Year 1 and 2 
vs. 4 and 5 
-24.50 34.18 -97.81 48.81 
FHS Data     
Group 1 vs. 3 for Year 1  
vs. 5 
-2.68 17.43 -38.04 32.67 
Group 1 vs. 3 for Year 1 and 2 
vs. 4 and 5 
-11.21 27.74 -67.46 45.04 
 
Based upon the findings of the primary statistical and sensitivity analyses, Hypothesis 1 
was rejected; however, the point estimations and confidence intervals suggest that with a 
larger sample size, the hypothesized relationship between physicians‘ ownership of 
OPPT services and their referrals for those services may be revealed. 
Hypotheses 2-4 
     Hypotheses 2-4 were tested by examining the influence of physician group, ownership 
status, and payer type on referrals. Hypothesis 2 stated that the hospital system OPPT 
clinics were expected to receive a significantly decreased number of referrals per 
physician of commercially insured patients from orthopaedic physicians who transitioned 
to POPTS practices as compared to the number of commercially insured patients from 
non-POPTS orthopaedic physicians over the same time period. Table 25 provides the 
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total numbers of commercial referrals from the paired physicians for years 1 and 5 of the 
study period.  
Table 25. Commercial referrals to ORHS year 1 versus 5. 
Commercial Insurance Number of 
Referrals 
Physician 
Group 
STATUS Year 1 vs. 5 
Group 1  
(N=8) 
PRE 329 
POST 232 
Group 1 Total 561 
Group 3 
(N=8) 
PRE 182 
POST 263 
Group 3 Total 445 
Grand Total 1006 
 
     Hypothesis 3 stated that the hospital system OPPT clinics were expected to receive a 
significantly increased number of referrals per physician of Medicare insured patients 
from orthopaedic physicians who transitioned to POPTS practices as compared to the 
number of Medicare insured patients referred from non-POPTS orthopaedic physicians 
over the same time period. Table 26 provides the total numbers of Medicare referrals 
from the paired physicians for years 1 and 5 of the study period.  
Table 26. Medicare referrals to ORHS year 1 versus 5. 
Medicare Number of 
Referrals 
Physician 
Group 
STATUS Year 1 vs. 5 
Group 1  
(N=8) 
PRE 5 
POST 71 
Group 1 Total 76 
Group 3 
(N=8) 
PRE 18 
POST 105 
Group 3 Total 123 
Grand Total 199 
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     Finally, Hypothesis 4 stated that the hospital system OPPT clinics were expected to 
receive a significantly increased number of referrals per physician of underinsured 
patients from orthopaedic physicians who transitioned to POPTS practices as compared 
to the number of underinsured patients referred by non-POPTS orthopaedic physicians 
over the same time period. Table 27 provides the total numbers of other insurance 
referrals from the paired physicians for years 1 and 5 of the study period.  
Table 27. Other referrals to ORHS year 1 versus 5. 
Other Insurance Number of 
Referrals 
Physician 
Group 
STATUS Year 1 vs. 5 
Group 1  
(N=8) 
PRE 7 
POST 13 
Group 1 Total 20 
Group 3 
(N=8) 
PRE 0 
POST 5 
Group 3 Total 5 
Grand Total 25 
 
The data represented in Tables 25-27 were used to test Hypotheses 2-4. Table 28 
provides the mean differences in referrals by payer type between the PRE and POST 
time periods for the Group 1 and Group 3 physicians. 
Hypotheses 2-4- Analyses for Year 1 versus 5 
 
     The interaction between physician group, ownership status, and payer type was not 
statistically significant (P=0.268; Table 29). The estimated marginal means for the 
PAYCD by STATUS interaction (Table 30) suggested a difference in referral patterns 
for Medicare patients following the transition period that was confirmed statistically  
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Table 28. Changes in mean referrals to ORHS by payer type (POST–PRE). 
Changes in Means =  
POST-PRE 
 
Changes in Mean  
Referrals 
ORHS Data Commercial  
Group 1 Year 1 vs. 5 -12.13 
Group 3 Year 1 vs. 5 10.13 
Group 1 Year 1 and 2 vs. 4 and 5 -38.88 
Group 3 Year 1 and 2 vs. 4 and 5 -9.25 
ORHS Data Medicare  
Group 1 Year 1 vs. 5 8.25 
Group 3 Year 1 vs. 5 10.88 
Group 1 Year 1 and 2 vs. 4 and 5 9.63 
Group 3 Year 1 and 2 vs. 4 and 5 11.88 
ORHS Data Other  
Group 1 Year 1 vs. 5 0.75 
Group 3 Year 1 vs. 5 0.13 
Group 1 Year 1 and 2 vs. 4 and 5 3.25 
Group 3 Year 1 and 2 vs. 4 and 5 -4.63 
 
Table 29. Type III tests of fixed effects for ORHS year 1 versus 5.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 14.000 43.055 .000 
1 14.000 .201 .661 
1 14.000 1.297 .274 
2 14.000 19.855 .000 
1 14.000 2.321 .150 
2 14.000 .655 .535 
2 14.000 5.086 .022 
2 14.000 1.449 .268 
Source 
Intercept 
PHYSCD 
STATUS 
PAYCD 
PHYSCD * STATUS 
PHYSCD * PAYCD 
STATUS * PAYCD 
PHYSCD * STATUS 
* PAYCD 
Numerator df 
Denominator 
df F Sig. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO. 
PHYSCD= Physician group 
STATUS= Pre or post year 3 (transition year) 
PAYCD= Payer type associated with the referral 
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Table 30. Estimated marginal means of payer type and status for ORHS year 1 versus 5. 
 
PAYCD*STATUS 
PAYCD STATUS Mean 
Std. 
Error 
df 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
COMMERCIAL PRE 
POST 
31.938 5.537 14.000 20.063 43.812 
30.938 6.710 14.000 16.545 45.330 
MEDICARE PRE 
POST 
1.438 .811 14.000 -.302 3.177 
11.000 3.642 14.000 3.188 18.812 
OTHER PRE 
POST 
.438 .371 14.000 -.359 1.234 
1.125 .399 14.000 .268 1.982 
Dependent Variable: REFNO. 
 
STATUS= Pre or post year 3 (transition year) 
PAYCD= Payer type associated with the referral 
 
(p=0.024; Test 7 in Appendix J). However, this change was not significantly different 
between Group 1 and Group 3 physicians. Tables 31-33 provide the total numbers of 
referrals from each of the payer types made by the paired physicians for years 1, 2, 4, and 
5 of the study period. The data from the Group 1 physicians‘ transition years and the 
paired Group 3 physicians‘ same years are not included. The data represented in these 
tables were used for the sensitivity analyses of Hypotheses 2-4. 
Table 31. Commercial referrals to ORHS years 1 and 2 versus 4 and 5. 
Commercial Insurance Number of 
Referrals 
Physician 
Group 
STATUS Years 1 and 2 
vs. 4 and 5 
Group 1  
(N=8) 
PRE 839 
POST 552 
Group 1 Total 1391 
Group 3 
(N=8) 
PRE 643 
POST 569 
Group 3 Total 1212 
Grand Total 2603 
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Table 32. Medicare referrals to ORHS years 1 and 2 versus 4 and 5. 
Medicare Number of 
Referrals 
Physician 
Group 
STATUS Years 1 and 2 
vs. 4 and 5 
Group 1  
(N=8) 
PRE 23 
POST 100 
Group 1 Total 123 
Group 3 
(N=8) 
PRE 119 
POST 214 
Group 3 Total 333 
Grand Total 456 
 
Table 33. Other referrals to ORHS years 1 and 2 versus 4 and 5. 
Other Insurance Number of 
Referrals 
Physician 
Group 
STATUS Years 1 and 2 
vs. 4 and 5 
Group 1  
(N=8) 
PRE 13 
POST 39 
Group 1 Total 52 
Group 3 
(N=8) 
PRE 97 
POST 60 
Group 3 Total 157 
Grand Total 209 
 
Hypotheses 2-4- Sensitivity Analyses 
     The addition of referral data from years 2 and 4 did not produce a statistically 
significant interaction between physician group, ownership status, and payer type 
(p=0.519; Table 34). In addition, the interaction between status and payer type was lost 
(p=0.067; Table 34). The sensitivity analyses showed no statistically significant change 
in commercial referrals, Medicare referrals, or referrals with other types of insurance over 
the study period. Output for this test is included as Test 8 in Appendix J.  
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Table 34. Type III tests of fixed effects for ORHS years 1 and 2 versus 4 and 5. 
 
 
 
Point Estimation and Between Groups Comparisons for Referrals by Payer Type 
     Table 35 provides the mean differences between the Group 1 and Group 3 physicians 
and the 95% confidence interval of those differences in referrals by payer type. The 
negative values of the mean differences in change scores (Table 35) for commercial 
insurance indicate a decrease in the rate of commercial referrals made to the hospital-
based OPPT clinics PRE to POST by Group 1 relative to Group 3. The negative values 
of the mean differences in change scores for Medicare referrals indicate a decrease in the 
rate of Medicare referrals made to the hospital-based OPPT clinics PRE to POST by 
Group 1 relative to Group 3. Finally, the positive values of the mean differences in 
change scores for referrals with other types of insurance indicate an increase in the rate of 
other types of referrals made to the hospital-based OPPT clinics PRE to POST by Group 
1 relative to Group 3. 
1 14.000 32.556 .000 
1 14.000 .056 .816 
1 14.000 .514 .485 
2 14.000 14.034 .000 
1 14.000 .363 .556 
2 14.000 1.132 .350 
2 14.000 3.310 .067 
2 14.000 .687 .519 
Source 
Intercept 
PHYSCD 
STATUS 
PAYCD 
PHYSCD * STATUS 
PHYSCD * PAYCD 
STATUS * PAYCD 
PHYSCD * STATUS 
* PAYCD 
Numerator df 
Denominator 
df F Sig. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO. 
 
PHYSCD= Physician group 
STATUS= Pre or post year 3 (transition year) 
PAYCD= Payer type associated with the referral 
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Table 35. Groups 1 – Group 3 differences for changes in mean referrals (POST–PRE) 
by payer type and the 95% confidence intervals. 
Group 1 – Group 3 Differences for 
Changes in Means 
Paired Differences 
Mean 
Differences 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence Intervals of the 
Differences 
Lower Upper 
ORHS Data Commercial     
Group 1 vs. 3 for Year 1 vs. 5 -22.25 13.46 -51.13 6.63 
Group 1 vs. 3 for Year 1 and 2  
vs. 4 and 5 
-26.63 31.66 -94.53 41.28 
ORHS Data Medicare     
Group 1 vs. 3 for Year 1 vs. 5 -2.63 5.98 -15.44 10.19 
Group 1 vs. 3 for Year 1 and 2  
vs. 4 and 5 
-2.25 6.28 -15.71 11.21 
ORHS Data Other     
Group 1 vs. 3 for Year 1 vs. 5 0.63 0.85 -1.20 2.45 
Group 1 vs. 3 for Year 1 and 2  
vs. 4 and 5 
7.88 9.68 -12.88 28.63 
 
     The confidence intervals for each of these point estimations show the relative 
imprecision of the statistical models and point to the influence that sample size may have 
had on the statistical the models‘ abilities to detect differences between the physician 
groups (Table 35).  Based upon the findings of the primary statistical and sensitivity 
analyses (Tests 7 and 8 in Appendix J), Hypotheses 2-4 were rejected. 
Summary 
     The hypothesis testing did not demonstrate a significant change in referrals per 
physician following orthopedic physicians‘ transition to POPTS. The two physician 
groups referred differently during the study period, but ownership status did not appear to 
influence the referrals. Hypothesis 1 was not supported in any of the statistical models. 
Hypotheses 2-4 regarding the influence of payer type on referral patterns from POPTS 
physicians also were not supported. Descriptive differences in referrals of patients with 
commercial insurance versus those with Medicare and other types of insurance were not 
dependent upon physician group or ownership status. Point estimation and 95% 
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confidence intervals for mean differences between Group1 and Group 3 suggested that 
the hypothesized relationships between physician ownership of PT services and total 
referrals, commercial referrals, and underinsured referrals may exist, but the small 
samples sizes limited the power of the statistical tests and their abilities to detect 
differences between the groups. 
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CHAPTER VI: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
     This chapter discusses the findings for the research questions and integrates those 
findings with existing literature pertaining to the influence of physician ownership on 
referral behaviors. The roles of other factors that may influence physicians‘ referrals are 
also explored. Finally, the study‘s limitations and implications are provided, and 
directions for future research are addressed. 
The Influence of Physician Ownership on Total Referrals 
Findings for Hypothesis 1 
     There was no statistically significant difference between the Group 1 and Group 3 
physicians in total referrals made to ORHS and FHS over the study period. In other 
words, physicians‘ ownership of physical therapy services was not a statistically 
significant factor in determining the number of referrals made to the hospital-based OPPT 
clinics over the five year period. One potential explanation for this finding is that overall 
population growth in the region created an increased volume of patients for both 
physician groups (Table 2 on pg. 69 of this dissertation). If the Group 1 physician 
practices did not have the capacity to absorb an excess demand for physical therapy 
services, then their referral rates to the hospital-based OPPT clinics may not have differed 
meaningfully from the Group 3 physician referral rates.  However, analysis of the 
139 
 
descriptive referral data only for the Group 1 and Group 3 physicians included in the 
hypothesis testing revealed a more complicated picture. 
    Prior to 2001, referrals in aggregate from both the Group 1 and Group 3 physicians 
grew (Figures 18-20). After 2002, referrals from both groups started to decline, although 
the referral patterns to each individual facility differed. For ORHS, there was a dip in 
referrals in 2003, followed by an increase in 2004 and another decline in 2005 from both 
Group 1 and Group 3 physicians (Figure 19). Despite these fluctuations, the referrals to 
ORHS from both physicians‘ groups were always above the baseline number of referrals 
made in 1999. Meanwhile, FHS saw a spike in its referrals from Group 1 physicians in 
2003 and then a decline below baseline between 2004 and 2006 (Figure 20). Group 3 
physicians‘ referrals hovered around the baseline value throughout the study period. 
Interestingly, the referral patterns from the Group 1 and Group 3 physicians tended to 
mirror each other throughout the study period. One possible explanation for this 
observation is that, in spite of ownership status, there is regional consistency in 
orthopaedists‘ decision-making related to referral to PT services. Unfortunately, the 
extent to which physicians in this market interact and share similar management 
strategies cannot be captured through hospital-system data. However, the common 
patterns in referrals from both groups are consistent with the outcome of the statistical 
testing for this hypothesis.  
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Figure 18. Referrals to both hospital systems by paired physician groups. *ORHS 
contributed data for only the first three-quarters of 2005 and no data for 2006 or 2007. 
FHS contributed data only for the first three-quarters of 2007. 
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Figure 19. Referrals to ORHS by paired physician groups. *ORHS contributed data for 
only the first three-quarters of 2005. 
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Figure 20. Referrals to FHS by paired physician groups.*FHS contributed data only for 
the first three-quarters of 2007. 
 
   Population growth may explain why the referral rates for Group 3 physicians surpassed 
and remained above the Group 1 physicians in the ORHS data. The increase in the 
population may also explain why the overall referrals from both groups made to ORHS 
exceeded the baseline number of referrals made in 1999 over time. However, the overall 
decline in referrals from both groups depicted in Figure 19 suggests that any increased 
demand for physical therapy services was met through other means.      
     Location may influence patients‘ choices of providers because of time and 
transportation costs. The Orlando Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) is 110.2 square 
miles and includes three counties (City of Orlando, 2011). While the hospital-based 
OPPT providers are located in numerous parts of the Orlando MSA, the distances that 
patients must travel to be able to access these clinics may still be a factor in their 
decisions to pursue OPPT at these clinics (Appendix G). Table 36 shows the county 
locations of the POPTS OPPT clinics, the non-POPTS physician practices, the hospital- 
Referrals to FHS by Paired Physician 
Groups 
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Table 36. Clinic locations around Orlando metropolitan area.    
Locations 
Orange 
County 
Osceola 
County 
Seminole 
County 
Other* 
POPTS Practices  13 0 1 0 
Non-POPTS Practices 40 13 16 2 
ORHS OPPT Clinics 5 (2 closed) 1 1 (2 closed) 0 
FHS OPPT Clinics 8 2 3 0 
Other OPPT Clinics 27 4 19 3 
Total = POPTS + OPPT Clinics 53 7 24 3 
*Location outside of but in close proximity to Orlando MSA. 
 
 based OPPT clinics, and the other OPPT clinics. The concentration of physician and 
OPPT practices in Orange County is understandable given that the population is also 
densest in this region (previous Table 2). Of note is the high number of other OPPT 
practices in Orange as well as Seminole counties. Growth of new OPPT practices 
increased markedly between 1999 and 2003 (previous Figure 9). If these competitors 
were more accessible to patients in need of OPPT services, they may have absorbed some 
of the referrals by both Group 1 and Group 3 physicians that would have otherwise been 
made to the hospital-based OPPT clinics. 
     It is possible that there is no difference between how Group 1 and Group 3 physicians 
changed their referral patterns over the study period. In addition, regional physician 
practice variation, population growth, and clinic locations, may have also contributed to 
the lack of statistical significance in the tests of Hypothesis 1. It is also possible that 
small sample sizes may have led to an underpowered study. For example, the direction 
and magnitude of change in referrals PRE to POST indicates that the Group 1 physicians 
were increasing their referrals at a slower rate than the Group 3 physicians in aggregate 
and to each individual hospital system (previous Table 19 and Table 24). However, the 
relatively large confidence intervals calculated for the Group 1 and Group 3 comparisons 
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(previous Table 24) are a result of the small sample size and highlight the imprecision of 
the statistical models. The potential influence of sample size on the hypothesis testing is 
explored in more depth in the Limitations section of this chapter.      
The Interaction of Ownership and Payer Type 
Findings for Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 
     This study investigated a theorized relationship between physicians‘ ownership of 
physical therapy services, patients‘ payer types, and referrals made to hospital-based 
OPPT clinics. The combined influence of ownership status and each of three levels of 
insurance type were explored to see if there was a difference between the referrals of 
more lucrative and less lucrative insurance types made by physicians who joined POPTS 
versus non-POPTS physicians. These hypotheses were explored only with the ORHS 
data, because FHS was unable to provide payer data for this study.  
Commercial Insurance 
     Theory suggests that physicians who become owners of physical therapy services will 
work to retain patients with lucrative sources of reimbursement (i.e., commercial 
insurance) for their own practices and refer other types of patients (i.e., Medicare and 
other) to outside providers (Ahern & Scott, 1992). The researcher hypothesized that 
OPPT clinics would receive significantly fewer commercial referrals per year from 
orthopaedic physicians who transitioned to POPTS as compared to the number of 
commercially insured patients referred from non-POPTS orthopaedic physicians over the 
same time period (Hypothesis 2). Statistical testing showed that ownership was not a 
significant factor in the referrals of commercially insured patients to ORHS for OPPT. 
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These findings suggest that physicians‘ referrals to the hospital-based OPPT clinics were 
not influenced by the patients‘ payer type but rather by other factors.  
     The results of previous studies and of the present research suggest that physicians‘ 
referral behaviors are complex and cannot be predicted by a single factor such as 
ownership interest in services to which they make referrals. Factors that have been shown 
to influence physicians‘ referrals for physical therapy include patient characteristics 
(Ehrmann-Feldman, Rossignol, Abenhaim, & Gobeille, 1996; Freburger, Carey, & 
Holmes, 2005; Freburger, Holmes, & Carey, 2003; Jorgensen & Olesen, 2001) , 
physicians‘ experiences with and attitudes toward physical therapy (Clemence & 
Seamark, 2003; Freburger, et al., 2005; Kerssens & Groenewegen, 1990; Stanton, Fox, 
Frangos, & et al., 1985; Uili, Shepard, & Savinar, 1984) , and physicians‘ expectations 
for physical and motor outcomes resulting from physical therapy interventions (Archer, 
MacKenzie, Bosse, Pollak, & Riley III, 2009).  
Ehrmann-Feldman and colleagues examined patient factors associated with 
physicians‘ referrals of Canadian workers experiencing low back pain. These authors 
found that older individuals, females, and persons with specific diagnoses were more 
likely to be referred to a PT (Ehrmann-Feldman, et al., 1996). Jorgensen and Olesen 
(2001) used survey data along with information from a county health insurance register to 
describe referral rates from general practitioners (GP‘s) to physical therapy. According to 
this study, women were more likely than men to be referred for PT. In addition, the 
numbers of referrals also varied between physician practices. However, these factors 
predicted only a small portion of the variability observed in the data.  
145 
 
     In a 2003 cross-sectional analysis of the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey 
(NAMCS), Freburger and colleagues identified insurance status and physician 
characteristics as predictors of PT referral. PCP‘s were more likely to refer for PT if their 
patients had private insurance or non-managed care plans. Orthopedic surgeons were 
more likely than PCP‘s to refer patients for PT, especially if those patients were covered 
by workers' compensation or managed care. D.O.‘s were more likely than allopathic 
physicians to refer for PT (Freburger, et al., 2003). Freburger and colleagues (2005) also 
examined data collected at 20 U.S. spine centers participating in the National Spine 
Network. These authors showed that patients with certain spinal disorder diagnoses, with 
more education, females, and patients less than 50 years of age were more likely to be 
referred for PT. In addition, there was variability in PT referral rates dependent upon 
which spinal center the patient visited. Due to their limited data set, the authors were not 
able to comment on whether insurance or illness severity may have influenced the 
referrals. 
     Clemence and Seamark (2003) conducted a series of interviews of GP‘s, physical 
therapists, and patients participating in the National Health System of the United 
Kingdom. GPs‘ past experience with physical therapy was described as affecting all of 
the surveyed GPs‘ uses of physical therapy services. The GP‘s suggested that experience 
gained in clinical practice appeared to be more important than formal training. This 
finding supports the previous work of Stanton and colleagues (1985) who conducted a 
survey of resident physicians in order to determine if these physicians felt they had 
adequate information and training to effectively refer patients to physical therapy. Their 
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findings suggested the presence of a knowledge deficit among many resident physicians 
regarding physical therapy evaluations and treatments. The authors proposed that 
additional education of physicians regarding physical therapy is necessary beyond 
medical school and resident training (Stanton, et al., 1985). In a similar study, Uili and 
colleagues (1984) conducted a U.S. survey of physicians in multiple subspecialties to 
determine their knowledge and utilization of physical therapy services. Physical medicine 
and rehabilitation specialists and physicians who had been in practice ten years or more 
had the most knowledge of physical therapy procedures and were most likely to refer for 
PT services (Uili, et al., 1984).  
     A 2009 study by Archer and colleagues explored the influence of physician and 
practice characteristics, physicians‘ outcome expectations, and physicians‘ attitudes 
toward physical therapy on referrals of patients with traumatic lower-extremity injury to 
PT. A cross-sectional survey was conducted using case vignettes. The authors found that 
on average, the surgeons felt that 57.6% of their patients with traumatic lower-extremity 
injury referred for physical therapy would have a positive health outcome. The surgeons 
expected the best outcomes for use of assistive devices, strength, and range of motion. 
The poorest outcome was expected for prevention of chronic pain. Nearly one-third of the 
patients in the case vignettes (32.6%) were expected to have no health benefit beyond 
what would occur with a surgeon-directed home exercise program, 27.2% were expected 
to have no improvement beyond what would naturally occur, and an additional 24.2% 
were anticipated to have negative outcomes from physical therapy. Positive physician 
outcome expectations for patients‘ improvements in physical and motor outcomes were 
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predictive of referrals for PT (odds ratio= 2.7, p<0.001) (Archer, et al., 2009). These 
findings highlight the importance of expectations for outcomes in the decision-making of 
physicians who are considering referral for physical therapy. The authors suggested that 
low referral rates may in part be attributed to physicians‘ preferences for surgeon-
directed, home-based exercises rather than physical therapy (Archer, et al., 2009). This 
study used only case vignettes, however, and did not attempt to examine physicians‘ 
actual referral behaviors which may be influence by other factors as well. 
     With regard to physicians‘ referrals in general, Shea and colleagues (1999) determined 
referrals occur between primary care physicians (PCP), between specialists, and between 
PCP‘s and specialists. In their study, patient incomes and levels of education, health 
conditions, and insurance type appeared to be significant factors in referrals between 
physicians (Shea, Stuart, Vasey, & Nag, 1999). Through a national survey of primary 
care physicians, Kinchen and colleagues showed that the medical skill of the specialist to 
whom the primary care physician was referring, the timeliness of the appointments their 
patients received, the previous experience of the PCP with the specialists, the quality of 
communication from the specialists, and the specialist‘s history of returning the referred 
patients back to the PCP‘s also influence referrals for specialty services (Kinchen, 
Cooper, Levine, Wang, & Powe, 2004). Finally, Franks and colleagues showed that 
female physicians, physicians with more experience, physician specialists, physicians 
who saw patients with a narrower range of diagnoses, and physicians who were risk 
averse were more likely to make referrals (Franks, Williams, Zwanziger, Mooney, & 
Sorbero, 2000). 
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     The findings of these studies and of the present research reveal some of the 
complexity of physicians‘ referral behaviors. In comparison to the referral behaviors of 
the Group 1 physicians, Group 0 physicians‘ data showed that physicians who were 
owners of POPTS throughout 1999-2005 appeared to increase their referrals of 
commercially insured patients to ORHS over time (Table 2 in Appendix I). These 
descriptive data support the idea that factors other than ownership may have provided a 
greater influence on the Group 0 physicians‘ referral decisions. On the other hand, it is 
possible that these physicians had reached their capacity to provide physical therapy 
services to their patients, so they needed to make referrals to other providers to handle the 
overflow of new patients. Access to proprietary physician data is necessary to determine 
whether these resource constraints actually influenced referral patterns from these 
physicians. 
      Although physicians‘ referral behaviors are complex and do not appear to be fully 
explained by ownership status, evidence of a potential influence of POPTS status on the 
Group 1 physicians‘ referrals of patients with commercial insurance was seen in the 
calculations of mean differences in these referrals between the Group 1 and Group 3 
physicians over time (previous Table 35). Compared to the Group 3 physicians, Group 1 
physicians decreased their mean referrals of commercially insured patients between 22.3 
and 26.6 patients. However, the wide 95% confidence interval suggests that the sample 
size was insufficient to detect a significant difference between the groups.   
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Medicare 
     Ahern and Scott‘s (1992) theory suggests that patients with Medicare would likely be 
selectively referred by POPTS to outside providers. The researcher hypothesized that 
hospital-based OPPT clinics would receive a significantly increased number of Medicare 
referrals per year from orthopaedic physicians who transitioned to POPTS practices as 
compared to Medicare referrals per year from non-POPTS orthopaedic physicians 
(Hypothesis 3). However, statistical testing showed that ownership was not a significant 
factor in the referrals of Medicare insured patients to the ORHS OPPT clinics. The 
hypothesis testing revealed no significant difference between the physician groups for 
changes in Medicare referrals, and no influence of POPTS status on the Group 1 
physicians‘ referrals of patients with Medicare was seen in the calculations of mean 
differences between the Group 1 and Group 3 physicians over time (previous Table 35). 
Compared to the Group 3 physicians, Group 1 physicians decreased their mean referrals 
of Medicare-insured patients between 2.25 and 2.63 patients.   
     These findings again suggest that physician owners of OPPT clinics did not alter their 
referrals based upon patients‘ insurance types. However, volume increases due to 
increases in the local population may have overcome differences in referral patterns 
between the groups. An overall increase in Medicare referrals was predictable, 
considering the census data for the region showed growth in the elderly population. 
Another possible explanation is that the difference in reimbursement rates from 
commercially insured patients and Medicare patients may not have been large enough to 
provide a financial incentive for physicians to selectively refer Medicare patients. A list 
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of physical therapy procedures that are commonly performed in outpatient physical 
therapy clinics and their reimbursements from Florida‘s Medicare administrative 
contractors (MAC) and fiscal intermediaries (FI) over the study period are listed in Table 
37 (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2011). The majority of the physical 
therapy procedures had increasing reimbursement over the study period. The rates of 
change in the reimbursement for the procedures are also included in this table (Table 37).  
Table 37. Medicare reimbursement for physical therapy services over the study period 
(Florida only).  
Common 
Procedural 
Terminology 
Code 
Procedure Reimbursement per Procedure 
in U.S. Dollars 
(% Change in Reimbursement) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
97001 Physical Therapy 
Evaluation 
60.54 68.56 
(↑13.2%) 
66.11 
(↑9.2%) 
66.11 73.43 
(↑21.3%) 
74.61 
(↑23.2) 
97032 Electrical 
Stimulation 
(Attended) 
16.35 18.88 
(↑15.5) 
16.47 
(↑0.7%) 
16.47 15.46 
(↓5.4%) 
15.66 
(↓4.2%) 
97035 Ultrasound 12.15 14.13 
(↑16.3) 
10.61 
(↓12.7%) 
10.61 12.20 
(↑0.4%) 
12.00 
(↓1.2) 
97110 Therapeutic 
Exercise 
22.94 24.79 
(↑8.1%) 
25.82 
(↑12.6%) 
25.82 28.59 
(↑24.6%) 
27.64 
(↑20.5%) 
97112 Neuromuscular 
Reeducation 
23.98 27.20 
(↑13.4%) 
26.73 
(↑11.5%) 
26.73 28.35 
(↑11.5%) 
29.06 
(↑21.2%) 
97116 Gait Training 21.36 25.33 
(↑18.6%) 
22.22 
(↑4.0%) 
23.98 
(↑12.3%) 
24.36 
(↑14.0%) 
24.19 
(↑13.2%) 
97124 Massage 19.58 
 
22.25 
(↑13.6%) 
20.00 
(↑2.1%) 
21.37 
(↑9.1%) 
21.67 
(↑10.7%) 
21.94 
(↑12.1%) 
97140 Manual Therapy 26.04 
 
28.26 
(↑8.5%) 
23.97 
(↓7.9%) 
25.75 
(↓1.1%) 
26.19 
(↑0.6%) 
26.17 
(↑0.5%) 
% Change relative to base year (2000). 
 
If the Medicare rates of reimbursement were similar to commercial rates of 
reimbursement for the same procedures, there would not have been a significant financial 
incentive for entrepreneurial physicians to externally refer patients who had Medicare. 
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The investigator was unable to compare Medicare‘s reimbursement rates with those of 
the commercial payers, however, because the commercial insurance fee schedules are not 
publicly available. Additional research is needed to determine if these other factors play a 
role in the Medicare referrals made by othopaedic physicians for outpatient physical 
therapy. 
Other Types of Insurance 
     Ahern and Scott‘s (1992) theory suggests that underinsured patients would likely be 
selectively referred by POPTS physicians to outside providers. The researcher 
hypothesized that OPPT clinics would receive a significantly increased number of 
underinsured referrals per year from orthopaedic physicians who transitioned to POPTS 
practices as compared to underinsured referrals per year from non-POPTS orthopaedic 
physicians (Hypothesis 4). In the statistical tests, physician ownership of OPPT clinics 
did not appear to influence the numbers of underinsured referrals made to the hospital-
based OPPT clinics. It may be that the orthopaedic physicians in this study were not 
influenced by their patients‘ insurance status when making referrals for OPPT. It is also 
possible that patients‘ financial constraints and increases in the overall numbers of 
uninsured/underinsured patients might have masked potential changes in referral patterns.
     The census data for Orlando showed that the numbers of children and persons living 
in poverty was increasing over the study period and that Medicaid enrollment for the 
region was also rising (previous Tables 2-4). Both the Group 1 and Group 3 physicians 
increased their overall referrals of underinsured patients over the same time frame. 
However, the underinsured referrals from the Group 1 physicians failed to keep pace with 
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the growing rates of Medicaid enrollees in the Orlando area, while the underinsured 
referrals from Group 3 were proportional to the percentages of Medicaid enrollees in 
Orlando (previous Table 4). One possibility for the difference in the rates of Medicaid 
referrals between the two physician groups is that the Group 3 physicians were treating 
more underinsured patients and subsequently had more of these patients available for 
referral to OPPT. However, the greatest increase in Medicaid enrollment occurred 
between 2004 and 2006, a period outside of the timeline of the present research. Data for 
this time period were not available due to the incomplete ORHS data set. Therefore, the 
time frame available for this analysis may not have been sufficient to detect an impact 
from increased Medicaid enrollment on the referral patterns of the Group 1 physicians.    
      As was the case with referral patterns for patients with commercial insurance, a 
potential influence of POPTS status on the Group 1 physicians‘ was seen over time in the 
calculations of mean differences in referrals of underinsured patients between the Group 
1 and Group 3 physicians (previous Table 35). Compared to the Group 3 physicians, 
Group 1 physicians increased their mean referrals of underinsured patients by up to 7.87 
patients per year, but the wide 95% confidence interval suggests that the sample size was 
insufficient to detect a difference between the groups. 
Ultimately, people with fewer financial resources who seek health care are restricted 
to providers who are willing or able to accept Medicaid reimbursement or self-paying 
patients, or to those who perform pro bono care. Research investigating the patient 
volumes, payer mixes, and referral patterns for physician practices would help to 
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determine if underinsured patients are able to access physicians and if they are 
subsequently referred for and able to access physical therapy services. 
Limitations 
     The following section outlines the limitations associated with this research. It begins 
with a discussion about the influence of sample size on the outcomes of the statistical 
tests and then explores issues associated with the data resources, the influence of other 
factors, and the generalizability of the findings.   
Sample Size 
In an attempt to identify an unbiased estimate of any changes in referral patterns, it 
was necessary to identify and include only physicians who were consistent referral 
sources for OPPT at ORHS and FHS. Physicians with a history of OPPT referrals to 
ORHS and FHS were thought to be familiar with these institutions as providers of OPPT. 
Inclusion of physicians with a minimum number of referrals in year 1 provided a baseline 
for comparison of any changes in the referral patterns that were being investigated. 
Unfortunately, application of this criterion reduced the sample of physicians available for 
analysis by 80.2% for ORHS and 42.7% for FHS, a situation that may have resulted in an 
underpowered study. As previously noted, the large confidence intervals calculated for 
each of the hypotheses involving Group 1 and Group 3 comparisons suggest that the 
small sample sizes led to imprecision of the statistical models (previous Table 24 and 
Table 35). Table 38 shows the total numbers of physicians who referred to ORHS and 
FHS as well as the subset of physicians who were deemed consistent referral sources.  
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Table 38. The numbers of physicians who referred to ORHS and FHS for OPPT. 
 
Physician 
Group 
 
 
ORHS 
Total Physicians 
(Met Criterion) 
 
FHS 
Total Physicians 
(Met Criterion) 
Group 1 
47 
(17) 
39 
(28) 
Group 3 
79 
(8) 
43 
(19) 
 
Group 1 physicians who met the inclusion criterion accounted for 51.0% of the aggregate 
Group 1 referrals; Group 3 physicians who met the criterion accounted for 48.4% of the 
aggregate Group 3 referrals.  
   The hypothesized number of annual referrals needed to establish physicians as 
consistent referral sources was determined a priori. Anecdotal reports subsequently were 
obtained from a small, non-random sample of physical therapists involved in private 
outpatient PT practices (non-POPTS) in several states. These physical therapists were 
queried online through a physical therapy practice management listserv 
(PTManager.com) and in direct conversation (Kovacek, 2011). The consensus of this 
informal group was that physicians who made a minimum of 10-12 referrals per year 
could be considered consistent referral sources for some OPPT practices. This approach 
has limited face validity, however. In the absence of empirical data to define a regular 
source of referrals, it is possible that the physicians in this study were misidentified in 
this regard. In order to assess the impact of the established inclusion criterion on the 
results of this study, a post hoc analysis was conducted using an alternative method for 
identifying physicians who met the minimum threshold for inclusion. The minimum 
threshold was maintained at ten referrals per year. However, the actual number of 
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referrals per physician prior to the transition year was calculated as an average over years 
1 and 2 of the study period rather than counted just in year 1. By using this approach, an 
additional 11 pairs of physicians became eligible for inclusion for analysis for ORHS (19 
pairs in total). An additional pair of physicians was also eligible for the FHS post hoc 
analyses (20 pairs in total). A total of 28 Group 1 and 33 Group 3 physicians were 
eligible for inclusion in the samples for the two systems in aggregate, up from 22 and 25 
respectively.  
The Mixed Linear Models were repeated as previously described using this new 
paired sample group. The findings for total referrals were similar to the results of the 
initial analyses. Physician ownership did not appear to negatively influence the numbers 
of referrals made to the hospital-based OPPT clinics. The findings differed, however, for 
the combined influence of physician ownership and payer type on referrals. Table 39 
shows the data used in this post hoc analysis. The table includes the numbers of referrals 
in the post hoc data for years 1 and 5 and the percent change in referrals between the 
primary analysis data and the post hoc data.  
     The post hoc analysis using the larger sample size revealed a significant three-way 
interaction between payer type, status, and physician group (p=0.034) (Tables 40 and 41). 
The estimated marginal means for the PAYCD by STATUS by PHYSCD interaction 
(Table 41) suggested a difference in referral patterns for commercially insured patients
following the transition period that was confirmed statistically (p=0.010; Test 15 in 
Appendix J). Group 3 increased its commercial referrals, while Group 1 decreased its
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Table 39. Post Hoc: Referrals to ORHS year 1 versus 5 and percent change in referrals 
from primary analyses. 
Year 1 versus 5 
Number of Referrals 
(% Change in Number of Referrals  
from Primary Analyses) 
Physician 
Group 
STATUS Commercial Medicare Other 
Group 1  
(N=19) 
PRE 655 
(↑99.1%) 
13 
(↑160.0%) 
10 
(↑42.9%) 
POST 429  
(↑84.9%) 
113 
(↑59.2%) 
74 
(↑469.2%) 
Group 1 Total 1084 
(↑93.2%) 
126 
(↑65.8%) 
84 
(↑320.0%) 
Group 3 
(N=19) 
PRE 238 
(↑30.8%) 
43 
(↑138.9%) 
5 
(↑%)† 
POST 436  
(↑65.8%) 
176  
(↑67.6%) 
85 
(↑1600.0%) 
Group 3 Total 674 
(↑51.5%) 
219 
(↑78.0%) 
90 
(↑1700.0%) 
Grand Total 1758 
(↑74.8%) 
345 
(↑73.4%) 
174 
(↑596.0%) 
† Increase to 5 referrals in POST condition from 0 referrals in PRE condition. 
   
Table 40. Post Hoc: Type III tests of fixed effects for ORHS year 1 versus 5. 
Source 
Numerator 
df 
Denominator 
df 
F Sig. 
Intercept 1 36.000 59.318 .000 
PHYSCD 1 36.000 1.107 .300 
STATUS 1 36.000 3.781 .060 
PAYCD 2 36.000 17.115 .000 
PHYSCD*STATUS 1 36.000 6.944 .012 
PHYSCD*PAYCD 2 36.000 2.597 .088 
STATUS*PAYCD 2 36.000 1.557 .225 
PHYSCD*STATUS*PAYCD 2 36.000 3.735 .034 
Dependent Variable: REFNO. 
 
PHYSCD= Physician group 
STATUS= Pre or post year 3 (transition year) 
PAYCD= Payer type associated with the referral 
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Table 41. Post Hoc: Estimated marginal means for physician group, status, and payer 
type for ORHS year 1 versus 5. 
 
PAYCD*PHYSCD*STATUS 
PAYCD PHYSCD STATUS Mean 
Std. 
Error 
df 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
COMMERCIAL Group 1 PRE 34.474 6.190 36.000 21.920 47.027 
POST 22.579 4.853 36.000 12.737 32.421 
Group 3 PRE 12.526 6.190 36.000 -.027 25.080 
POST 22.947 4.853 36.000 13.105 32.790 
MEDICARE Group 1 PRE .684 .805 36.000 -.949 2.318 
POST 5.947 2.477 36.000 .924 10.971 
Group 3 PRE 2.263 .805 36.000 .630 3.897 
POST 9.263 2.477 36.000 4.240 14.287 
OTHER Group 1 PRE .526 .307 36.000 -.096 1.149 
POST 3.895 2.262 36.000 -.693 8.483 
Group 3 PRE .263 .307 36.000 -.359 .886 
POST 4.474 2.262 36.000 -.114 9.062 
Dependent Variable: REFNO. 
 
PHYSCD= Physician group 
STATUS= Pre or post year 3 (transition year) 
PAYCD= Payer type associated with the referral 
 
commercial referrals over the study period. Referrals of patients with Medicare and other 
types of insurance were not influenced by physicians‘ ownership of OPPT services. 
      Including a larger sample size in the post hoc analyses led to outcomes that were 
different than those seen in the initial statistical tests. This is preliminary evidence that a 
larger sample may have revealed the hypothesized relationships between physician 
ownership status, payer type, and referrals to hospital-based OPPT clinics. It is critical to 
note, however, that no clinically important difference in referral rates was established a 
priori for this research. The calculations of the mean differences reinforce these finding
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by highlighting the direction of change in referrals for the POPTS versus the non-POPTS 
physicians (Tables 42 and 43). The findings support the need for future researchers to use 
larger sample sizes in the data analysis to maximize the power of the statistical tests. 
Table 42. Post Hoc: Group1 – Group 3 differences for changes in mean referrals  
(POST–PRE) and the 95% confidence intervals. 
Group1 – Group 3  
Differences for Changes in Means 
Paired Differences 
Mean 
Differences 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence Intervals of the 
Differences 
Lower Upper 
Aggregate Data Both Hospitals     
Group 1 vs. 3 for Year 1  
vs. 5 
-17.54 12.16 -41.86 6.78 
Group 1 vs. 3 for Year 1 and 2 vs. 4 
and 5 
-24.50 19.94 -64.40 15.41 
ORHS Data     
Group 1 vs. 3 for Year 1  
vs. 5 
-24.90 9.45 -44.05 -5.74 
Group 1 vs. 3 for Year 1 and 2 vs. 4 
and 5 
-32.84 18.14 -69.63 3.95 
FHS Data     
Group 1 vs. 3 for Year 1  
vs. 5 
-5.30 16.44 -38.57 27.97 
Group 1 vs. 3 for Year 1 and 2 vs. 4 
and 5 
-7.15 26.02 -59.82 45.52 
 
 Table 43. Post Hoc: Groups 1 – Group 3 differences for changes in mean referrals  
(POST – PRE) by payer type and the 95% confidence intervals. 
Group 1 – Group 3  
Differences for Changes in Means 
Paired Differences 
 
Mean 
Differences 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence Intervals of 
the Differences 
Lower Upper 
ORHS Data Commercial     
Group 1 vs. 3 for Year 1 vs. 5 -22.32 7.81 -38.16 -6.47 
Group 1 vs. 3 for Year 1 and 2  
vs. 4 and 5 
-32.05 15.49 -63.48 -0.63 
ORHS Data Medicare     
Group 1 vs. 3 for Year 1 vs. 5 -1.74 2.88 -7.54 4.10 
Group 1 vs. 3 for Year 1 and 2  
vs. 4 and 5 
-1.63 3.29 -8.30 5.03 
ORHS Data Other     
Group 1 vs. 3 for Year 1 vs. 5 -.084 3.19 -7.31 5.62 
Group 1 vs. 3 for Year 1 and 2  
vs. 4 and 5 
0.84 6.48 -12.30 13.99 
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Data Resources and Quality 
 
     The researcher was unable to obtain proprietary referral data directly from physicians‘ 
practices. These data would have allowed the researcher to examine the total referrals and 
payer types associated with the referrals for OPPT made by the physicians in this study. 
The number of patients who were referred to in-house care or to corporate or privately 
held OPPT clinics might have also been determined from these proprietary data. Without 
this information, it was unclear how many patients were actually being seen by these 
physicians, how many were being referred for OPPT, and the final dispositions of those 
referrals. The payer types associated with those referrals and the numbers and types of 
insurance networks the providers participated in also were unknown. Without access to 
this information, the researcher was only able to draw inferences from the orthopaedic 
OPPT referrals made to the two hospital systems. This indirect approach to understanding 
physicians‘ behaviors only partially addresses the apparently complex issue of 
physicians‘ referrals.  
     This research required the use of phone interviews to verify orthopaedic physicians‘ 
ownership or non-ownership of OPPT clinics. The timing of the Group 1 physicians‘ 
becoming owners was studied relative to patterns of the OPPT referrals they made to 
ORHS and FHS. Group 3 physicians‘ referrals were also studied over the same time 
period. It is possible that the data obtained from the phone interviews were inaccurate. 
The researcher contacted and spoke with the practice manager at each physician practice 
to ascertain if the practice owned or invested in OPPT. If the practice did have ownership 
interest in OPPT, the managers were asked in what year they became owners or investors 
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in these services. This investigation relied upon the accuracy of these data to determine 
the timing of the physicians‘ referrals relative to their changes in ownership of OPPT 
services. The researcher did not ask about the number of physical therapy staff working 
at the clinics, nor were the clinics asked how the employment of the physical therapy 
staff changed over time. These data should be collected in future research in order to 
more fully understand the capacities of the POPTS and OPPT clinics to treat patients. 
Estimating the treatment capacities of these clinics would allow researchers to better 
predict how patient volumes might influence physicians‘ referrals for PT made to outside 
providers. The expectation would be that when physician-owned clinics reached their 
capacities to treat patients, additional patients would be referred to outside providers or 
not at all.  
     The absence of data from the non-responsive and closed OPPT competitor clinics 
identified in this research may have influenced the findings. The researcher was unable to 
determine the timing of entry into and exit from the OPPT market for these clinics. Also, 
the investigator was unable to determine if physicians had had an ownership interest in 
these clinics. In the absence of data, the investigator had to assume that the non-
responding clinics were similar to the responding OPPT competitor clinics.   
     This research required the use of secondary data sets. Since this was a retrospective 
analysis, the researcher was not involved in the initial data collection, coding, or 
screening of the ORHS and FHS databases. There also was no retrospective way to detect 
inaccuracies in the coding made by the hospitals‘ data entry personnel. The numbers and 
types of referrals made to the two hospital systems were included in the hospital data sets 
161 
 
which provided a reportedly 100% representation of the outpatient orthopaedic physical 
therapy referrals received by the two systems. These data facilitated comparison of the 
patterns of OPPT referrals made to the two hospital systems between 1999 and 2007. 
However, these two hospital systems represented only a portion of the outpatient physical 
therapy providers in the Orlando area (Appendix F).  
An additional limitation in the use of the ORHS and FHS databases was that they did 
not make it possible to identify patients treated for physical therapy at the hospital 
systems prior to the study period. The researcher also could not determine if each episode 
of care was the result of a new patient referral or perhaps a repeat referral. Patients who 
had received physical therapy previously at the hospital-based OPPT clinics might have 
requested to be sent to these facilities due to familiarity or prior experience with these 
clinics. The physicians also might have selected these facilities for referral based upon 
their prior experiences with the hospital-based clinicians and the outcomes of their 
physical therapy services. Alternatively, the patients may have also subscribed to 
insurance or managed care organizations that limited the numbers of providers available 
to them. In any case, referral patterns of patients already familiar with an outside PT 
provider may be less sensitive to change due to a change in physician ownership status 
than referral patterns of patients who have never received physical therapy. In the future, 
researchers should examine repeat versus new referrals when reflecting upon how 
physicians‘ referral decisions are influenced by factors such as ownership.  
The ORHS and FHS databases also did not capture information pertaining to patient‘s 
secondary diagnoses and co-morbidities. Patient characteristics have been shown to 
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influence physicians‘ referral decisions, and patients with multiple health concerns are 
likely to be more costly to care for in the context of fixed reimbursement. Physicians 
motivated by income may be inclined to refer these types of patients to other facilities for 
their care. Another drawback to the use of the hospitals‘ proprietary databases was that 
FHS was unable to provide information regarding the payer types associated with the 
orthopaedic referrals made to its facilities. This limited the analysis of the distribution of 
referrals by payer type to the ORHS facilities only. 
Level of Analysis 
    The administrators at ORHS and FHS perceived a change in their orthopaedic OPPT 
referrals at a time when there was a rise in POPTS practices (Jagger, 2007). The 
administrators suggested that the increase in POPTS practices was creating referral 
problems for their clinics; however, they may not have considered the influence of other 
market changes that were occurring, such as the increase in OPPT competitors in the 
region.  
     During the period of 1999 to 2007, competition for outpatient physical therapy 
referrals increased. This rise is consistent with the expectation that the demand for 
physical therapy services would increase as the population in the region increased. 
Several firms entered the market in the time of this study, and the number eventually 
plateaued around the year 2007. The emergence of market competitors may have 
influenced the volume of referrals being sent to certain hospital-system OPPT clinics, 
especially if they were in close proximity to competitor clinics. 
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     The researcher used a group of non-POPTS physicians for comparison to try to control 
for some of the history effects within the Orlando market, such as the emergence of 
market competitors. The impact of ownership was only investigated at the hospital 
system level, however. The limited sample size precluded analyses of the individual 
hospital clinics and prevented the researcher from determining the influence of POPTS 
and market forces on the referrals these individual clinics received. A larger sample of 
physicians would have allowed for the pairing of physicians who refer to individual 
clinics in order to control for the history effects of market changes on each hospital-based 
practice. 
Other Influences on Referrals 
There are several factors that may contribute to changes in the number of orthopaedic 
referrals made to hospital-based outpatient rehabilitation centers. For example, increases 
in population, change in insurance contracts, facility/interpersonal politics, patient 
preferences for providers, the introduction of new technologies and therapies, practice 
mergers/consolidation, proximity and convenience, patient and physician familiarity, and 
health policy may all influence the flow of patients between providers. The influence of 
these types of factors on the physicians‘ referrals might explain some of the variability in 
the data set not accounted for by the statistical models. Having both a control group of 
orthopaedic physicians who did not participate in POPTS and a group of physicians who 
did transition to POPTS allowed the researcher to examine between groups differences in 
patterns of referrals while accounting for some factors in history, such as population or 
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policy changes and the influence of medical practice consultants, which may have 
influenced the referral behaviors of the orthopaedic physicians in the region.  
In addition to all of these extrinsic influences, physicians participating together in a 
practice are likely to be similarly influenced by the expectations of that practice and its 
manager(s). It is reasonable to think that physicians within a practice might experience 
pressure from the practice managers to refer patients in a manner that makes their 
businesses more profitable. Therefore, physicians grouped in a particular practice may be 
influenced to refer similarly, creating a co-variation of referrals. The investigator had 
hoped to account for this phenomenon by including practice (PRACCD) as a co-variate 
in the statistical models; however, there were too few practices to be able to perform 
adequate analyses with this additional variable. Interestingly, Group 1 physicians (N=48) 
tended to be members of large group practices (N=6 practices) while Group 3 physicians 
(N=86) tended to have independent practices or to practice with small groups of 
physicians (N=73 practices). 
Generalizability 
     The generalizability of this study‘s findings is limited to health care markets that are 
similar to Orlando‘s. Having the participation of both ORHS and FHS helped to 
strengthen the argument regarding patterns of orthopaedic physicians‘ referrals in this 
market; however, future research should work to include data from a larger sample of 
referral sources and OPPT providers.  
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Study Implications 
Theory 
     Ahern and Scott‘s (1992) theory predicts that entrepreneurial physicians will work to 
eliminate competition by reducing overall referrals to their competitors. The body of 
evidence regarding physician ownership of ancillary services includes investigations of 
specialty hospitals (Government Accountability Office, 2003; Medicare Payment 
Advisory Committee, 2005, 2006), radiological services (Childs & Hunter, 1972; 
Government Accountability Office, 1994; B. Hillman, et al., 1990; B. Hillman, Olson, 
Griffith, Sunshine, Joseph, Kennedy, Helson, et al., 1992; Mitchell, 2007; Mitchell & 
Scott, 1991, 1992c; Mitchell & Sunshine, 1992), laboratory services (Ahern & Scott, 
1992; Danzon, 1982), and physical therapy services (Mitchell & Scott, 1992b; Swedlow, 
et al., 1992). These studies have uncovered an influence of physician ownership on rates 
of utilization, numbers of referrals, and costs of care that is consistent with Ahern and 
Scott‘s theory.  
Specific to physical therapy, physicians‘ ownership interests have been shown to 
increase service utilization rates and costs for workers‘ compensation programs from 
outpatient physical therapy (Mitchell, 2007; Mitchell & Scott, 1992b; Mitchell & 
Sunshine, 1992; OIG, 1994; Olshin, et al., 2002; Swedlow, et al., 1992). This research 
did not support the theory that physician owners of OPPT will work to reduce 
competition by limiting the numbers and controlling the types of referrals made to 
outside OPPT providers. Instead, in aggregate total referrals increased suggesting that 
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physicians may have been influenced by other considerations with respect to referral for 
PT services.  
It is possible that the physicians who referred for OPPT were not motivated by 
income. It is also possible that physical therapy services are not lucrative enough to 
influence physicians‘ referrals for OPPT. For example, there may be greater opportunities 
to increase income from diagnostics or laboratory testing instead of PT. In addition, other 
factors such as location, insurance contract restrictions, pre-existing relationships 
between providers, patients‘ preferences for providers, provider reputations, and clinical 
considerations may outweigh ownership considerations with respect to physical therapy. 
Although it is possible the theory does not apply to self-referral of PT services, there 
are other plausible explanations for this study‘s results. Global changes in the population 
could have masked the effects of physician self-referral by overwhelming these 
physicians‘ capacities to provide the physical therapy services in-house during the study 
period. Physician practices that transitioned to POPTS may have required a longer period 
of time to stabilize their PT workforce in response to growing patient demand. In addition 
to global changes, if the costs to provide physical therapy services exceeded the 
reimbursement for those services, motivation for physicians to self-refer for profit may 
have been reduced. Access to data from physician practices or through payer data that 
identifies physical therapists‘ employers is needed in order to resolve this issue.   
     In accordance with Ahern and Scott‘s theory, it was hypothesized that orthopaedic 
physicians would selectively retain patients with commercial insurance once they joined 
POPTS and that they would refer patients with Medicare and other types of insurance to 
167 
 
hospital-based OPPT more frequently after becoming owners. The results of this study 
did not support these hypotheses. Once again there is a possibility that the theory does not 
apply to self-referral of physical therapy services. Alternatively, the differential in 
reimbursement rates between commercial insurers and Medicare may not have been 
enough in this market during this study period to stimulate differences in referral patterns 
for these payer classes. Another explanation, however, is that this study was 
underpowered to detect ownership influences on referral patterns. 
Implications for Policy 
     Several studies have demonstrated the influence of payment type on referrals and 
utilization rates. The present research showed no relationship between physician 
ownership, referrals to OPPT services, and patients‘ payment types. However, there is 
some indication that the Group 1 physicians were responding in an entrepreneurial 
fashion to market forces. The data for this study were collected during a time when 
overall reimbursement for physician services was declining. Estimated Sustainable 
Growth Rates (SGR) published by the Office of the Actuary for the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS) show that the physician fee scale was being downwardly 
adjusted between 1999 and 2007 (Table 44) (Office of the Actuary, 2010). The SGR is a 
method used by CMS to control costs by ensuring that the annual increase in the expense 
per Medicare beneficiary does not exceed growth in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
(Office of the Actuary, 2010).  
     While physicians‘ reimbursement for services they rendered was declining, 
reimbursement for other medical interventions (i.e., physical therapy services) was 
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Table 44. Actual past Medicare Economic Index Increases and Physician Updates for 
1992-2009, and Estimated Values for 2010 (Office of the Actuary, 2010). 
 
Year Physician Medicare 
Economic Index Increase 
Physician Update 
1992 3.2% 1.9% 
1993 2.7% 1.4% 
1994 2.3% 7.0% 
1995 2.1% 7.5% 
1996 2.0% 0.8% 
1997 2.0% 0.6% 
1998 2.2% 2.3% 
1999 2.3% 2.3% 
2000 2.4% 5.5% 
2001 2.1% 5.0% 
2002 2.6% -4.8% 
2003 3.0% 1.7% 
2004 2.9% 1.5% 
2005 3.1% 1.5% 
2006 2.8% 0.2% 
2007 2.1% 0.0% 
2008 1.8% 0.5% 
2009 1.6% 1.1% 
Projected:   
2010 1.2% -21.3% 
 
increasing (previous Table 37). This may have made annexation of these services more 
attractive to physicians looking to improve or maintain their incomes. The greatest 
adjustment to the physician fee schedule occurred in 2001, the same time as when the 
vast majority of Group 1 physicians transitioned to POPTS. Having a partially-privatized 
health system makes it difficult for government policymakers to produce legislation that 
protects against abuses in physicians‘ referral behaviors across the spectrum of patients 
and insurers. The issue of selective referral is particularly important for those providers 
who serve as the safety-net for citizens who have little or no health insurance. 
Policymakers could require providers who participate in federally funded insurance 
programs to be transparent in the numbers and types of referrals that are made for 
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designated health services such as OPPT. In addition to the information that is currently 
gathered by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, it would be necessary for 
physicians to divulge the quantities of the patients they see, the types of patients they see 
(based upon demographics, levels of acuity/chronicity, and payer), the dispositions of the 
referrals they make, and the quantities and costs of the care they provide. OPPT clinics 
also would need to provide information on the number of referrals they receive from 
these physicians and the payer mixes associated with those referrals, as well as quantities 
and costs of the services provided. Policymakers must have more information to be able 
to determine if current regulations are having their intended effects on self-referral for 
profit activities or if changes to the policies are needed.   
Future Research 
     Acknowledging the limitations of this research, the results must be interpreted 
carefully. The relationship between physician ownership of physical therapy services and 
referral patterns can only be fully ascertained when data from all parties are included. It 
would be meaningful for the purposes of this kind of research to have insurers track what 
kinds of facilities their clients are referred to for OPPT services or to link individual 
providers of physical therapy services to particular clinical locations. Specifically, 
facilities providing OPPT would need to be easily identifiable and coded according to 
their ownership status. Some examples of categories might be not-for-profit, hospital-
based; corporate, hospital-based; not-for-profit, privately owned by physical therapist(s); 
corporately owned clinics; joint-ventured clinics; and physician-owned clinics. The 
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owners or investors in these clinics also would need to be tracked to allow researchers, 
payers, and policymakers to monitor physicians‘ referral activity.  
     Linking providers to particular locations would allow researchers to examine the 
influence of relationships between providers on OPPT referrals. Knowing the locations of 
specific clinics would help to determine the influence of proximity on referrals. In 
addition, patients could be sampled to determine what factors influenced their decisions 
to pursue PT at specific locations or with specific providers. Since patient characteristics 
have also been shown to influence referrals, patients‘ demographic data, health statuses, 
diagnoses, and insurance data would be necessary for more in-depth analysis. 
Demographic, specialty training, and education data should also be collected on the 
referring physicians and the providers of the OPPT services to provide a more complete 
picture of potential influences on referral patterns.  
     In combination, these data would allow investigators to trace physicians‘ referrals for 
OPPT from their origins and to map out the volume and types of patients being referred 
to various facilities. Knowing the final dispositions of these referrals would allow 
investigators to draw more robust conclusions about the relationships between 
physicians‘ ownership interest and the numbers and types of referrals for OPPT they 
make to their own clinics and to market competitors. Having these data could then inform 
policymakers who are trying to influence health care costs and the distribution of OPPT 
services. In addition, researchers also need to assess the impact of changes in referrals on 
the economic viability of the clinics that depend upon those referrals. 
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     With regard to the research methodology, the combined approach of aggregate and 
narrowed analyses was needed in order to detect patterns in physicians‘ referrals for 
OPPT. Examining the data in aggregate allowed the researcher to clarify trends in the 
overall referrals made to the hospital-based OPPT clinics. Then, by utilizing the 
individual physicians as the units of analysis and pairing the physicians for comparison, 
the investigator was able to identify the variability of the physicians‘ referral patterns. 
Analysis of the paired physician samples allowed for comparison of referral patterns over 
time while controlling for history effects. These comparisons highlighted the fluctuations 
in referrals of both the POPTS and non-POPTS orthopaedists. The use of data from years 
1 and 5 and then from years 1, 2, 4, and 5 showed that there was a time element in this 
research, but the stability of the sensitivity analyses highlighted the consistency of the 
data across the five year study period.  
    The post hoc analyses resulted in findings that differed from the primary analyses and 
revealed a possible influence of physician ownership and payer type on referrals. The fact 
that the post hoc mixed linear model (interaction of PHYSCD, STATUS, and PAYCD) 
with the larger sample sizes differed from the primary analyses highlights the importance 
of increasing sample sizes to maximize the power of the statistical tests and reduce errors 
in interpretation.  
Conclusion 
     This research outlines a novel approach to analyzing the potential influence of 
physician ownership and payer type on referral behaviors. The findings suggest that 
physicians‘ ownership of physical therapy services was not a statistically significant 
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predictor of their referrals to hospital-based OPPT services. Specifically, there was no 
significant effect of physician ownership of OPPT services on the total volume of 
referrals made to two hospital-systems‘ OPPT clinics. There also was no significant 
relationship between physician ownership, payer type, and referrals made to the hospital-
based clinics. The theory predicting that POPTS physicians would work to eliminate 
market competition by reducing referral volumes and retaining patients with more 
lucrative reimbursement for their own practices was not supported. However, post hoc 
analysis provided some evidence that a larger sample may have revealed the 
hypothesized relationships between physician ownership, payer type, and referrals for 
OPPT. Future research utilizing larger samples and data tracking physicians‘ OPPT 
referrals from their origins to their final dispositions are needed to clarify the 
relationships between physicians‘ ownership of OPPT services and the referrals they 
make for those services. 
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Source: MGMA Physician Compensation and Production Survey: 2009 Report Based on 2008 Data. 
http://www.mgma.com/solutions/landing.aspx?cid=16710&id1=16686&id2=17080&id3=17030&id4l=170
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Appendix C 
 
Federal Legislation: Section 1 
The Social Security Act  
Part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 
 
Sec. 1128B. [42 USC § 1320a–7a]. Civil monetary penalties 
 
(a) Improperly filed claims  
 
Any person (including an organization, agency, or other entity, but excluding a 
beneficiary, as defined in subsection (i)(5) of this section) that—  
(1) knowingly presents or causes to be presented to an officer, employee, or agent 
of the United States, or of any department or agency thereof, or of any  
State agency (as defined in subsection (i)(1) of this section), a claim (as defined in 
subsection (i) (2) of this section) that the Secretary determines—  
(A) is for a medical or other item or service that the person knows or 
should know was not provided as claimed, including any person who 
engages in a pattern or practice of presenting or causing to be presented a 
claim for an item or service that is based on a code that the person knows 
or should know will result in a greater payment to the person than the code 
the person knows or should know is applicable to the item or service 
actually provided,  
(B) is for a medical or other item or service and the person knows or 
should know the claim is false or fraudulent,  
(C) is presented for a physician‘s service (or an item or service incident to 
a physician‘s service) by a person who knows or should know that the  
individual who furnished (or supervised the furnishing of) the service—  
(i) was not licensed as a physician,  
(ii) was licensed as a physician, but such license had been obtained 
through a misrepresentation of material fact (including cheating on 
an examination required for licensing), or  
(iii) represented to the patient at the time the service was furnished 
that the physician was certified in a medical specialty by a medical  
specialty board when the individual was not so certified,  
(D) is for a medical or other item or service furnished during a period in 
which the person was excluded from the program under which the claim  
was made pursuant to a determination by the Secretary under this section 
or under section 1320a–7, 1320c–5, 1320c–9 (b) (as in effect on 
September 2, 1982), 1395y(d) (as in effect on August 18, 1987), or 
1395cc(b) of this title or as a result of the application of the provisions of 
section 1395u (j)(2) of this title, or  
(E) is for a pattern of medical or other items or services that a person 
knows or should know are not medically necessary;  
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(2) knowingly presents or causes to be presented to any person a request for 
payment which is in violation of the terms of  
(A) an assignment under section 1395u (b)(3)(B)(ii) of this title, or  
(B) an agreement with a State agency (or other requirement of a State plan 
under subchapter XIX of this chapter) not to charge a person for an item or 
service in excess of the amount permitted to be charged, or  
(C) an agreement to be a participating physician or supplier under section 
1395u (h)(1) of this title, or  
(D) an agreement pursuant to section 1395cc (a)(1)(G) of this title;  
(3) knowingly gives or causes to be given to any person, with respect to coverage 
under subchapter XVIII of this chapter of inpatient hospital services subject to the 
provisions of section 1395ww of this title, information that he knows or should 
know is false or misleading, and that could reasonably be expected to influence 
the decision when to discharge such person or another individual from the 
hospital;  
(4) in the case of a person who is not an organization, agency, or other entity, is 
excluded from participating in a program under subchapter XVIII of this chapter 
or a State health care program in accordance with this subsection or under section 
1320a–7 of this title and who, at the time of a violation of this subsection—  
(A) retains a direct or indirect ownership or control interest in an entity 
that is participating in a program under subchapter XVIII of this chapter or 
a State health care program, and who knows or should know of the action 
constituting the basis for the exclusion; or  
(B) is an officer or managing employee (as defined in section 1320a–5 (b) 
of this title) of such an entity;  
(5) offers to or transfers remuneration to any individual eligible for benefits under 
subchapter XVIII of this chapter, or under a State health care program (as defined 
in section 1320a–7 (h) of this title) that such person knows or should know is 
likely to influence such individual to order or receive from a particular provider, 
practitioner, or supplier any item or service for which payment may be made, in 
whole or in part, under subchapter XVIII of this chapter, or a State health care 
program (as so defined);  
(6) arranges or contracts (by employment or otherwise) with an individual or 
entity that the person knows or should know is excluded from participation in a 
Federal health care program (as defined in section 1320a–7b (f) of this title), for 
the provision of items or services for which payment may be made under such a 
program; or  
(7) commits an act described in paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1320a–7b (b) of 
this title; shall be subject, in addition to any other penalties that may be prescribed 
by law, to a civil money penalty of not more than $10,000 for each item or service 
(or, in cases under paragraph (3), $15,000 for each individual with respect to 
whom false or misleading information was given; in cases under paragraph (4), 
$10,000 for each day the prohibited relationship occurs; or in cases under 
paragraph (7), $50,000 for each such act). In addition, such a person shall be 
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subject to an assessment of not more than 3 times the amount claimed for each 
such item or service in lieu of damages sustained by the United States or a State 
agency because of such claim (or, in cases under paragraph (7), damages of not 
more than 3 times the total amount of remuneration offered, paid, solicited, or 
received, without regard to whether a portion of such remuneration was offered, 
paid, solicited, or received for a lawful purpose). In addition the Secretary may 
make a determination in the same proceeding to exclude the person from 
participation in the Federal health care programs (as defined in section 1320a–7b 
(f)(1) of this title) and to direct the appropriate State agency to exclude the person 
from participation in any State health care program.  
 
(b) Payments to induce reduction or limitation of services  
 
(1) If a hospital or a critical access hospital knowingly makes a payment, directly 
or indirectly, to a physician as an inducement to reduce or limit services provided 
with respect to individuals who—  
(A) are entitled to benefits under part A or part B of subchapter XVIII of 
this chapter or to medical assistance under a State plan approved under 
subchapter XIX of this chapter, and  
(B) are under the direct care of the physician,  
the hospital or a critical access hospital shall be subject, in addition to any 
other penalties that may be prescribed by law, to a civil money penalty of 
not more than $2,000 for each such individual with respect to whom the 
payment is made.  
(2) Any physician who knowingly accepts receipt of a payment described in 
paragraph (1) shall be subject, in addition to any other penalties that may be 
prescribed by law, to a civil money penalty of not more than $2,000 for each 
individual described in such paragraph with respect to whom the payment is 
made.  
(3)  
(A) Any physician who executes a document described in subparagraph 
(B) with respect to an individual knowing that all of the requirements 
referred to in such subparagraph are not met with respect to the individual 
shall be subject to a civil monetary penalty of not more than the greater 
of—  
(i) $5,000, or  
(ii) three times the amount of the payments under subchapter 
XVIII of this chapter for home health services which are made 
pursuant to such certification.  
(B) A document described in this subparagraph is any document that 
certifies, for purposes of subchapter XVIII of this chapter, that an 
individual meets the requirements of section 1395f (a)(2)(C) or 1395n 
(a)(2)(A) of this title in the case of home health services furnished to the 
individual.  
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(c) Initiation of proceeding; authorization by Attorney General, notice, etc., estoppel, 
failure to comply with order or procedure  
 
(1) The Secretary may initiate a proceeding to determine whether to impose a 
civil money penalty, assessment, or exclusion under subsection (a) or (b) of this 
section only as authorized by the Attorney General pursuant to procedures agreed 
upon by them. The Secretary may not initiate an action under this section with 
respect to any claim, request for payment, or other occurrence described in this 
section later than six years after the date the claim was presented, the request for 
payment was made, or the occurrence took place. The Secretary may initiate an 
action under this section by serving notice of the action in any manner authorized 
by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
(2) The Secretary shall not make a determination adverse to any person under 
subsection (a) or (b) of this section until the person has been given written notice 
and an opportunity for the determination to be made on the record after a hearing 
at which the person is entitled to be represented by counsel, to present witnesses, 
and to cross-examine witnesses against the person.  
(3) In a proceeding under subsection (a) or (b) of this section which—  
(A) is against a person who has been convicted (whether upon a verdict 
after trial or upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere) of a Federal crime 
charging fraud or false statements, and  
(B) involves the same transaction as in the criminal action,  
the person is estopped from denying the essential elements of the criminal 
offense.  
(4) The official conducting a hearing under this section may sanction a person, 
including any party or attorney, for failing to comply with an order or procedure, 
failing to defend an action, or other misconduct as would interfere with the 
speedy, orderly, or fair conduct of the hearing. Such sanction shall reasonably 
relate to the severity and nature of the failure or misconduct. Such sanction may 
include—  
(A) in the case of refusal to provide or permit discovery, drawing negative 
factual inferences or treating such refusal as an admission by deeming the 
matter, or certain facts, to be established,  
(B) prohibiting a party from introducing certain evidence or otherwise 
supporting a particular claim or defense,  
(C) striking pleadings, in whole or in part,  
(D) staying the proceedings,  
(E) dismissal of the action,  
(F) entering a default judgment,  
(G) ordering the party or attorney to pay attorneys‘ fees and other costs 
caused by the failure or misconduct, and  
(H) refusing to consider any motion or other action which is not filed in a 
timely manner.  
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(d) Amount or scope of penalty, assessment, or exclusion  
 
In determining the amount or scope of any penalty, assessment, or exclusion imposed 
pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) of this section, the Secretary shall take into account—  
(1) the nature of claims and the circumstances under which they were presented,  
(2) the degree of culpability, history of prior offenses, and financial condition of 
the person presenting the claims, and  
(3) such other matters as justice may require.  
 
(e) Review by courts of appeals  
 
Any person adversely affected by a determination of the Secretary under this section may 
obtain a review of such determination in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
circuit in which the person resides, or in which the claim was presented, by filing in such 
court (within sixty days following the date the person is notified of the Secretary‘s 
determination) a written petition requesting that the determination be modified or set 
aside. A copy of the petition shall be forthwith transmitted by the clerk of the court to the 
Secretary, and thereupon the Secretary shall file in the Court 
[1]
 the record in the 
proceeding as provided in section 2112 of title 28. Upon such filing, the court shall have 
jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the question determined therein, and shall have the 
power to make and enter upon the pleadings, testimony, and proceedings set forth in such 
record a decree affirming, modifying, remanding for further consideration, or setting 
aside, in whole or in part, the determination of the Secretary and enforcing the same to 
the extent that such order is affirmed or modified. No objection that has not been urged 
before the Secretary shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge 
such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances. The findings of 
the Secretary with respect to questions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the 
record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive. If any party shall apply to the court for 
leave to adduce additional evidence and shall show to the satisfaction of the court that 
such additional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds for the failure 
to adduce such evidence in the hearing before the Secretary, the court may order such 
additional evidence to be taken before the Secretary and to be made a part of the record. 
The Secretary may modify his findings as to the facts, or make new findings, by reason of 
additional evidence so taken and filed, and he shall file with the court such modified or 
new findings, which findings with respect to questions of fact, if supported by substantial 
evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive, and his 
recommendations, if any, for the modification or setting aside of his original order. Upon 
the filing of the record with it, the jurisdiction of the court shall be exclusive and its 
judgment and decree shall be final, except that the same shall be subject to review by the 
Supreme Court of the United States, as provided in section 1254 of title 28.  
 
(f) Compromise of penalties and assessments; recovery; use of funds recovered  
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Civil money penalties and assessments imposed under this section may be compromised 
by the Secretary and may be recovered in a civil action in the name of the United States 
brought in United States district court for the district where the claim was presented, or 
where the claimant resides, as determined by the Secretary. Amounts recovered under 
this section shall be paid to the Secretary and disposed of as follows:  
(1)  
(A) In the case of amounts recovered arising out of a claim under 
subchapter XIX of this chapter, there shall be paid to the State agency an 
amount bearing the same proportion to the total amount recovered as the 
State‘s share of the amount paid by the State agency for such claim bears 
to the total amount paid for such claim.  
(B) In the case of amounts recovered arising out of a claim under an 
allotment to a State under subchapter V of this chapter, there shall be paid 
to the State agency an amount equal to three-sevenths of the amount 
recovered.  
(2) Such portion of the amounts recovered as is determined to have been paid out 
of the trust funds under sections 1395i and 1395t of this title shall be repaid to 
such trust funds.  
(3) With respect to amounts recovered arising out of a claim under a Federal 
health care program (as defined in section 1320a–7b (f) of this title), the portion 
of such amounts as is determined to have been paid by the program shall be 
repaid to the program, and the portion of such amounts attributable to the amounts 
recovered under this section by reason of the amendments made by the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (as estimated by the 
Secretary) shall be deposited into the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund 
pursuant to section 1395i (k)(2)(C) of this title.  
(4) The remainder of the amounts recovered shall be deposited as miscellaneous 
receipts of the Treasury of the United States.  
The amount of such penalty or assessment, when finally determined, or the 
amount agreed upon in compromise, may be deducted from any sum then or later 
owing by the United States or a State agency to the person against whom the 
penalty or assessment has been assessed.  
 
(g) Finality of determination respecting penalty, assessment, or exclusion  
 
A determination by the Secretary to impose a penalty, assessment, or exclusion under 
subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall be final upon the expiration of the sixty-day 
period referred to in subsection (e) of this section. Matters that were raised or that could 
have been raised in a hearing before the Secretary or in an appeal pursuant to subsection 
(e) of this section may not be raised as a defense to a civil action by the United States to 
collect a penalty, assessment, or exclusion assessed under this section.  
 
(h) Notification of appropriate entities of finality of determination  
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Whenever the Secretary‘s determination to impose a penalty, assessment, or exclusion 
under subsection (a) or (b) of this section becomes final, he shall notify the appropriate 
State or local medical or professional organization, the appropriate State agency or 
agencies administering or supervising the administration of State health care programs 
(as defined in section 1320a–7 (h) of this title), and the appropriate utilization and quality 
control peer review organization, and the appropriate State or local licensing agency or 
organization (including the agency specified in section 1395aa (a) and 1396a (a)(33) of 
this title) that such a penalty, assessment, or exclusion has become final and the reasons 
therefore.  
 
(i) Definitions  
 
For the purposes of this section:  
(1) The term ―State agency‖ means the agency established or designated to 
administer or supervise the administration of the State plan under subchapter XIX 
of this chapter or designated to administer the State‘s program under subchapter V 
of this chapter or subchapter XX of this chapter.  
(2) The term ―claim‖ means an application for payments for items and services 
under a Federal health care program (as defined in section 1320a–7b (f) of this 
title).  
(3) The term ―item or service‖ includes  
(A) any particular item, device, medical supply, or service claimed to have 
been provided to a patient and listed in an itemized claim for payment, and  
(B) in the case of a claim based on costs, any entry in the cost report, 
books of account or other documents supporting such claim.  
(4) The term ―agency of the United States‖ includes any contractor acting as a 
fiscal intermediary, carrier, or fiscal agent or any other claims processing agent 
for a Federal health care program (as so defined).  
(5) The term ―beneficiary‖ means an individual who is eligible to receive items or 
services for which payment may be made under a Federal health care program (as 
so defined) but does not include a provider, supplier, or practitioner.  
(6) The term ―remuneration‖ includes the waiver of coinsurance and deductible 
amounts (or any part thereof), and transfers of items or services for free or for 
other than fair market value. The term ―remuneration‖ does not include—  
(A) the waiver of coinsurance and deductible amounts by a person, if—  
(i) the waiver is not offered as part of any advertisement or 
solicitation;  
(ii) the person does not routinely waive coinsurance or deductible 
amounts; and  
(iii) the person—  
(I) waives the coinsurance and deductible amounts after 
determining in good faith that the individual is in financial 
need; or  
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(II) fails to collect coinsurance or deductible amounts after 
making reasonable collection efforts;  
(B) subject to subsection (n) of this section, any permissible practice 
described in any subparagraph of section 1320a–7b (b)(3) of this title or in 
regulations issued by the Secretary;  
(C) differentials in coinsurance and deductible amounts as part of a benefit 
plan design as long as the differentials have been disclosed in writing to 
all beneficiaries, third party payers, and providers, to whom claims are 
presented and as long as the differentials meet the standards as defined in 
regulations promulgated by the Secretary not later than 180 days after 
August 21, 1996; or  
(D)  
[2]
 incentives given to individuals to promote the delivery of 
preventive care as determined by the Secretary in regulations so 
promulgated.  
(D)  
[2]
 a reduction in the copayment amount for covered OPD services 
under section 1395l (t)(5)(B) 
[3]
 of this title.  
(7) The term ―should know‖ means that a person, with respect to information—  
(A) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; 
or  
(B) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information,  
and no proof of specific intent to defraud is required.  
 
(j) Subpoenas  
 
(1) The provisions of subsections (d) and (e) of section 405 of this title shall apply 
with respect to this section to the same extent as they are applicable with respect 
to subchapter II of this chapter. The Secretary may delegate the authority granted 
by section 405 (d) of this title (as made applicable to this section) to the Inspector 
General of the Department of Health and Human Services for purposes of any 
investigation under this section.  
(2) The Secretary may delegate authority granted under this section and under 
section 1320a–7 of this title to the Inspector General of the Department of Health 
and Human Services.  
 
(k) Injunctions  
 
Whenever the Secretary has reason to believe that any person has engaged, is engaging, 
or is about to engage in any activity which makes the person subject to a civil monetary 
penalty under this section, the Secretary may bring an action in an appropriate district 
court of the United States (or, if applicable, a United States court of any territory) to 
enjoin such activity, or to enjoin the person from concealing, removing, encumbering, or 
disposing of assets which may be required in order to pay a civil monetary penalty if any 
such penalty were to be imposed or to seek other appropriate relief.  
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(l) Liability of principal for acts of agent  
 
A principal is liable for penalties, assessments, and an exclusion under this section for the 
actions of the principal‘s agent acting within the scope of the agency.  
 
(m) Claims within jurisdiction of other departments or agencies  
 
(1) For purposes of this section, with respect to a Federal health care program not 
contained in this chapter, references to the Secretary in this section shall be 
deemed to be references to the Secretary or Administrator of the department or 
agency with jurisdiction over such program and references to the Inspector 
General of the Department of Health and Human Services in this section shall be 
deemed to be references to the Inspector General of the applicable department or 
agency.  
(2)  
(A) The Secretary and Administrator of the departments and agencies 
referred to in paragraph (1) may include in any action pursuant to this 
section, claims within the jurisdiction of other Federal departments or 
agencies as long as the following conditions are satisfied:  
(i) The case involves primarily claims submitted to the Federal 
health care programs of the department or agency initiating the 
action.  
(ii) The Secretary or Administrator of the department or agency 
initiating the action gives notice and an opportunity to participate 
in the investigation to the Inspector General of the department or 
agency with primary jurisdiction over the Federal health care 
programs to which the claims were submitted.  
(B) If the conditions specified in subparagraph (A) are fulfilled, the Inspector 
General of the department or agency initiating the action is authorized to exercise 
all powers granted under the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) with 
respect to the claims submitted to the other departments or agencies to the same 
manner and extent as provided in that Act with respect to claims submitted to 
such departments or agencies.  
 
(n) Safe harbor for payment of Medigap premiums  
 
(1) Subparagraph (B) of subsection (i)(6) of this section shall not apply to a 
practice described in paragraph (2) unless—  
(A) the Secretary, through the Inspector General of the Department of 
Health and Human Services, promulgates a rule authorizing such a 
practice as an exception to remuneration; and  
(B) the remuneration is offered or transferred by a person under such rule 
during the 2-year period beginning on the date the rule is first 
promulgated.  
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(2) A practice described in this paragraph is a practice under which a health care 
provider or facility pays, in whole or in part, premiums for Medicare 
supplemental policies for individuals entitled to benefits under part A of 
subchapter XVIII of this chapter pursuant to section 426–1 of this title.  
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Appendix C 
 
Federal Legislation: Section 2 
The Social Security Act 
Part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 
Anti-Kickback: The Intent-Based Criminal Statute                                                          
Sec. 1128B. [42 USC § 1320a–7b]. Criminal penalties for acts involving Federal health 
care programs 
 (a) Making or causing to be made false statements or representations  
 
Whoever— 
(1) knowingly and willfully makes or causes to be made any false statement or 
representation of a material fact in any application for any benefit or payment 
under a Federal health care program (as defined in subsection (f) of this section),  
(2) at any time knowingly and willfully makes or causes to be made any false 
statement or representation of a material fact for use in determining rights to such 
benefit or payment,  
(3) having knowledge of the occurrence of any event affecting  
(A) his initial or continued right to any such benefit or payment, or  
(B) the initial or continued right to any such benefit or payment of any 
other individual in whose behalf he has applied for or is receiving such 
benefit or payment, conceals or fails to disclose such event with an intent 
fraudulently to secure such benefit or payment either in a greater amount 
or quantity than is due or when no such benefit or payment is authorized,  
(4) having made application to receive any such benefit or payment for the use 
and benefit of another and having received it, knowingly and willfully converts 
such benefit or payment or any part thereof to a use other than for the use and 
benefit of such other person,  
(5) presents or causes to be presented a claim for a physician‘s service for which 
payment may be made under a Federal health care program and knows that the 
individual who furnished the service was not licensed as a physician, or  
(6) for a fee knowingly and willfully counsels or assists an individual to dispose 
of assets (including by any transfer in trust) in order for the individual to become 
eligible for medical assistance under a State plan under subchapter XIX of this 
chapter, if disposing of the assets results in the imposition of a period of 
ineligibility for such assistance under section 1396p (c) of this title,  
shall  
(i) in the case of such a statement, representation, concealment, failure, or 
conversion by any person in connection with the furnishing (by that 
person) of items or services for which payment is or may be made under 
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the program, be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof fined not 
more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years or both, or  
(ii) in the case of such a statement, representation, concealment, failure, 
conversion, or provision of counsel or assistance by any other person, be 
guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof fined not more than 
$10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. In addition, in 
any case where an individual who is otherwise eligible for assistance 
under a Federal health care program is convicted of an offense under the 
preceding provisions of this subsection, the administrator of such program 
may at its option (notwithstanding any other provision of such program) 
limit, restrict, or suspend the eligibility of that individual for such period 
(not exceeding one year) as it deems appropriate; but the imposition of a 
limitation, restriction, or suspension with respect to the eligibility of any 
individual under this sentence shall not affect the eligibility of any other 
person for assistance under the plan, regardless of the relationship between 
that individual and such other person.  
(b) Illegal remunerations  
(1) Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration 
(including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or 
covertly, in cash or in kind—  
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing or 
arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may 
be made in whole or in part under a Federal health care program, or  
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or 
recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, 
or item for which payment may be made in whole or in part under a 
Federal health care program,  
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not 
more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.  
(2) Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration (including 
any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash 
or in kind to any person to induce such person—  
(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for the 
furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made in 
whole or in part under a Federal health care program, or  
(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend purchasing, 
leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which payment 
may be made in whole or in part under a Federal health care program,  
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not 
more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.  
(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not apply to—  
(A) a discount or other reduction in price obtained by a provider of 
services or other entity under a Federal health care program if the 
reduction in price is properly disclosed and appropriately reflected in the 
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costs claimed or charges made by the provider or entity under a Federal 
health care program;  
(B) any amount paid by an employer to an employee (who has a bona fide 
employment relationship with such employer) for employment in the 
provision of covered items or services;  
(C) any amount paid by a vendor of goods or services to a person 
authorized to act as a purchasing agent for a group of individuals or 
entities who are furnishing services reimbursed under a Federal health care 
program if—  
(i) the person has a written contract, with each such individual or 
entity, which specifies the amount to be paid the person, which 
amount may be a fixed amount or a fixed %age of the value of the 
purchases made by each such individual or entity under the 
contract, and  
(ii) in the case of an entity that is a provider of services (as defined 
in section 1395x (u) of this title), the person discloses (in such 
form and manner as the Secretary requires) to the entity and, upon 
request, to the Secretary the amount received from each such 
vendor with respect to purchases made by or on behalf of the 
entity;  
(D) a waiver of any coinsurance under part B of subchapter XVIII of this 
chapter by a Federally qualified health care center with respect to an 
individual who qualifies for subsidized services under a provision of the 
Public Health Service Act [42 U.S.C. 201 et seq.];  
(E) any payment practice specified by the Secretary in regulations 
promulgated pursuant to section 14(a) of the Medicare and Medicaid 
Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987 or in regulations under section 
1395w–104 (e)(6) [1] of this title;  
(F) any remuneration between an organization and an individual or entity 
providing items or services, or a combination thereof, pursuant to a written 
agreement between the organization and the individual or entity if the 
organization is an eligible organization under section 1395mm of this title 
or if the written agreement, through a risk-sharing arrangement, places the 
individual or entity at substantial financial risk for the cost or utilization of 
the items or services, or a combination thereof, which the individual or 
entity is obligated to provide;  
(G) the waiver or reduction by pharmacies (including pharmacies of the 
Indian Health Service, Indian tribes, tribal organizations, and urban Indian 
organizations) of any cost-sharing imposed under part D of subchapter 
XVIII of this chapter, if the conditions described in clauses (i) through (iii) 
of section 1320a–7a (i)(6)(A) of this title are met with respect to the 
waiver or reduction (except that, in the case of such a waiver or reduction 
on behalf of a subsidy eligible individual (as defined in section 1395w–
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114 (a)(3) of this title), section 1320a–7a (i)(6)(A) of this title shall be 
applied without regard to clauses (ii) and (iii) of that section); and  
(H) any remuneration between a health center entity described under 
clause (i) or (ii) of section 1396d (l)(2)(B) of this title and any individual 
or entity providing goods, items, services, donations, loans, or a 
combination thereof, to such health center entity pursuant to a contract, 
lease, grant, loan, or other agreement, if such agreement contributes to the 
ability of the health center entity to maintain or increase the availability, or 
enhance the quality, of services provided to a medically underserved 
population served by the health center entity.  
 
(c) False statements or representations with respect to condition or operation of 
institutions  
 
Whoever knowingly and willfully makes or causes to be made, or induces or seeks to 
induce the making of, any false statement or representation of a material fact with respect 
to the conditions or operation of any institution, facility, or entity in order that such 
institution, facility, or entity may qualify (either upon initial certification or upon 
recertification) as a hospital, critical access hospital, skilled nursing facility, nursing 
facility, intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded, home health agency, or other 
entity (including an eligible organization under section 1395mm (b) of this title) for 
which certification is required under subchapter XVIII of this chapter or a State health 
care program (as defined in section 1320a–7 (h) of this title), or with respect to 
information required to be provided under section 1320a–3a of this title, shall be guilty of 
a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned 
for not more than five years, or both.  
 
(d) Illegal patient admittance and retention practices  
 
Whoever knowingly and willfully—  
(1) charges, for any service provided to a patient under a State plan approved 
under subchapter XIX of this chapter, money or other consideration at a rate in 
excess of the rates established by the State (or, in the case of services provided to 
an individual enrolled with a medicaid managed care organization under 
subchapter XIX of this chapter under a contract under section 1396b (m) of this 
title or under a contractual, referral, or other arrangement under such contract, at a 
rate in excess of the rate permitted under such contract), or  
(2) charges, solicits, accepts, or receives, in addition to any amount otherwise 
required to be paid under a State plan approved under subchapter XIX of this 
chapter, any gift, money, donation, or other consideration (other than a charitable, 
religious, or philanthropic contribution from an organization or from a person 
unrelated to the patient)—  
(A) as a precondition of admitting a patient to a hospital, nursing facility, 
or intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded, or  
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(B) as a requirement for the patient‘s continued stay in such a facility,  
when the cost of the services provided therein to the patient is paid for (in 
whole or in part) under the State plan,  
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not 
more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.  
 
(e) Violation of assignment terms  
 
Whoever accepts assignments described in section 1395u (b)(3)(B)(ii) of this title or 
agrees to be a participating physician or supplier under section 1395u (h)(1) of this title 
and knowingly, willfully, and repeatedly violates the term of such assignments or 
agreement, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined 
not more than $2,000 or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both.  
 
(f) ―Federal health care program‖ defined  
 
For purposes of this section, the term ―Federal health care program‖ means—  
(1) any plan or program that provides health benefits, whether directly, through 
insurance, or otherwise, which is funded directly, in whole or in part, by the 
United States Government (other than the health insurance program under chapter 
89 of title 5); or  
(2) any State health care program, as defined in section 1320a–7 (h) of this title. 
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Appendix C 
 
Federal Legislation: Section 3 
The Ethics in Patient Referral Act (Stark II Legislation):  Civil Statute 
Part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 
Sec. 1877. [42 USC § 1395nn]. Limitation on certain physician referrals 
(a) Prohibition of certain referrals  
 
(1) In general  
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, if a physician (or an 
immediate family member of such physician) has a financial relationship with an 
entity specified in paragraph (2), then—  
(A) the physician may not make a referral to the entity for the furnishing 
of designated health services for which payment otherwise may be made 
under this subchapter, and  
(B) the entity may not present or cause to be presented a claim under this 
subchapter or bill to any individual, third party payer, or other entity for 
designated health services furnished pursuant to a referral prohibited under 
subparagraph (A).  
(2) Financial relationship specified  
For purposes of this section, a financial relationship of a physician (or an 
immediate family member of such physician) with an entity specified in this 
paragraph is—  
(A) except as provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this section, an 
ownership or investment interest in the entity, or  
(B) except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, a compensation 
arrangement (as defined in subsection (h)(1) of this section) between the 
physician (or an immediate family member of such physician) and the 
entity.  
An ownership or investment interest described in subparagraph (A) may 
be through equity, debt, or other means and includes an interest in an 
entity that holds an ownership or investment interest in any entity 
providing the designated health service.  
 
(b) General exceptions to both ownership and compensation arrangement prohibitions  
 
Subsection (a)(1) of this section shall not apply in the following cases:  
(1) Physicians‘ services  
In the case of physicians‘ services (as defined in section 1395x (q) of this title) 
provided personally by (or under the personal supervision of) another physician in 
the same group practice (as defined in subsection (h)(4) of this section) as the 
referring physician.  
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(2) In-office ancillary services  
In the case of services (other than durable medical equipment (excluding infusion 
pumps) and parenteral and enteral nutrients, equipment, and supplies)—  
(A) that are furnished—  
(i) personally by the referring physician, personally by a physician 
who is a member of the same group practice as the referring 
physician, or personally by individuals who are directly supervised 
by the physician or by another physician in the group practice, and  
(ii)  
(I) in a building in which the referring physician (or another 
physician who is a member of the same group practice) 
furnishes physicians‘ services unrelated to the furnishing of 
designated health services, or  
(II) in the case of a referring physician who is a member of 
a group practice, in another building which is used by the 
group practice—  
(aa) for the provision of some or all of the group‘s 
clinical laboratory services, or  
(bb) for the centralized provision of the group‘s 
designated health services (other than clinical 
laboratory services), unless the Secretary 
determines other terms and conditions under which 
the provision of such services does not present a 
risk of program or patient abuse, and  
(B) that are billed by the physician performing or supervising the services, 
by a group practice of which such physician is a member under a billing 
number assigned to the group practice, or by an entity that is wholly 
owned by such physician or such group practice,  
if the ownership or investment interest in such services meets such other 
requirements as the Secretary may impose by regulation as needed to 
protect against program or patient abuse.  
(3) Prepaid plans  
In the case of services furnished by an organization—  
(A) with a contract under section 1395mm of this title to an individual 
enrolled with the organization,  
(B) described in section 1395l (a)(1)(A) of this title to an individual 
enrolled with the organization,  
(C) receiving payments on a prepaid basis, under a demonstration project 
under section 1395b–1 (a) of this title or under section 222(a) of the Social 
Security Amendments of 1972, to an individual enrolled with the 
organization,  
(D) that is a qualified health maintenance organization (within the 
meaning of section 300e–9 (d) [1] of this title) to an individual enrolled 
with the organization, or  
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(E) that is a Medicare+Choice organization under part C of this subchapter 
that is offering a coordinated care plan described in section 1395w–21 
(a)(2)(A) of this title to an individual enrolled with the organization.  
(4) Other permissible exceptions  
In the case of any other financial relationship which the Secretary 
determines, and specifies in regulations, does not pose a risk of program or 
patient abuse.  
(5) Electronic prescribing  
(c) exception established by regulation under section 1395w–104 (e)(6) of 
this title.
[1]
(c) General exception related only to ownership or investment 
prohibition for ownership in publicly traded securities and mutual funds  
Ownership of the following shall not be considered to be an ownership or 
investment interest described in subsection (a)(2)(A) of this section:  
(1) Ownership of investment securities (including shares or bonds, 
debentures, notes, or other debt instruments) which may be 
purchased on terms generally available to the public and which 
are—  
(A)  
(i) securities listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, or any 
regional exchange in which quotations are 
published on a daily basis, or foreign securities 
listed on a recognized foreign, national, or regional 
exchange in which quotations are published on a 
daily basis, or  
(ii) traded under an automated interdealer quotation 
system operated by the National Association of 
Securities Dealers, and  
(B) in a corporation that had, at the end of the corporation‘s 
most recent fiscal year, or on average during the previous 3 
fiscal years, stockholder equity exceeding $75,000,000.  
(2) Ownership of shares in a regulated investment company as 
defined in section 851(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, if 
such company had, at the end of the company‘s most recent fiscal 
year, or on average during the previous 3 fiscal years, total assets 
exceeding $75,000,000.  
 
(d) Additional exceptions related only to ownership or investment prohibition  
 
The following, if not otherwise excepted under subsection (b) of this section, shall not be 
considered to be an ownership or investment interest described in subsection (a)(2)(A) of 
this section:  
(1) Hospitals in Puerto Rico  
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In the case of designated health services provided by a hospital located in Puerto 
Rico.  
(2) Rural providers  
In the case of designated health services furnished in a rural area (as defined in 
section 1395ww (d)(2)(D) of this title) by an entity, if—  
(A) substantially all of the designated health services furnished by the 
entity are furnished to individuals residing in such a rural area; and  
(B) effective for the 18-month period beginning on December 8, 2003, the 
entity is not a specialty hospital (as defined in subsection (h)(7) of this 
section).  
(3) Hospital ownership  
In the case of designated health services provided by a hospital (other than a 
hospital described in paragraph (1)) if—  
(A) the referring physician is authorized to perform services at the 
hospital;  
(B) effective for the 18-month period beginning on December 8, 2003, the 
hospital is not a specialty hospital (as defined in subsection (h)(7) of this 
section); and  
(C) the ownership or investment interest is in the hospital itself (and not 
merely in a subdivision of the hospital). 
  
(e) Exceptions relating to other compensation arrangements  
 
The following shall not be considered to be a compensation arrangement described in 
subsection (a)(2)(B) of this section:  
(1) Rental of office space; rental of equipment  
(A) Office space  
Payments made by a lessee to a lessor for the use of premises if—  
(i) the lease is set out in writing, signed by the parties, and 
specifies the premises covered by the lease,  
(ii) the space rented or leased does not exceed that which is 
reasonable and necessary for the legitimate business purposes of 
the lease or rental and is used exclusively by the lessee when being 
used by the lessee, except that the lessee may make payments for 
the use of space consisting of common areas if such payments do 
not exceed the lessee‘s pro rata share of expenses for such space 
based upon the ratio of the space used exclusively by the lessee to 
the total amount of space (other than common areas) occupied by 
all persons using such common areas,  
(iii) the lease provides for a term of rental or lease for at least 1 
year,  
(iv) the rental charges over the term of the lease are set in advance, 
are consistent with fair market value, and are not determined in a 
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manner that takes into account the volume or value of any referrals 
or other business generated between the parties,  
(v) the lease would be commercially reasonable even if no referrals 
were made between the parties, and  
(vi) the lease meets such other requirements as the Secretary may 
impose by regulation as needed to protect against program or 
patient abuse.  
(B) Equipment  
Payments made by a lessee of equipment to the lessor of the 
equipment for the use of the equipment if—  
(i) the lease is set out in writing, signed by the parties, and 
specifies the equipment covered by the lease,  
(ii) the equipment rented or leased does not exceed that which is 
reasonable and necessary for the legitimate business purposes of 
the lease or rental and is used exclusively by the lessee when being 
used by the lessee,  
(iii) the lease provides for a term of rental or lease of at least 1 
year,  
(iv) the rental charges over the term of the lease are set in advance, 
are consistent with fair market value, and are not determined in a 
manner that takes into account the volume or value of any referrals 
or other business generated between the parties,  
(v) the lease would be commercially reasonable even if no referrals 
were made between the parties, and  
(vi) the lease meets such other requirements as the Secretary may 
impose by regulation as needed to protect against program or 
patient abuse.  
(2) Bona fide employment relationships  
Any amount paid by an employer to a physician (or an immediate family member 
of such physician) who has a bona fide employment relationship with the 
employer for the provision of services if—  
(A) the employment is for identifiable services,  
(B) the amount of the remuneration under the employment—  
(i) is consistent with the fair market value of the services, and  
(ii) is not determined in a manner that takes into account (directly 
or indirectly) the volume or value of any referrals by the referring 
physician,  
(C) the remuneration is provided pursuant to an agreement which would 
be commercially reasonable even if no referrals were made to the 
employer, and  
(D) the employment meets such other requirements as the Secretary may 
impose by regulation as needed to protect against program or patient 
abuse.  
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Subparagraph (B)(ii) shall not prohibit the payment of remuneration in the 
form of a productivity bonus based on services performed personally by 
the physician (or an immediate family member of such physician).  
(3) Personal service arrangements  
(A) In general  
Remuneration from an entity under an arrangement (including 
remuneration for specific physicians‘ services furnished to a non-profit 
blood center) if—  
(i) the arrangement is set out in writing, signed by the parties, and 
specifies the services covered by the arrangement,  
(ii) the arrangement covers all of the services to be provided by the 
physician (or an immediate family member of such physician) to the 
entity,  
(iii) the aggregate services contracted for do not exceed those that are 
reasonable and necessary for the legitimate business purposes of the 
arrangement,  
(iv) the term of the arrangement is for at least 1 year,  
(v) the compensation to be paid over the term of the arrangement is set in 
advance, does not exceed fair market value, and except in the case of a 
physician incentive plan described in subparagraph (B), is not determined 
in a manner that takes into account the volume or value of any referrals or 
other business generated between the parties,  
(vi) the services to be performed under the arrangement do not involve the 
counseling or promotion or a business arrangement or other activity that 
violates any State or Federal law, and  
(vii) the arrangement meets such other requirements as the Secretary may 
impose by regulation as needed to protect against program or patient 
abuse.  
(B) Physician incentive plan exception  
(i) In general In the case of a physician incentive plan (as defined 
in clause (ii)) between a physician and an entity, the compensation 
may be determined in a manner (through a withhold, capitation, 
bonus, or otherwise) that takes into account directly or indirectly 
the volume or value of any referrals or other business generated 
between the parties, if the plan meets the following requirements:  
(I) No specific payment is made directly or indirectly under 
the plan to a physician or a physician group as an 
inducement to reduce or limit medically necessary services 
provided with respect to a specific individual enrolled with 
the entity.  
(II) In the case of a plan that places a physician or a 
physician group at substantial financial risk as determined 
by the Secretary pursuant to section 1395mm (i)(8)(A)(ii) 
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of this title, the plan complies with any requirements the 
Secretary may impose pursuant to such section.  
(III) Upon request by the Secretary, the entity provides the 
Secretary with access to descriptive information regarding 
the plan, in order to permit the Secretary to determine 
whether the plan is in compliance with the requirements of 
this clause.  
(ii) ―Physician incentive plan‖ defined For purposes of this 
subparagraph, the term ―physician incentive plan‖ means any 
compensation arrangement between an entity and a physician or 
physician group that may directly or indirectly have the effect of 
reducing or limiting services provided with respect to individuals 
enrolled with the entity.  
(4) Remuneration unrelated to the provision of designated health services  
In the case of remuneration which is provided by a hospital to a physician if such 
remuneration does not relate to the provision of designated health services.  
(5) Physician recruitment  
In the case of remuneration which is provided by a hospital to a physician to 
induce the physician to relocate to the geographic area served by the hospital in 
order to be a member of the medical staff of the hospital, if—  
(A) the physician is not required to refer patients to the hospital,  
(B) the amount of the remuneration under the arrangement is not 
determined in a manner that takes into account (directly or indirectly) the 
volume or value of any referrals by the referring physician, and  
(C) the arrangement meets such other requirements as the Secretary may 
impose by regulation as needed to protect against program or patient 
abuse.  
(6) Isolated transactions  
In the case of an isolated financial transaction, such as a one-time sale of property 
or practice, if—  
(A) the requirements described in subparagraphs (B) and (C) of paragraph 
(2) are met with respect to the entity in the same manner as they apply to 
an employer, and  
(B) the transaction meets such other requirements as the Secretary may 
impose by regulation as needed to protect against program or patient abuse.  
(7) Certain group practice arrangements with a hospital  
(A) In general  
An arrangement between a hospital and a group under which designated 
health services are provided by the group but are billed by the hospital 
if—  
(i) with respect to services provided to an inpatient of the hospital, 
the arrangement is pursuant to the provision of inpatient hospital 
services under section 1395x (b)(3) of this title.  
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(ii) the arrangement began before December 19, 1989, and has 
continued in effect without interruption since such date,  
(iii) with respect to the designated health services covered under 
the arrangement, substantially all of such services furnished to 
patients of the hospital are furnished by the group under the 
arrangement,  
(iv) the arrangement is pursuant to an agreement that is set out in 
writing and that specifies the services to be provided by the parties 
and the compensation for services provided under the agreement,  
(v) the compensation paid over the term of the agreement is 
consistent with fair market value and the compensation per unit of 
services is fixed in advance and is not determined in a manner that 
takes into account the volume or value of any referrals or other 
business generated between the parties,  
(vi) the compensation is provided pursuant to an agreement which 
would be commercially reasonable even if no referrals were made 
to the entity, and  
(vii) the arrangement between the parties meets such other 
requirements as the Secretary may impose by regulation as needed 
to protect against program or patient abuse.  
(8) Payments by a physician for items and services  
Payments made by a physician—  
(A) to a laboratory in exchange for the provision of clinical laboratory 
services, or  
(B) to an entity as compensation for other items or services if the items or 
services are furnished at a price that is consistent with fair market value. 
 
(f) Reporting requirements  
 
Each entity providing covered items or services for which payment may be made under 
this subchapter shall provide the Secretary with the information concerning the entity‘s 
ownership, investment, and compensation arrangements, including—  
(1) the covered items and services provided by the entity, and  
(2) the names and unique physician identification numbers of all physicians with 
an ownership or investment interest (as described in subsection (a)(2)(A) of this 
section), or with a compensation arrangement (as described in subsection 
(a)(2)(B) of this section), in the entity, or whose immediate relatives have such an 
ownership or investment interest or who have such a compensation relationship 
with the entity.  
Such information shall be provided in such form, manner, and at such times as the 
Secretary shall specify. The requirement of this subsection shall not apply to 
designated health services provided outside the United States or to entities which 
the Secretary determines provides 
[3]
 services for which payment may be made 
under this subchapter very infrequently.  
214 
 
 
(g) Sanctions 
  
(1) Denial of payment  
No payment may be made under this subchapter for a designated health service 
which is provided in violation of subsection (a)(1) of this section.  
(2) Requiring refunds for certain claims  
If a person collects any amounts that were billed in violation of subsection (a)(1) 
of this section, the person shall be liable to the individual for, and shall refund on 
a timely basis to the individual, any amounts so collected.  
(3) Civil money penalty and exclusion for improper claims  
Any person that presents or causes to be presented a bill or a claim for a service 
that such person knows or should know is for a service for which payment may 
not be made under paragraph (1) or for which a refund has not been made under 
paragraph (2) shall be subject to a civil money penalty of not more than $15,000 
for each such service. The provisions of section 1320a–7a of this title (other than 
the first sentence of subsection (a) and other than subsection (b)) shall apply to a 
civil money penalty under the previous sentence in the same manner as such 
provisions apply to a penalty or proceeding under section 1320a–7a (a) of this 
title.  
(4) Civil money penalty and exclusion for circumvention schemes  
Any physician or other entity that enters into an arrangement or scheme (such as a 
cross-referral arrangement) which the physician or entity knows or should know 
has a principal purpose of assuring referrals by the physician to a particular entity 
which, if the physician directly made referrals to such entity, would be in 
violation of this section, shall be subject to a civil money penalty of not more than 
$100,000 for each such arrangement or scheme. The provisions of section 1320a–
7a of this title (other than the first sentence of subsection (a) and other than 
subsection (b)) shall apply to a civil money penalty under the previous sentence in 
the same manner as such provisions apply to a penalty or proceeding under 
section 1320a–7a (a) of this title.  
(5) Failure to report information  
Any person who is required, but fails, to meet a reporting requirement of 
subsection (f) of this section is subject to a civil money penalty of not more than 
$10,000 for each day for which reporting is required to have been made. The 
provisions of section 1320a–7a of this title (other than the first sentence of 
subsection (a) and other than subsection (b)) shall apply to a civil money penalty 
under the previous sentence in the same manner as such provisions apply to a 
penalty or proceeding under section 1320a–7a (a) of this title.  
(6) Advisory opinions  
(A) In general  
The Secretary shall issue written advisory opinions concerning whether a 
referral relating to designated health services (other than clinical 
laboratory services) is prohibited under this section. Each advisory opinion 
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issued by the Secretary shall be binding as to the Secretary and the party 
or parties requesting the opinion.  
(B) Application of certain rules  
The Secretary shall, to the extent practicable, apply the rules under 
subsections (b)(3) and (b)(4) of this section and take into account the 
regulations promulgated under subsection (b)(5) of section 1320a–7d of 
this title in the issuance of advisory opinions under this paragraph.  
(C) Regulations  
In order to implement this paragraph in a timely manner, the Secretary 
may promulgate regulations that take effect on an interim basis, after 
notice and pending opportunity for public comment.  
(D) Applicability  
This paragraph shall apply to requests for advisory opinions made after the 
date which is 90 days after August 5, 1997, and before the close of the 
period described in section 1320a–7d (b)(6) of this title.  
 
(h) Definitions and special rules  
 
For purposes of this section:  
(1) Compensation arrangement; remuneration  
(A) The term ―compensation arrangement‖ means any arrangement 
involving any remuneration between a physician (or an immediate family 
member of such physician) and an entity other than an arrangement 
involving only remuneration described in subparagraph (C).  
(B) The term ―remuneration‖ includes any remuneration, directly or 
indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind.  
(C) Remuneration described in this subparagraph is any remuneration 
consisting of any of the following:  
(i) The forgiveness of amounts owed for inaccurate tests or 
procedures, mistakenly performed tests or procedures, or the 
correction of minor billing errors.  
(ii) The provision of items, devices, or supplies that are used solely 
to—  
(I) collect, transport, process, or store specimens for the 
entity providing the item, device, or supply, or  
(II) order or communicate the results of tests or procedures 
for such entity.  
(iii) A payment made by an insurer or a self-insured plan to a 
physician to satisfy a claim, submitted on a fee for service basis, 
for the furnishing of health services by that physician to an 
individual who is covered by a policy with the insurer or by the 
self-insured plan, if—  
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(I) the health services are not furnished, and the payment is 
not made, pursuant to a contract or other arrangement 
between the insurer or the plan and the physician,  
(II) the payment is made to the physician on behalf of the 
covered individual and would otherwise be made directly to 
such individual,  
(III) the amount of the payment is set in advance, does not 
exceed fair market value, and is not determined in a manner 
that takes into account directly or indirectly the volume or 
value of any referrals, and  
(IV) the payment meets such other requirements as the 
Secretary may impose by regulation as needed to protect 
against program or patient abuse.  
(2) Employee  
An individual is considered to be ―employed by‖ or an ―employee‖ of an entity if 
the individual would be considered to be an employee of the entity under the 
usual common law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee 
relationship (as applied for purposes of section 3121(d)(2) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986).  
(3) Fair market value  
The term ―fair market value‖ means the value in arms length transactions, 
consistent with the general market value, and, with respect to rentals or leases, the 
value of rental property for general commercial purposes (not taking into account 
its intended use) and, in the case of a lease of space, not adjusted to reflect the 
additional value the prospective lessee or lessor would attribute to the proximity 
or convenience to the lessor where the lessor is a potential source of patient 
referrals to the lessee.  
(4) Group practice  
(A) Definition of group practice  
The term ―group practice‖ means a group of 2 or more physicians legally 
organized as a partnership, professional corporation, foundation, not-for-
profit corporation, faculty practice plan, or similar association—  
(i) in which each physician who is a member of the group provides 
substantially the full range of services which the physician 
routinely provides, including medical care, consultation, diagnosis, 
or treatment, through the joint use of shared office space, facilities, 
equipment and personnel,  
(ii) for which substantially all of the services of the physicians who 
are members of the group are provided through the group and are 
billed under a billing number assigned to the group and amounts so 
received are treated as receipts of the group,  
(iii) in which the overhead expenses of and the income from the 
practice are distributed in accordance with methods previously 
determined,  
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(iv) except as provided in subparagraph (B)(i), in which no 
physician who is a member of the group directly or indirectly 
receives compensation based on the volume or value of referrals by 
the physician,  
(v) in which members of the group personally conduct no less than 
 75 % of the physician-patient encounters of the group 
 practice, and  
(vi) which meets such other standards as the Secretary may impose 
 by regulation.  
(B) Special rules  
(i) Profits and productivity bonuses A physician in a group practice 
may be paid a share of overall profits of the group, or a 
productivity bonus based on services personally performed or 
services incident to such personally performed services, so long as 
the share or bonus is not determined in any manner which is 
directly related to the volume or value of referrals by such 
physician.  
(ii) Faculty practice plans In the case of a faculty practice plan 
associated with a hospital, institution of higher education, or 
medical school with an approved medical residency training 
program in which physician members may provide a variety of 
different specialty services and provide professional services both 
within and outside the group, as well as perform other tasks such 
as research, subparagraph (A) shall be applied only with respect to 
the services provided within the faculty practice plan.  
(5) Referral; referring physician  
(A) Physicians‘ services  
Except as provided in subparagraph (C), in the case of an item or service 
for which payment may be made under part B of this subchapter, the 
request by a physician for the item or service, including the request by a 
physician for a consultation with another physician (and any test or 
procedure ordered by, or to be performed by (or under the supervision of) 
that other physician), constitutes a ―referral‖ by a ―referring physician‖.  
(B) Other items  
Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the request or establishment of a 
plan of care by a physician which includes the provision of the designated 
health service constitutes a ―referral‖ by a ―referring physician‖.  
(C) Clarification respecting certain services integral to a consultation by 
certain specialists  
A request by a pathologist for clinical diagnostic laboratory tests and 
pathological examination services, a request by a radiologist for diagnostic 
radiology services, and a request by a radiation oncologist for radiation 
therapy, if such services are furnished by (or under the supervision of) 
such pathologist, radiologist, or radiation oncologist pursuant to a 
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consultation requested by another physician does not constitute a 
―referral‖ by a ―referring physician‖.  
(6) Designated health services  
The term ―designated health services‖ means any of the following items or 
services:  
(A) Clinical laboratory services.  
(B) Physical therapy services.  
(C) Occupational therapy services.  
(D) Radiology services, including magnetic resonance imaging, 
computerized axial tomography scans, and ultrasound services.  
(E) Radiation therapy services and supplies.  
(F) Durable medical equipment and supplies.  
(G) Parenteral and enteral nutrients, equipment, and supplies.  
(H) Prosthetics, orthotics, and prosthetic devices and supplies.  
(I) Home health services.  
(J) Outpatient prescription drugs.  
(K) Inpatient and outpatient hospital services.  
(7) Specialty hospital  
(A) In general  
For purposes of this section, except as provided in subparagraph (B), the 
term ―specialty hospital‖ means a subsection (d) hospital (as defined in 
section 1395ww (d)(1)(B) of this title) that is primarily or exclusively 
engaged in the care and treatment of one of the following categories:  
(i) Patients with a cardiac condition.  
(ii) Patients with an orthopedic condition.  
(iii) Patients receiving a surgical procedure.  
(iv) Any other specialized category of services that the Secretary 
designates as inconsistent with the purpose of permitting physician 
ownership and investment interests in a hospital under this section.  
(B) Exception  
For purposes of this section, the term ―specialty hospital‖ does not include 
any hospital—  
(i) determined by the Secretary—  
(I) to be in operation before November 18, 2003; or  
(II) under development as of such date;  
(ii) for which the number of physician investors at any time on or 
after such date is no greater than the number of such investors as of 
such date;  
(iii) for which the type of categories described in subparagraph (A) 
at any time on or after such date is no different than the type of 
such categories as of such date;  
(iv) for which any increase in the number of beds occurs only in 
the facilities on the main campus of the hospital and does not 
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exceed 50 % of the number of beds in the hospital as of November 
18, 2003, or 5 beds, whichever is greater; and  
(v) that meets such other requirements as the Secretary may 
specify 
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Appendix C 
 
Federal Legislation:  Section 4 
Laws Regarding Inducement of Services 
 
SEC. 1156. [42 USC 1320c-5] Obligations of Health Care Practitioners and Providers of 
Health Care Services; Sanctions and Penalties; Hearings and Review 
(a) It shall be the obligation of any health care practitioner and any other person 
(including a hospital or other health care facility, organization, or agency) who provides 
health care services for which payment may be made (in whole or in part) under this Act, 
to assure, to the extent of his authority that services or items ordered or provided by such 
practitioner or person to beneficiaries and recipients under this Act—  
(1) will be provided economically and only when, and to the extent, medically 
necessary;  
(2) will be of a quality which meets professionally recognized standards of health 
care; and  
(3) will be supported by evidence of medical necessity and quality in such form 
and fashion and at such time as may reasonably be required by a reviewing peer 
review organization in the exercise of its duties and responsibilities.  
(b)(1) If after reasonable notice and opportunity for discussion with the practitioner or 
person concerned, and, if appropriate, after the practitioner or person has been given a 
reasonable opportunity to enter into and complete a corrective action plan (which may 
include remedial education) agreed to by the organization, and has failed successfully to 
complete such plan, any organization having a contract with the Secretary under this part 
determines that such practitioner or person has—  
(A) failed in a substantial number of cases substantially to comply with any 
obligation imposed on him under subsection (a), or  
(B) grossly and flagrantly violated any such obligation in one or more instances,  
such organization shall submit a report and recommendations to the Secretary. If the 
Secretary agrees with such determination, the Secretary (in addition to any other sanction 
provided under law) may exclude (permanently or for such period as the Secretary may 
prescribe, except that such period may not be less than 1 year) such practitioner or person 
from eligibility to provide services under this Act on a reimbursable basis. If the 
Secretary fails to act upon the recommendations submitted to him by such organization 
within 120 days after such submission, such practitioner or person shall be excluded from 
eligibility to provide services on a reimbursable basis until such time as the Secretary 
determines otherwise.  
221 
 
(2) A determination made by the Secretary under this subsection to exclude a 
practitioner or person shall be effective on the same date and in the same manner 
as an exclusion from participation under the programs under this Act becomes 
effective under section 1128(c), and shall (subject to the minimum period 
specified in the second sentence of paragraph (1)) remain in effect until the 
Secretary finds and gives reasonable notice to the public that the basis for such 
determination has been removed and that there is reasonable assurance that it will 
not recur.  
(3) In lieu of the sanction authorized by paragraph (1), the Secretary may require 
that (as a condition to the continued eligibility of such practitioner or person to 
provide such health care services on a reimbursable basis) such practitioner or 
person pays to the United States, in case such acts or conduct involved the 
provision or ordering by such practitioner or person of health care services which 
were medically improper or unnecessary, an amount not in excess of up to 
$10,000 for each instance of the medically improper or unnecessary services so 
provided. Such amount may be deducted from any sums owing by the United 
States (or any instrumentality thereof) to the practitioner or person from whom 
such amount is claimed.  
(4) Any practitioner or person furnishing services described in paragraph (1) who 
is dissatisfied with a determination made by the Secretary under this subsection 
shall be entitled to reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing thereon by the 
Secretary to the same extent as is provided in section 205(b), and to judicial 
review of the Secretary's final decision after such hearing as is provided in section 
205(g).  
(5) Before the Secretary may effect an exclusion under paragraph (2) in the case 
of a provider or practitioner located in a rural health professional shortage area or 
in a county with a population of less than 70,000, the provider or practitioner 
adversely affected by the determination is entitled to a hearing before an 
administrative law judge (described in section 205(b)) respecting whether the 
provider or practitioner should be able to continue furnishing services to 
individuals entitled to benefits under this Act, pending completion of the 
administrative review procedure under paragraph (4). If the judge does not 
determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the provider or practitioner 
will pose a serious risk to such individuals if permitted to continue furnishing 
such services, the Secretary shall not effect the exclusion under paragraph (2) 
until the provider or practitioner has been provided reasonable notice and 
opportunity for an administrative hearing thereon under paragraph (4).  
(6) When the Secretary effects an exclusion of a physician under paragraph (2), 
the Secretary shall notify the State board responsible for the licensing of the 
physician of the exclusion.  
(c) It shall be the duty of each utilization and quality control peer review organization to 
use such authority or influence it may possess as a professional organization, and to enlist 
the support of any other professional or governmental organization having influence or 
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authority over health care practitioners and any other person (including a hospital or other 
health care facility, organization, or agency) providing health care services in the area 
served by such review organization, in assuring that each practitioner or person (referred 
to in subsection (a)) providing health care services in such area shall comply with all 
obligations imposed on him under subsection (a). 
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FLORIDA LEGISLATION
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Appendix D 
Florida Legislation 
 
The Florida Anti-Kickback statutes (Fla. Stat §456.054) state: 
 
 It is unlawful for: 
 
i) any health care provider or any provider of health care services to 
offer, pay, solicit, or receive a kickback, directly or indirectly, 
overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind, for referring or soliciting 
patients. 
ii) violations of this section shall be considered patient brokering and 
shall be punishable as provided in s. 817.505 (Patient Brokering 
Act) 
 
The Florida Medicaid Anti-Kickback statutes [Fla. Stat §490.920(2)] state: 
 
 It is unlawful for a person to: 
 
i) Knowingly solicit, offer, pay, or receive any remuneration, 
including any kickback, bribe, or rebate, directly or indirectly, 
overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind, in return for referring an 
individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for the 
furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made, 
in whole or in part, under the Medicaid program, or in return for 
obtaining, purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or 
recommending, obtaining, purchasing, leasing, or ordering any 
goods, facility, item, or service, for which payment may be made, 
in whole or in part, under the Medicaid program. 
 
The Florida Patient Brokering Act (Fla. Stat §817.505) states: 
 
 It is unlawful to: 
 
i) offer or pay, solicit or receive, a commission, bonus rebate, 
kickback, or bribe, directly or indirectly, in cash or in kind, or 
engage in any split-fee arrangement to induce referrals. 
ii) aid, abet, advise or otherwise participate in the above prohibited 
conduct. 
 
The Florida Fee-Splitting laws (Fla. Stat §458.331) prohibit: 
 
i) Paying or receiving any commission, bonus, kickback, or rebate; or 
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ii) Engaging in any split-fee arrangement in any form whatsoever 
with a physician, organization, agency, or person, either directly or 
indirectly, for patients referred to providers of health care goods 
and services, including, but not limited to, hospitals, nursing 
homes, clinical laboratories, ambulatory surgical centers, or 
pharmacies. 
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APPENDIX E 
CENSUS DATA 
  
 
Appendix E: Census Data 
 
Region and Division 
U.S. Census Bureau, Population 
Division, Interim State 
Population Projections, 2005. 
Internet Release April 21, 2005. 
 
Percent 
distribution 
of population 
Census 2000 
Percent 
distribution of 
population 
Projections 
2010 
Percent 
distribution 
of population 
Projections 
2020 
Percent 
distribution 
of population 
Projections 
2030 
Percent 
distribution 
of population 
change 2000 
to 2010 
Percent 
distribution 
of population 
change 2010 
to 2020 
Percent 
distribution  
of population 
change 2020 to 
2030 
Percent 
distribution  
of population 
change 2000 to 
2030 
United States 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
.Northeast 19.0 18.1 17.0 15.9 8.0 5.0 1.9 5.0 
..New England 4.9 4.8 4.6 4.3 3.0 2.1 1.1 2.1 
..Middle Atlantic 14.1 13.3 12.5 11.6 5.0 2.9 0.8 2.9 
.Midwest 22.9 21.8 20.7 19.4 10.9 7.7 3.8 7.4 
..East North Central 16.0 15.2 14.4 13.4 6.9 4.3 1.5 4.2 
..West North Central 6.8 6.6 6.3 6.0 4.0 3.3 2.2 3.2 
.South 35.6 36.8 38.0 39.4 48.5 52.1 56.5 52.4 
..South Atlantic 18.4 19.4 20.4 21.5 29.2 32.2 34.7 32.0 
..East South Central 6.0 5.8 5.7 5.5 3.8 3.4 3.3 3.5 
..West South Central 11.2 11.6 12.0 12.5 15.6 16.5 18.4 16.8 
.West 22.5 23.4 24.3 25.3 32.6 35.2 37.8 35.2 
..Mountain 6.5 7.0 7.6 8.2 13.0 14.2 15.7 14.3 
..Pacific 16.0 16.3 16.7 17.1 19.7 21.0 22.1 20.9 
New England: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont 
Middle Atlantic: New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania 
East North Central: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin 
West North Central: Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota 
South Atlantic: Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia 
East South Central: Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee 
West South Central: Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas 
Mountain: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming 
Pacific: Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington 
2
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OPPT PROVIDERS IN ORLANDO
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Appendix F: 
OPPT Providers in Orlando 
 
Name of Physical Therapy Provider Year Provider Opened Practice 
Ability Health Services 2006 
Ally Physical Therapy Center, Inc. Unable to determine. 
Baker, Heard, Osteen, Davenport (1980s) 
Baseline Rehabilitation 1999 
Better Body Physical Therapy Unable to determine. 
Cora Rehabilitation:  14 Locations 4 in 1999, 5 in 2000, 1 for each year 2001 
through 2006 
Florida Fitness Concepts 1994 
Florida Hospital Rehabiliation and Sports 
Medicine:  13 Locations 
(1990s) 
HealthSouth Sports Medicine and 
Rehabilitation Center (Now Select 
Medical):  9 Locations 
(1999-2004) 
Jewett Orthopaedic Clinic:  7 Locations 2001 
Lake Mary Physical Therapy   1992 
Life Skills Unable to determine. 
Mederi (Rita) Unable to determine. 
Metro Rehab of Orlando Unable to determine. 
Mid-Florida Orthopaedics 1991 
ORHS Facilities:  7 Locations 1997 
Orlando Orthopaedic:  4 Locations 2002 
Orlando Pain and Medical Rehab Center 2000 
Orlando Physical Therapy Unable to determine. 
Orlando Sports Medicine Group 2003 
Physicians' Choice Physical Therapy 2006 
Physicians‘ Injury Care Center:  4 
Locations 
Unable to determine. 
Physio Med of Orlando, Inc.  1998 
Physiotherapy Associates Unable to determine. 
Physiotherapy Works 2004 
Pro Form Physical Therapy 2002 
Regional Orthopaedic Associates:  2 
Locations 
2001 
South Orange Wellness and Injury Unable to determine. 
Sports Specific:  3 Locations 1998 
Stanford Orthopaedics Unable to determine. 
VanderSchaaf Chiropractic Clinic Unable to determine. 
Vissers Physical Therapy 2003 
Wynne Chiropractic Unable to determine. 
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Appendix G 
ORHS and FHS Outpatient Rehabilitation Facility Locations 
 
ORHS Clinic Locations 
 
1. Orlando Regional Medical Center Campus 
1301 Sligh Blvd. 
Orlando, FL  32806 
407-649-6888 
 
2. Orlando Regional Dr. P. Phillips Hospital (Formerly Sand Lake Hospital) 
7350 Sandlake Commons Blvd., Ste. 1105 
Orlando, FL 32819 
407-351-8580 
 
3. Orlando Regional South Seminole Hospital 
555 W. State Road 434 
Longwood, FL  32750 
407-767-5842 
 
4. Orlando Regional: Lucerne Medical Center 
100 W. Gore St., Ste. 104 
Orlando, FL  32806 
407-841-8911 
 
5. Dr. Phillips YMCA:  OPENED 2006 
7000 Dr. Phillips Blvd. 
Orlando, FL  32819 
407-351-9417 
 
6. St. Cloud Regional Rehab Services:  OPENED 2003 
1575 Budinger Ave. 
St. Cloud, FL 34769 
407-957-8106 
 
7. Orlando Regional:  Arnold Palmer Hospital for Children 
OPENED 2003 
 
8. Orlando Regional Outpatient Rehabilitation:  Orange Avenue Location 
CLOSED in 2000 
 
9. Orlando Regional Outpatient Rehabilitation:  Wekiva Location 
CLOSED 2006 
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10. Orlando Regional Outpatient Rehabilitation:  Winter Park Location 
CLOSED end of 2004 
 
11. Orlando Regional Outpatient Rehabilitation:  Oviedo Location 
CLOSED 2006 
 
Florida Hospital Clinic Locations 
1. Florida Hospital Rehabilitation and Sports Medicine: Altamonte 
608 East Altamonte Drive, Suite 1100 
Altamonte Springs, FL 32701 
407-830-3900 
 
2. Florida Hospital Rehabilitation Center: Apopka 
205 North Park Avenue, Suite 110 
Apopka, FL 32703 
407-889-1039 
 
3. Florida Hospital Rehabilitation and Sports Medicine: Celebration Health 
400 Celebration Place 
Celebration, FL 34747 
407-303-4003 
 
4. Florida Hospital Rehabilitation and Sports Medicine: East Orlando 
7975 Lake Underhill Road 
Suite 300 (Pediatrics) / Suite 345 (Adults) 
Orlando, FL 32822 
407-303-6733 (Pediatrics) 
407-303-8626 (Adults)  
 
5. Florida Hospital Rehabilitation and Sports Medicine: Kissimmee 
201 Hilda Street, Suite 12 
Kissimmee, FL 34741 
407-933-6684 
6. Florida Hospital Rehabilitation and Sports Medicine: Lake Mary 
100 Waymont Court, Suite 120 
Lake Mary, FL 32746 
407-323-0399 
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7. Florida Hospital Rehabilitation and Sports Medicine Maitland: RDV Sportsplex 
8701 Maitland Summit Blvd. 
Orlando, FL 32810 
407-916-4500 
 
8. Florida Hospital Rehabilitation and Sports Medicine: Ocoee 
9580 West Colonial Dr. 
Ocoee, FL 34761 
407-532-6815 
 
9. Florida Hospital Rehabilitation and Sports Medicine: Orlando - Lee Road 
5165 Adanson Street 
Orlando, FL 32804 
407-303-7600 
 
10. Florida Hospital Rehabilitation And Sports Medicine: Orlando - Downtown 
601 East Rollins Street 
Orlando, FL 32803 
407-303-9459 (Fax) 407-303-5688 (Inpatient) 
407-303-1928 (Outpatient) 
 
11. Florida Hospital Rehabilitation and Sports Medicine: Oviedo 
8000 Red Bug Lake Road 
Oviedo, FL 32765 
407-359-5211 
 
12. Florida Hospital Rehabilitation and Sports Medicine: Orthopaedic Institute 
Winter Park Memorial Hospital 
200 N. Lakemont Ave 
Winter Park, FL 32792 
407-303-5688 
 
13. Florida Hospital Rehabilitation and Sports Medicine: YMCA Crosby Wellness Center 
2005 Mizell Avenue 
Winter Park, FL 32792 
407-646-7711 
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Appendix H 
Scripted Phone Interview for Physician Offices 
Introduction 
My name is Joy Bruce. I am a doctoral candidate with Virginia Commonwealth 
University in Richmond, VA. I am conducting a study in collaboration with the Orlando 
Regional Healthcare System (ORHS) and the Florida Hospital System (FHS) regarding 
the use of physical therapy services in the Orlando market. Orthopedic physicians 
frequently refer patients for physical therapy. Therefore, I am calling the practices of all 
orthopaedic physicians affiliated with ORHS and FHS to verify information pertaining to 
the use and/or ownership of physical therapy services. Your direct answers will remain 
confidential, being made available only to me and to my dissertation advisor, Dianne 
Jewell, PT, DPT, PhD, CCS.  The names of facilities and physicians included in this 
study will be kept confidential and not shared with anyone outside of the research team.  
Only aggregate data will be reported in the final dissertation manuscript and any 
subsequent publication. Your participation is strictly voluntary.  
Consent 
Would you be willing to participate in my research by answering a few questions 
about your practice so that I can include this information in my study?   
Questions 
1. Are you the manager of this physician practice?  If not, what is your role?   
2. How many years have you served in this role for this practice? 
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3. Does your practice currently invest in or own physical therapy services to which 
you make referrals? 
4. If yes, in what year did you invest in or take ownership of the physical therapy 
services? 
5. Has your practice previously invested in or owned physical therapy services to 
which you made referrals?   
6. If yes, in which years did you have these ties to physical therapy services? 
 
That was my final question.  Do you have any questions about this research? 
Thank you for your participation in this study. If you have any questions or would like to 
receive my research results, please contact me, Joy Bruce at 770-296-7431 or 
joy_bruce@shepherd.org.  
 
Date of Interview: _____________________________   
237 
 
      
Scripted Phone Interview for Competing Physical Therapy Providers 
My name is Joy Bruce. I am a doctoral candidate with Virginia Commonwealth 
University in Richmond, VA. I am conducting a study in collaboration with the Orlando 
Regional Healthcare System (ORHS) and the Florida Hospital System (FHS) regarding 
the use of physical therapy services in the Orlando market. I am calling the offices of all 
physical therapy providers to verify information pertaining to the establishment of your 
practice. Your direct answers will remain confidential, being made available only to me 
and to my dissertation advisor, Dianne Jewell, PT, DPT, PhD, CCS.  The names of 
facilities and physicians included in this study will be kept confidential and not shared 
with anyone outside of the research team.  Only aggregate data will be reported in the 
final dissertation manuscript and any subsequent publication. Your participation is 
strictly voluntary.  
Consent 
Would you be willing to participate in my research by answering a few questions about 
your practice so that I can include this information in my study?  
1. Are you the manager of this physical therapy practice?  If not, what is your role?   
2. How many years have you served in this role for this practice? 
3. In what year did your practice begin seeing patients? 
That was my final question.  Do you have any questions about this research? 
Thank you for your participation in this study. If you have any questions or would like to 
receive my research results, please contact me, Joy Bruce at 770-296-7431 or 
joy_bruce@shepherd.org.  
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Date of Interview: _____________________________   
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Table 1. Average referrals per physician per year to ORHS (raw data). 
PHYSICIAN 
GROUP 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 
Group 0 
 
21.8 50.3 34.0 27.3 37.0 164.3 162.3* 
 
Group 1 
 
18.1 35.0 38.4 36.5 34.5 47.2 26.2* 
 
Group 2 
 
3.0 3.8 7.0 6.8 13.8 34.0 68.5* 
 
Group 3 
 
3.6 9.9 15.5 16.7 17.8 49.6 39.0* 
*Data for 2005 for ORHS are incomplete. Only three-quarters of the year are represented. 
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Table 2.  Breakdown by payer group per physician group (ORHS only). 
PHYSICIAN 
CODE PAYORCODE 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005* (blank)
  
 
Grand 
Total 
Group 0 Commercial =0 63 120 67 64 104 531 530   1479 
 (N=4) Medicare=1 24 66 16 9 27 115 78  335 
  Other=2   15 53 36 17 11 41  173 
Group 0 
Total   87 201 136 109 148 657 649   1987 
 Group 1 Commercial =0 836 1524 1569 1482 1272 1713 924 1
† 
9321 
 (N=47) Medicare=1 12 61 110 126 225 254 160  948 
  Other=2 2 59 127 109 124 251 146  818 
Group 1 
Total   850 1644 1806 1717 1621 2218 1230 1
†
 11087 
Group 2 Commercial =0 11 13 13 17 49 61 154   318 
 (N=4) Medicare=1 1  5  1 28 21  56 
  Other=2   2 10 10 5 47 99  173 
Group 2 
Total   12 15 28 27 55 136 274   547 
 Group 3 Commercial =0 269 641 801 833 896 2748 2219 2
†
 8409 
 (N=79) Medicare=1 14 105 240 322 293 536 262  1772 
  Other=2   35 186 162 221 637 597  1838 
Group 3 
Total   283 781 1227 1317 1410 3921 3078 2
†
 12019 
Grand Total  1232 2641 3197 3170 3234 6932 5231* 3
†
 25640 
* Data for 2005 incomplete. Only three-quarters of year included. 
†Missing information on year of referral.  
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Table 3.  Percentage of total by payer group and physician group. 
PHYSICIAN 
CODE PAYERCODE 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Group 0 Commercial =0 72.4% 59.7% 49.3% 58.7% 70.3% 80.8% 81.7% 
  Medicare=1 27.6% 32.8% 11.8% 8.3% 18.2% 17.6% 12.0% 
  Other=2 0.0%  7.5% 38.9% 33.0% 11.5% 1.7% 6.3% 
 Group 1 Commercial =0 98.4% 92.7% 86.9% 86.3% 78.5% 77.2% 75.1% 
  Medicare=1 1.4% 3.7% 6.1% 7.4% 13.9% 11.5% 13.0% 
  Other=2 0.2% 3.6% 7.0% 6.3% 7.6% 11.3% 11.9% 
Group 2 Commercial =0 91.7% 86.7% 46.4% 63.0% 89.1% 44.9% 56.2% 
  Medicare=1 8.3% 0.0% 17.9% 0.0% 1.8% 20.6% 7.7% 
  Other=2  0.0% 13.3% 35.7% 37.0% 9.1% 34.5% 36.1% 
 Group 3 Commercial =0 95.1% 82.1% 65.3% 63.2% 63.5% 70.1% 72.1% 
  Medicare=1 4.9% 13.4% 19.6% 24.5% 20.8% 13.7% 8.5% 
  Other=2  0.0% 4.5% 15.2% 12.3% 15.7% 16.2% 19.4% 
 
Table 4.  Referrals to FHS by physician group (raw data).  
PHYSICIAN 
CODE 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Grand 
Total 
Group 0 26 45 82 76 65 44 38 42 28* 446 
Group 1 2334 3701 3806 4101 2877 2728 2587 2260 1614* 26008 
Group 2 125 255 280 185 109 120 179 137 83* 1473 
Group 3 747 977 1143 1163 1160 1403 1620 1598 986* 10797 
Grand Total 3232 4978 5311 5525 4211 4295 4424 4037 2711* 38724 
*Data from 2007 for FHS are incomplete. Only three-quarters of the year are included. 
 
2
4
1
 
       
Table 5. Average referrals to FHS per year per physician group (raw data). 
PHYSICIAN 
CODE 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Group 0 
 
5.2 9 16.4 15.2 13 8.8 7.6 8.4 5.6* 
Group 1 
 
59.8 94.9 97.6 105.2 73.8 69.9 66.3 57.9 41.4* 
Group 2 
 
31.3 63.8 70.0 46.3 27.3 30.0 44.8 34.3 20.8* 
Group 3 
 
17.4 22.7 26.6 27.0 27.0 32.6 37.7 37.2 22.9* 
*Data from 2007 for FHS are incomplete. Only three-quarters of the year are included. 
Table 6. Referrals to both hospitals by physician group. 
 ORHS and FHS in Aggregate FHS Only  
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
Group 0 113 246 218 185 213 701 687* 42 28** 2433 
Group 1 3184 5345 5612 5818 4498 4946 3817* 2260 1614** 37094 
Group 2 137 270 308 212 164 256 453* 137 83** 2020 
Group 3 1030 1758 2370 2480 2570 5324 4698* 1598 986** 22814 
Totals 4464 7619 8508 8695 7745 11227 9655* 4037 2711** 64361 
*Only three-quarters of year for ORHS included. No data for ORHS 2006 and 2007. 
**Only three-quarters of year for FHS included. 
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APPENDIX J 
COMPARISONS FOR GROUP 1 AND GROUP 3 PHYSICIANS 
       
Appendix J:   
Comparisons for Group 1 and Group 3 Physicians 
 
Test 1: Mixed Model Analysis (Aggregate Year 1 versus 5) 
Model Dimensiona
1 1
2 1
2 1
4 1
2 Unstructured 3 PHYSID 47
11 7
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PHYSCD * STATUS
Fixed Ef fects
STATUSRepeated Ef fects
Total
Number
of  Levels
Covariance
Structure
Number of
Parameters
Subject
Variables
Number of
Subjects
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
Inform ation Crite riaa
988.503
994.503
994.782
1005.002
1002.002
-2 Restric ted Log
Likelihood
Akaike's Information
Criterion (AIC)
Hurvich and Tsai's
Criterion (AICC)
Bozdogan's Criterion
(CAIC)
Schw arz's Bayesian
Criterion (BIC)
The information criteria are displayed
in smaller-is-better forms.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
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Fixed Effects 
Type III Tests of Fixed Effectsa
1 45.000 51.873 .000
1 45.000 6.567 .014
1 45.000 1.065 .307
1 45.000 .632 .431
Source
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PHYSCD * STATUS
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Estimates  of Fixed Effectsb
50.760000 15.818179 45 3.209 .002 18.900551 82.619449
42.603636 23.120333 45.000 1.843 .072 -3.963105 89.170378
0a 0 . . . . .
-13.6400 10.216049 45.000 -1.335 .189 -34.216180 6.936180
0a 0 . . . . .
11.867273 14.932089 45.000 .795 .431 -18.207499 41.942044
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
Parameter
Intercept
[PHYSCD=1]
[PHYSCD=3]
[STATUS=0]
[STATUS=1]
[STATUS=0] *
[PHYSCD=1]
[STATUS=1] *
[PHYSCD=1]
[STATUS=0] *
[PHYSCD=3]
[STATUS=1] *
[PHYSCD=3]
Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
This  parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
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Covariance Parameters 
Estimates  of Covariance  Parametersa
3445.599 726.3961
3545.889 870.8466
6255.370 1318.748
Parameter
UN (1,1)
UN (2,1)
UN (2,2)
Repeated
Measures
Estimate Std. Error
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. PHYSCD 
Estimatesa
92.477 13.814 45.000 64.654 120.300
43.940 12.959 45 17.840 70.040
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
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Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
48.537* 18.941 45.000 .014 10.389 86.686
-48.537* 18.941 45.000 .014 -86.686 -10.389
(J) PHYSCD
3
1
(I) PHYSCD
1
3
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
The mean dif ference is  s ignif icant at the .05 level.*. 
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
Univariate  Testsa
1 45.000 6.567 .014
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  PHYSCD. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
2. STATUS 
Estimatesa
64.355 8.580 45.000 47.075 81.636
72.062 11.560 45.000 48.778 95.345
STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
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Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
-7.706 7.466 45.000 .307 -22.744 7.331
7.706 7.466 45.000 .307 -7.331 22.744
(J) STATUS
POST
PRE
(I) STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
Univariate  Testsa
1 45.000 1.065 .307
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  STATUS. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
3. PHYSCD * STATUSa
91.591 12.515 45 66.385 116.797
93.364 16.862 45.000 59.401 127.326
37.120 11.740 45.000 13.475 60.765
50.760 15.818 45 18.901 82.619
STATUS
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
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Test 2: Mixed Model Analysis (ORHS Year 1 versus 5) 
Model Dimensiona
1 1
2 1
2 1
4 1
2 Unstructured 3 PHYSID 16
11 7
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PHYSCD * STATUS
Fixed Ef fects
w aveRepeated Ef fects
Total
Number
of  Levels
Covariance
Structure
Number of
Parameters
Subject
Variables
Number of
Subjects
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Inform ation Crite riaa
271.115
277.115
278.115
284.111
281.111
-2 Restric ted Log
Likelihood
Akaike's Information
Criterion (AIC)
Hurvich and Tsai's
Criterion (AICC)
Bozdogan's Criterion
(CAIC)
Schw arz's Bayesian
Criterion (BIC)
The information criteria are displayed
in smaller-is-better forms.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
2
4
9
 
       
Fixed Effects 
Type III Tests of Fixed Effectsa
1 14.000 43.055 .000
1 14.000 .201 .661
1 14 1.297 .274
1 14 2.321 .150
Source
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PHYSCD * STATUS
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Estimates  of Fixed Effectsb
46.625000 11.820788 14 3.944 .001 21.271931 71.978069
-7.125000 16.717119 14 -.426 .676 -42.979653 28.729653
0a 0 . . . . .
-21.6250 11.487862 14 -1.882 .081 -46.264014 3.014014
0a 0 . . . . .
24.750000 16.246291 14 1.523 .150 -10.094828 59.594828
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
Parameter
Intercept
[PHYSCD=1]
[PHYSCD=3]
[STATUS=0]
[STATUS=1]
[PHYSCD=1] *
[STATUS=0]
[PHYSCD=1] *
[STATUS=1]
[PHYSCD=3] *
[STATUS=0]
[PHYSCD=3] *
[STATUS=1]
Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
This  parameter is set to zero because it is  redundant.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
 
2
5
0
 
       
Covariance Parameters 
Estimates  of Covariance  Parametersa
508.1339 192.0566
285.1071 215.3573
1117.848 422.5069
Parameter
UN (1,1)
UN (2,1)
UN (2,2)
Repeated
Measures
Estimate Std. Error
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. PHYSCD 
Estimatesa
41.063 8.284 14.000 23.294 58.831
35.813 8.284 14 18.044 53.581
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
2
5
1
 
       
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
5.250 11.716 14.000 .661 -19.878 30.378
-5.250 11.716 14.000 .661 -30.378 19.878
(J) PHYSCD
3
1
(I) PHYSCD
1
3
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
Univariate  Testsa
1 14.000 .201 .661
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  PHYSCD. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
2. STATUS 
Estimatesa
33.813 5.635 14 21.726 45.899
43.063 8.359 14 25.135 60.990
STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 25
2
 
       
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
-9.250 8.123 14 .274 -26.672 8.172
9.250 8.123 14 .274 -8.172 26.672
(J) STATUS
POST
PRE
(I) STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
Univariate  Testsa
1 14 1.297 .274
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  STATUS. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
3. PHYSCD * STATUSa
42.625 7.970 14 25.532 59.718
39.500 11.821 14 14.147 64.853
25.000 7.970 14 7.907 42.093
46.625 11.821 14 21.272 71.978
STATUS
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 25
3
 
       
Test 3: Mixed Model Analysis (FHS Year 1 versus 5) 
Model Dimensiona
1 1
2 1
2 1
4 1
2 Unstructured 3 PHYSID 38
11 7
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PHYSCD * STATUS
Fixed Ef fects
STATUSRepeated Ef fects
Total
Number
of  Levels
Covariance
Structure
Number of
Parameters
Subject
Variables
Number of
Subjects
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Inform ation Crite riaa
794.862
800.862
801.215
810.692
807.692
-2 Restric ted Log
Likelihood
Akaike's Information
Criterion (AIC)
Hurvich and Tsai's
Criterion (AICC)
Bozdogan's Criterion
(CAIC)
Schw arz's Bayesian
Criterion (BIC)
The information criteria are displayed
in smaller-is-better forms.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
2
5
4
 
       
Fixed Effects 
Type III Tests of Fixed Effectsa
1 36.000 40.304 .000
1 36.000 5.081 .030
1 36.000 .497 .485
1 36.000 .100 .754
Source
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PHYSCD * STATUS
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Estimates  of Fixed Effectsb
47.157895 18.260832 36.000 2.582 .014 10.123211 84.192579
44.315789 25.824716 36.000 1.716 .095 -8.059163 96.690742
0a 0 . . . . .
-8.842105 12.245476 36.000 -.722 .475 -33.677081 15.992871
0a 0 . . . . .
5.473684 17.317718 36.000 .316 .754 -29.648276 40.595644
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
Parameter
Intercept
[PHYSCD=1]
[PHYSCD=3]
[STATUS=0]
[STATUS=1]
[STATUS=0] *
[PHYSCD=1]
[STATUS=1] *
[PHYSCD=1]
[STATUS=0] *
[PHYSCD=3]
[STATUS=1] *
[PHYSCD=3]
Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
This  parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
 
2
5
5
 
       
Covariance Parameters 
Estimates  of Covariance  Parametersa
3368.442 793.9493
3427.531 958.7232
6335.702 1493.339
Parameter
UN (1,1)
UN (2,1)
UN (2,2)
Repeated
Measures
Estimate Std. Error
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. PHYSCD 
Estimatesa
89.789 14.761 36.000 59.853 119.726
42.737 14.761 36.000 12.800 72.673
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2
5
6
 
       
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
47.053* 20.875 36.000 .030 4.716 89.389
-47.053* 20.875 36.000 .030 -89.389 -4.716
(J) PHYSCD
3
1
(I) PHYSCD
1
3
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
The mean dif ference is  s ignif icant at the .05 level.*. 
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
Univariate  Testsa
1 36.000 5.081 .030
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  PHYSCD. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
2. STATUS 
Estimatesa
63.211 9.415 36 44.116 82.305
69.316 12.912 36.000 43.128 95.503
STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
2
5
7
 
       
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
-6.105 8.659 36.000 .485 -23.666 11.456
6.105 8.659 36.000 .485 -11.456 23.666
(J) STATUS
POST
PRE
(I) STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
Univariate  Testsa
1 36.000 .497 .485
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  STATUS. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
3. PHYSCD * STATUSa
88.105 13.315 36.000 61.101 115.109
91.474 18.261 36.000 54.439 128.508
38.316 13.315 36 11.312 65.320
47.158 18.261 36.000 10.123 84.193
STATUS
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 25
8
 
       
Test 4: Mixed Model Analysis (Aggregate Years 1 and 2 versus 4 and 5) 
Model Dimensiona
1 1
2 1
2 1
4 1
2 Unstructured 3 PHYSID 47
11 7
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PHYSCD * STATUS
Fixed Ef fects
STATUSRepeated Ef fects
Total
Number
of  Levels
Covariance
Structure
Number of
Parameters
Subject
Variables
Number of
Subjects
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Inform ation Crite riaa
1117.996
1123.996
1124.275
1134.495
1131.495
-2 Restric ted Log
Likelihood
Akaike's Information
Criterion (AIC)
Hurvich and Tsai's
Criterion (AICC)
Bozdogan's Criterion
(CAIC)
Schw arz's Bayesian
Criterion (BIC)
The information criteria are displayed
in smaller-is-better forms.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
2
5
9
 
       
Fixed Effects 
Type III Tests of Fixed Effectsa
1 45.000 54.030 .000
1 45.000 6.812 .012
1 45 .120 .730
1 45 .446 .508
Source
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PHYSCD * STATUS
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Estimates  of Fixed Effectsb
113.5600 34.687696 45.000 3.274 .002 43.695395 183.424605
109.5764 50.700593 45.000 2.161 .036 7.460128 211.692599
0a 0 . . . . .
-12.8000 17.257603 45.000 -.742 .462 -47.558596 21.958596
0a 0 . . . . .
16.845455 25.224238 45 .668 .508 -33.958768 67.649678
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
Parameter
Intercept
[PHYSCD=1]
[PHYSCD=3]
[STATUS=0]
[STATUS=1]
[STATUS=0] *
[PHYSCD=1]
[STATUS=1] *
[PHYSCD=1]
[STATUS=0] *
[PHYSCD=3]
[STATUS=1] *
[PHYSCD=3]
Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
This  parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
 
2
6
0
 
       
Covariance Parameters 
 
Estimates  of Covariance  Parametersa
21479.69 4528.315
22057.48 5016.996
30080.91 6341.612
Parameter
UN (1,1)
UN (2,1)
UN (2,2)
Repeated
Measures
Estimate Std. Error
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. PHYSCD 
Estimatesa
225.159 32.973 45.000 158.748 291.570
107.160 30.931 45.000 44.861 169.459
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
2
6
1
 
       
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
117.999* 45.210 45.000 .012 26.941 209.057
-117.999* 45.210 45.000 .012 -209.057 -26.941
(J) PHYSCD
3
1
(I) PHYSCD
1
3
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
The mean dif ference is  s ignif icant at the .05 level.*. 
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
Univariate  Testsa
1 45.000 6.812 .012
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  PHYSCD. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
2. STATUS 
Estimatesa
163.971 21.422 45.000 120.826 207.116
168.348 25.350 45.000 117.290 219.406
STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
2
6
2
 
       
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
-4.377 12.612 45 .730 -29.779 21.025
4.377 12.612 45 .730 -21.025 29.779
(J) STATUS
POST
PRE
(I) STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
Univariate  Testsa
1 45 .120 .730
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  STATUS. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
3. PHYSCD * STATUSa
227.182 31.247 45.000 164.248 290.116
223.136 36.977 45.000 148.660 297.612
100.760 29.312 45.000 41.723 159.797
113.560 34.688 45.000 43.695 183.425
STATUS
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
2
6
3
 
       
 
 
Test 5: Mixed Model Analysis (ORHS Years 1 and 2 versus 4 and 5) 
Model Dimensiona
1 1
2 1
2 1
4 1
2 Unstructured 3 PHYSID 16
11 7
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PHYSCD * STATUS
Fixed Ef fects
STATUSRepeated Ef fects
Total
Number
of  Levels
Covariance
Structure
Number of
Parameters
Subject
Variables
Number of
Subjects
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Inform ation Crite riaa
325.120
331.120
332.120
338.117
335.117
-2 Restric ted Log
Likelihood
Akaike's Information
Criterion (AIC)
Hurvich and Tsai's
Criterion (AICC)
Bozdogan's Criterion
(CAIC)
Schw arz's Bayesian
Criterion (BIC)
The information criteria are displayed
in smaller-is-better forms.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 2
6
4
 
       
Fixed Effects 
Type III Tests of Fixed Effectsa
1 14.000 34.840 .000
1 14.000 .020 .889
1 14 .695 .418
1 14 .514 .485
Source
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PHYSCD * STATUS
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Estimates  of Fixed Effectsb
105.3750 26.906709 14 3.916 .002 47.665849 163.084151
-17.2500 38.051833 14 -.453 .657 -98.863064 64.363064
0a 0 . . . . .
2.000000 24.168678 14 .083 .935 -49.836659 53.836659
0a 0 . . . . .
24.500000 34.179672 14 .717 .485 -48.808106 97.808106
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
Parameter
Intercept
[PHYSCD=1]
[PHYSCD=3]
[STATUS=0]
[STATUS=1]
[STATUS=0] *
[PHYSCD=1]
[STATUS=1] *
[PHYSCD=1]
[STATUS=0] *
[PHYSCD=3]
[STATUS=1] *
[PHYSCD=3]
Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
This  parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
 
2
6
5
 
       
Covariance Parameters 
Estimates  of Covariance  Parametersa
6455.125 2439.808
3786.946 1922.193
5791.768 2189.082
Parameter
UN (1,1)
UN (2,1)
UN (2,2)
Repeated
Measures
Estimate Std. Error
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. PHYSCD 
Estimatesa
101.375 24.888 14.000 47.996 154.754
106.375 24.888 14.000 52.996 159.754
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
2
6
6
 
       
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
-5.000 35.197 14.000 .889 -80.489 70.489
5.000 35.197 14.000 .889 -70.489 80.489
(J) PHYSCD
3
1
(I) PHYSCD
1
3
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
Univariate  Testsa
1 14.000 .020 .889
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  PHYSCD. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
2. STATUS 
Estimatesa
111.000 20.086 14.000 67.920 154.080
96.750 19.026 14 55.943 137.557
STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 26
7
 
       
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
14.250 17.090 14 .418 -22.404 50.904
-14.250 17.090 14 .418 -50.904 22.404
(J) STATUS
POST
PRE
(I) STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
Univariate  Testsa
1 14 .695 .418
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  STATUS. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
3. PHYSCD * STATUSa
114.625 28.406 14.000 53.701 175.549
88.125 26.907 14 30.416 145.834
107.375 28.406 14.000 46.451 168.299
105.375 26.907 14 47.666 163.084
STATUS
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
2
6
8
 
       
Test 6: Mixed Model Analysis (FHS Years 1 and 2 versus 4 and 5) 
Model Dimensiona
1 1
2 1
2 1
4 1
2 Unstructured 3 PHYSID 38
11 7
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PHYSCD * STATUS
Fixed Ef fects
STATUSRepeated Ef fects
Total
Number
of  Levels
Covariance
Structure
Number of
Parameters
Subject
Variables
Number of
Subjects
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Inform ation Crite riaa
889.528
895.528
895.881
905.358
902.358
-2 Restric ted Log
Likelihood
Akaike's Information
Criterion (AIC)
Hurvich and Tsai's
Criterion (AICC)
Bozdogan's Criterion
(CAIC)
Schw arz's Bayesian
Criterion (BIC)
The information criteria are displayed
in smaller-is-better forms.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
2
6
9
 
       
Fixed Effects 
Type III Tests of Fixed Effectsa
1 36.000 42.163 .000
1 36.000 6.336 .016
1 36.000 .759 .390
1 36.000 .163 .688
Source
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PHYSCD * STATUS
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Estimates  of Fixed Effectsb
105.0526 39.412992 36.000 2.665 .011 25.119378 184.985885
116.2105 55.738388 36.000 2.085 .044 3.167835 229.253217
0a 0 . . . . .
-17.6842 19.613250 36.000 -.902 .373 -57.461726 22.093305
0a 0 . . . . .
11.210526 27.737325 36.000 .404 .688 -45.043376 67.464428
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
Parameter
Intercept
[PHYSCD=1]
[PHYSCD=3]
[STATUS=0]
[STATUS=1]
[STATUS=0] *
[PHYSCD=1]
[STATUS=1] *
[PHYSCD=1]
[STATUS=0] *
[PHYSCD=3]
[STATUS=1] *
[PHYSCD=3]
Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
This  parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
 
2
7
0
 
       
Covariance Parameters 
Estimates  of Covariance  Parametersa
18638.15 4393.055
20421.77 5183.148
29514.30 6956.586
Parameter
UN (1,1)
UN (2,1)
UN (2,2)
Repeated
Measures
Estimate Std. Error
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. PHYSCD 
Estimatesa
218.026 34.220 36.000 148.625 287.427
96.211 34.220 36.000 26.809 165.612
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
2
7
1
 
       
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
121.816* 48.394 36.000 .016 23.668 219.964
-121.816* 48.394 36.000 .016 -219.964 -23.668
(J) PHYSCD
3
1
(I) PHYSCD
1
3
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
The mean dif ference is  s ignif icant at the .05 level.*. 
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
Univariate  Testsa
1 36.000 6.336 .016
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  PHYSCD. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
2. STATUS 
Estimatesa
151.079 22.147 36.000 106.163 195.995
163.158 27.869 36.000 106.637 219.679
STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
2
7
2
 
       
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
-12.079 13.869 36.000 .390 -40.206 16.048
12.079 13.869 36.000 .390 -16.048 40.206
(J) STATUS
POST
PRE
(I) STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
Univariate  Testsa
1 36.000 .759 .390
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  STATUS. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
3. PHYSCD * STATUSa
214.789 31.320 36.000 151.269 278.310
221.263 39.413 36.000 141.330 301.196
87.368 31.320 36.000 23.848 150.889
105.053 39.413 36.000 25.119 184.986
STATUS
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
2
7
3
 
       
Test 7:  Mixed Model Analysis (ORHS Insurance Year 1 versus 5) 
 
Model Dimensiona
1 1
2 1
2 1
3 2
4 1
6 2
6 2
12 2
6 Unstructured 21 PHYSID 16
42 33
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PAYCD
PHYSCD * STATUS
PHYSCD * PAYCD
STATUS * PAYCD
PHYSCD * STATUS
* PAYCD
Fixed Effects
w aveRepeated Effects
Total
Number
of  Levels
Covariance
Structure
Number of
Parameters
Subject
Variables
Number of
Subjects
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Inform ation Crite riaa
539.831
581.831
596.734
653.878
632.878
-2 Restric ted Log
Likelihood
Akaike's Information
Criterion (AIC)
Hurvich and Tsai's
Criterion (AICC)
Bozdogan's Criterion
(CAIC)
Schw arz's Bayesian
Criterion (BIC)
The information criteria are displayed
in smaller-is-better forms.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
2
7
4
 
       
Fixed Effects 
Type III Tes ts of Fixed Effectsa
1 14.000 43.055 .000
1 14.000 .201 .661
1 14.000 1.297 .274
2 14.000 19.855 .000
1 14.000 2.321 .150
2 14.000 .655 .535
2 14.000 5.086 .022
2 14.000 1.449 .268
Source
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PAYCD
PHYSCD * STATUS
PHYSCD * PAYCD
STATUS * PAYCD
PHYSCD * STATUS
* PAYCD
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
2
7
5
 
276 
 
      
Estimates  of Fixed Effectsb
.625000 .564975 14.000 1.106 .287 -.586750 1.836750
1.000000 .798995 14.000 1.252 .231 -.713674 2.713674
0a 0 . . . . .
-.625000 .690335 14.000 -.905 .381 -2.105621 .855621
0a 0 . . . . .
32.250000 9.390047 14.000 3.434 .004 12.110351 52.389649
12.500000 5.033371 14.000 2.483 .026 1.704493 23.295507
0a 0 . . . . .
-.125000 .976281 14.000 -.128 .900 -2.218915 1.968915
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
-4.875000 13.279532 14.000 -.367 .719 -33.356764 23.606764
-5.250000 7.118261 14.000 -.738 .473 -20.517152 10.017152
0a 0 . . . . .
0a 0 . . . . .
0a 0 . . . . .
0a 0 . . . . .
-9.500000 9.352652 14.000 -1.016 .327 -29.559443 10.559443
-10.2500 4.063667 14.000 -2.522 .024 -18.965700 -1.534300
0a 0 . . . . .
0a 0 . . . . .
0a 0 . . . . .
0a 0 . . . . .
22.375000 13.226647 14.000 1.692 .113 -5.993337 50.743337
2.750000 5.746894 14.000 .479 .640 -9.575861 15.075861
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
Parameter
Intercept
[PHYSCD=1]
[PHYSCD=3]
[STATUS=0]
[STATUS=1]
[PAYCD=0]
[PAYCD=1]
[PAYCD=2]
[PHYSCD=1] *
[STATUS=0]
[PHYSCD=1] *
[STATUS=1]
[PHYSCD=3] *
[STATUS=0]
[PHYSCD=3] *
[STATUS=1]
[PHYSCD=1] * [PAYCD=0]
[PHYSCD=1] * [PAYCD=1]
[PHYSCD=1] * [PAYCD=2]
[PHYSCD=3] * [PAYCD=0]
[PHYSCD=3] * [PAYCD=1]
[PHYSCD=3] * [PAYCD=2]
[STATUS=0] * [PAYCD=0]
[STATUS=0] * [PAYCD=1]
[STATUS=0] * [PAYCD=2]
[STATUS=1] * [PAYCD=0]
[STATUS=1] * [PAYCD=1]
[STATUS=1] * [PAYCD=2]
[PHYSCD=1] *
[STATUS=0] * [PAYCD=0]
[PHYSCD=1] *
[STATUS=0] * [PAYCD=1]
[PHYSCD=1] *
[STATUS=0] * [PAYCD=2]
[PHYSCD=1] *
[STATUS=1] * [PAYCD=0]
[PHYSCD=1] *
[STATUS=1] * [PAYCD=1]
[PHYSCD=1] *
[STATUS=1] * [PAYCD=2]
[PHYSCD=3] *
[STATUS=0] * [PAYCD=0]
[PHYSCD=3] *
[STATUS=0] * [PAYCD=1]
[PHYSCD=3] *
[STATUS=0] * [PAYCD=2]
[PHYSCD=3] *
[STATUS=1] * [PAYCD=0]
[PHYSCD=3] *
[STATUS=1] * [PAYCD=1]
[PHYSCD=3] *
[STATUS=1] * [PAYCD=2]
Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
This  parameter is set to zero because it is  redundant.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
       
Covariance Parameters 
 
Estimates  of Covariance Parametersa
490.4554 185.3747
-2.366071 19.214051
10.526786 3.978751
3.866071 8.850245
.973214 1.313732
2.205357 .833547
242.9107 171.6255
-12.8393 23.527040
-2.857143 10.680768
720.4911 272.3200
16.741071 86.349858
39.955357 16.542000
-1.151786 5.790713
76.366071 106.4924
212.2679 80.229709
.973214 9.461803
.901786 1.406468
.473214 .646721
8.830357 11.704092
6.071429 6.430415
2.553571 .965159
Parameter
UN (1,1)
UN (2,1)
UN (2,2)
UN (3,1)
UN (3,2)
UN (3,3)
UN (4,1)
UN (4,2)
UN (4,3)
UN (4,4)
UN (5,1)
UN (5,2)
UN (5,3)
UN (5,4)
UN (5,5)
UN (6,1)
UN (6,2)
UN (6,3)
UN (6,4)
UN (6,5)
UN (6,6)
Repeated
Measures
Estimate Std. Error
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
  
 
2
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Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. PHYSCD 
Estimatesa
13.688 2.761 14.000 7.765 19.610
11.938 2.761 14.000 6.015 17.860
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
1.750 3.905 14.000 .661 -6.626 10.126
-1.750 3.905 14.000 .661 -10.126 6.626
(J) PHYSCD
3
1
(I) PHYSCD
1
3
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
Univariate  Testsa
1 14.000 .201 .661
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  PHYSCD. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
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2. STATUS 
Estimatesa
11.271 1.878 14.000 7.242 15.300
14.354 2.786 14.000 8.378 20.330
STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
-3.083 2.708 14.000 .274 -8.891 2.724
3.083 2.708 14.000 .274 -2.724 8.891
(J) STATUS
POST
PRE
(I) STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
Univariate  Testsa
1 14.000 1.297 .274
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  STATUS. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
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3. PAYCD 
Estimatesa
31.438 5.149 14.000 20.394 42.481
6.219 2.175 14.000 1.554 10.883
.781 .299 14.000 .141 1.422
PAYCD
COMMERCIAL
MEDICARE
MEDICAID
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
25.219* 5.367 14.000 .001 10.632 39.806
30.656* 5.125 14.000 .000 16.728 44.584
-25.219* 5.367 14.000 .001 -39.806 -10.632
5.438 2.146 14.000 .072 -.396 11.271
-30.656* 5.125 14.000 .000 -44.584 -16.728
-5.438 2.146 14.000 .072 -11.271 .396
(J) PAYCD
MEDICARE
MEDICAID
COMMERCIAL
MEDICAID
COMMERCIAL
MEDICARE
(I) PAYCD
COMMERCIAL
MEDICARE
MEDICAID
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
The mean dif ference is  s ignif icant at the .05 level.*. 
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
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Univariate  Testsa
2 14.000 19.855 .000
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  PAYCD. This test is based on the
linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among the
estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
4. PHYSCD * STATUSa
14.208 2.657 14.000 8.511 19.906
13.167 3.940 14.000 4.716 21.618
8.333 2.657 14.000 2.636 14.031
15.542 3.940 14.000 7.091 23.993
STATUS
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
5. PAYCD * PHYSCDa
35.063 7.282 14.000 19.445 50.680
27.813 7.282 14.000 12.195 43.430
4.750 3.076 14.000 -1.847 11.347
7.687 3.076 14.000 1.091 14.284
1.250 .422 14.000 .344 2.156
.313 .422 14.000 -.593 1.218
PHYSCD
1
3
1
3
1
3
PAYCD
COMMERCIAL
MEDICARE
MEDICAID
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
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6. PAYCD * STATUSa
31.938 5.537 14.000 20.063 43.812
30.938 6.710 14.000 16.545 45.330
1.438 .811 14.000 -.302 3.177
11.000 3.642 14.000 3.188 18.812
.438 .371 14.000 -.359 1.234
1.125 .399 14.000 .268 1.982
STATUS
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PAYCD
COMMERCIAL
MEDICARE
MEDICAID
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
7. PAYCD * PHYSCD * STATUSa
41.125 7.830 14.000 24.332 57.918
29.000 9.490 14.000 8.646 49.354
22.750 7.830 14.000 5.957 39.543
32.875 9.490 14.000 12.521 53.229
.625 1.147 14.000 -1.835 3.085
8.875 5.151 14.000 -2.173 19.923
2.250 1.147 14.000 -.210 4.710
13.125 5.151 14.000 2.077 24.173
.875 .525 14.000 -.251 2.001
1.625 .565 14.000 .413 2.837
1.71E-014 .525 14.000 -1.126 1.126
.625 .565 14.000 -.587 1.837
STATUS
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PHYSCD
1
3
1
3
1
3
PAYCD
COMMERCIAL
MEDICARE
MEDICAID
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
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Test 8: Mixed Model Analysis (ORHS Insurance Years 1 and 2 versus 4 and 5) 
 
Model Dimensiona
1 1
2 1
2 1
3 2
4 1
6 2
6 2
12 2
6 Unstructured 21 PHYSID 16
42 33
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PAYCD
PHYSCD * STATUS
PHYSCD * PAYCD
STATUS * PAYCD
PHYSCD * STATUS
* PAYCD
Fixed Effects
WAVERepeated Effects
Total
Number
of  Levels
Covariance
Structure
Number of
Parameters
Subject
Variables
Number of
Subjects
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Inform ation Crite riaa
721.321
763.321
778.225
835.369
814.369
-2 Restric ted Log
Likelihood
Akaike's Information
Criterion (AIC)
Hurvich and Tsai's
Criterion (AICC)
Bozdogan's Criterion
(CAIC)
Schw arz's Bayesian
Criterion (BIC)
The information criteria are displayed
in smaller-is-better forms.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
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Fixed Effects 
Type III Tes ts of Fixed Effectsa
1 14.000 32.556 .000
1 14.000 .056 .816
1 14.000 .514 .485
2 14.000 14.034 .000
1 14.000 .363 .556
2 14.000 1.132 .350
2 14.000 3.310 .067
2 14.000 .687 .519
Source
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PAYCD
PHYSCD * STATUS
PHYSCD * PAYCD
STATUS * PAYCD
PHYSCD * STATUS
* PAYCD
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
2
8
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285 
 
      
Estimates  of Fixed Effectsb
7.500000 3.601680 14.000 2.082 .056 -.224835 15.224835
-2.625000 5.093545 14.000 -.515 .614 -13.549567 8.299567
0a 0 . . . . .
4.625000 6.843516 14.000 .676 .510 -10.052881 19.302881
0a 0 . . . . .
63.625000 22.595581 14.000 2.816 .014 15.162299 112.087701
19.250000 9.327080 14.000 2.064 .058 -.754597 39.254597
0a 0 . . . . .
-7.875000 9.678193 14.000 -.814 .429 -28.632659 12.882659
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
.500000 31.954977 14.000 .016 .988 -68.036609 69.036609
-11.6250 13.190483 14.000 -.881 .393 -39.915772 16.665772
0a 0 . . . . .
0a 0 . . . . .
0a 0 . . . . .
0a 0 . . . . .
4.625000 22.789555 14.000 .203 .842 -44.253735 53.503735
-16.5000 9.429189 14.000 -1.750 .102 -36.723598 3.723598
0a 0 . . . . .
0a 0 . . . . .
0a 0 . . . . .
0a 0 . . . . .
34.500000 32.229298 14.000 1.070 .303 -34.624970 103.624970
10.125000 13.334886 14.000 .759 .460 -18.475487 38.725487
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
Parameter
Intercept
[PHYSCD=1]
[PHYSCD=3]
[STATUS=0]
[STATUS=1]
[PAYCD=0]
[PAYCD=1]
[PAYCD=2]
[PHYSCD=1] *
[STATUS=0]
[PHYSCD=1] *
[STATUS=1]
[PHYSCD=3] *
[STATUS=0]
[PHYSCD=3] *
[STATUS=1]
[PHYSCD=1] * [PAYCD=0]
[PHYSCD=1] * [PAYCD=1]
[PHYSCD=1] * [PAYCD=2]
[PHYSCD=3] * [PAYCD=0]
[PHYSCD=3] * [PAYCD=1]
[PHYSCD=3] * [PAYCD=2]
[STATUS=0] * [PAYCD=0]
[STATUS=0] * [PAYCD=1]
[STATUS=0] * [PAYCD=2]
[STATUS=1] * [PAYCD=0]
[STATUS=1] * [PAYCD=1]
[STATUS=1] * [PAYCD=2]
[PHYSCD=1] *
[STATUS=0] * [PAYCD=0]
[PHYSCD=1] *
[STATUS=0] * [PAYCD=1]
[PHYSCD=1] *
[STATUS=0] * [PAYCD=2]
[PHYSCD=1] *
[STATUS=1] * [PAYCD=0]
[PHYSCD=1] *
[STATUS=1] * [PAYCD=1]
[PHYSCD=1] *
[STATUS=1] * [PAYCD=2]
[PHYSCD=3] *
[STATUS=0] * [PAYCD=0]
[PHYSCD=3] *
[STATUS=0] * [PAYCD=1]
[PHYSCD=3] *
[STATUS=0] * [PAYCD=2]
[PHYSCD=3] *
[STATUS=1] * [PAYCD=0]
[PHYSCD=3] *
[STATUS=1] * [PAYCD=1]
[PHYSCD=3] *
[STATUS=1] * [PAYCD=2]
Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
This  parameter is set to zero because it is  redundant.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
       
Covariance Parameters 
Estimates  of Covariance Parametersa
4324.054 1634.339
221.3750 360.3042
408.9821 154.5807
192.3036 374.1240
423.0536 160.5388
444.6250 168.0525
2020.402 1201.021
150.9375 332.3868
125.9196 345.6484
3726.205 1408.373
589.9464 512.5151
510.6607 202.7800
523.8393 209.8899
653.5179 485.2194
769.9643 291.0191
-175.473 185.0728
77.598214 58.836538
86.866071 61.925916
-127.250 169.6396
88.892857 79.195219
103.7768 39.223938
Parameter
UN (1,1)
UN (2,1)
UN (2,2)
UN (3,1)
UN (3,2)
UN (3,3)
UN (4,1)
UN (4,2)
UN (4,3)
UN (4,4)
UN (5,1)
UN (5,2)
UN (5,3)
UN (5,4)
UN (5,5)
UN (6,1)
UN (6,2)
UN (6,3)
UN (6,4)
UN (6,5)
UN (6,6)
Repeated
Measures
Estimate Std. Error
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
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Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. PHYSCD 
Estimatesa
32.625 8.437 14.000 14.529 50.721
35.458 8.437 14.000 17.362 53.555
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
-2.833 11.932 14.000 .816 -28.426 22.759
2.833 11.932 14.000 .816 -22.759 28.426
(J) PHYSCD
3
1
(I) PHYSCD
1
3
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
Univariate  Testsa
1 14.000 .056 .816
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  PHYSCD. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
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2. STATUS 
Estimatesa
36.125 6.898 14.000 21.331 50.919
31.958 6.363 14.000 18.311 45.606
STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
4.167 5.809 14.000 .485 -8.293 16.627
-4.167 5.809 14.000 .485 -16.627 8.293
(J) STATUS
POST
PRE
(I) STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
Univariate  Testsa
1 14.000 .514 .485
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  STATUS. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
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3. PAYCD 
Estimatesa
81.344 13.745 14.000 51.864 110.824
14.250 5.863 14.000 1.674 26.826
6.531 3.359 14.000 -.673 13.736
PAYCD
COMMERCIAL
MEDICARE
OTHER
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
67.094* 13.146 14.000 .000 31.367 102.821
74.813* 14.132 14.000 .000 36.404 113.221
-67.094* 13.146 14.000 .000 -102.821 -31.367
7.719 3.297 14.000 .104 -1.241 16.679
-74.813* 14.132 14.000 .000 -113.221 -36.404
-7.719 3.297 14.000 .104 -16.679 1.241
(J) PAYCD
MEDICARE
OTHER
COMMERCIAL
OTHER
COMMERCIAL
MEDICARE
(I) PAYCD
COMMERCIAL
MEDICARE
OTHER
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
The mean dif ference is  s ignif icant at the .05 level.*. 
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
Univariate  Testsa
2 14.000 14.034 .000
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  PAYCD. This test is based on the
linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among the
estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
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4. PHYSCD * STATUSa
36.458 9.755 14.000 15.537 57.380
28.792 8.999 14.000 9.491 48.092
35.792 9.755 14.000 14.870 56.713
35.125 8.999 14.000 15.825 54.425
STATUS
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
5. PAYCD * PHYSCDa
86.938 19.438 14.000 45.247 128.628
75.750 19.438 14.000 34.059 117.441
7.688 8.292 14.000 -10.097 25.472
20.813 8.292 14.000 3.028 38.597
3.250 4.750 14.000 -6.939 13.439
9.813 4.750 14.000 -.376 20.001
PHYSCD
1
3
1
3
1
3
PAYCD
COMMERCIAL
MEDICARE
OTHER
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
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6. PAYCD * STATUSa
92.625 16.439 14.000 57.366 127.884
70.063 15.261 14.000 37.332 102.793
8.875 5.056 14.000 -1.969 19.719
19.625 6.937 14.000 4.746 34.504
6.875 5.272 14.000 -4.431 18.181
6.188 2.547 14.000 .725 11.650
STATUS
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PAYCD
COMMERCIAL
MEDICARE
OTHER
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
7. PAYCD * PHYSCD * STATUSa
104.875 23.249 14.000 55.011 154.739
69.000 21.582 14.000 22.712 115.288
80.375 23.249 14.000 30.511 130.239
71.125 21.582 14.000 24.837 117.413
2.875 7.150 14.000 -12.460 18.210
12.500 9.810 14.000 -8.541 33.541
14.875 7.150 14.000 -.460 30.210
26.750 9.810 14.000 5.709 47.791
1.625 7.455 14.000 -14.365 17.615
4.875 3.602 14.000 -2.850 12.600
12.125 7.455 14.000 -3.865 28.115
7.500 3.602 14.000 -.225 15.225
STATUS
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PHYSCD
1
3
1
3
1
3
PAYCD
COMMERCIAL
MEDICARE
OTHER
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
2
9
1
 
       
Test 9: Mixed Model Analysis (Post Hoc Aggregate Year 1 versus 5) 
Model Dimensiona
1 1
2 1
2 1
4 1
2 Unstructured 3 PHYSID 61
11 7
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PHYSCD * STATUS
Fixed Ef fects
STATUSRepeated Ef fects
Total
Number
of  Levels
Covariance
Structure
Number of
Parameters
Subject
Variables
Number of
Subjects
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Inform ation Crite riaa
1292.733
1298.733
1298.944
1310.045
1307.045
-2 Restric ted Log
Likelihood
Akaike's Information
Criterion (AIC)
Hurvich and Tsai's
Criterion (AICC)
Bozdogan's Criterion
(CAIC)
Schw arz's Bayesian
Criterion (BIC)
The information criteria are displayed
in smaller-is-better forms.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
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Fixed Effects 
Type III Tests of Fixed Effectsa
1 59.000 54.554 .000
1 59.000 6.898 .011
1 59.000 2.099 .153
1 59.000 2.082 .154
Source
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PHYSCD * STATUS
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Estimates  of Fixed Effectsb
49.000000 13.208507 59.000 3.710 .000 22.569839 75.430161
35.607143 19.495736 59.000 1.826 .073 -3.403734 74.618020
0a 0 . . . . .
-17.5758 8.235586 59.000 -2.134 .037 -34.055126 -1.096389
0a 0 . . . . .
17.540043 12.155712 59.000 1.443 .154 -6.783480 41.863566
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
Parameter
Intercept
[PHYSCD=1]
[PHYSCD=3]
[STATUS=0]
[STATUS=1]
[STATUS=0] *
[PHYSCD=1]
[STATUS=1] *
[PHYSCD=1]
[STATUS=0] *
[PHYSCD=3]
[STATUS=1] *
[PHYSCD=3]
Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
This  parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
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Covariance Parameters 
Estimates  of Covariance  Parametersa
4011.100 738.5034
3765.107 794.7846
5757.334 1060.011
Parameter
UN (1,1)
UN (2,1)
UN (2,2)
Repeated
Measures
Estimate Std. Error
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. PHYSCD 
Estimatesa
84.589 12.428 59.000 59.721 109.457
40.212 11.448 59.000 17.305 63.119
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
2
9
4
 
       
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
44.377* 16.897 59.000 .011 10.567 78.188
-44.377* 16.897 59.000 .011 -78.188 -10.567
(J) PHYSCD
3
1
(I) PHYSCD
1
3
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
The mean dif ference is  s ignif icant at the .05 level.*. 
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
Univariate  Testsa
1 59.000 6.898 .011
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  PHYSCD. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
2. STATUS 
Estimatesa
57.998 8.136 59 41.717 74.279
66.804 9.748 59.000 47.298 86.309
STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
2
9
5
 
       
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
-8.806 6.078 59.000 .153 -20.967 3.356
8.806 6.078 59.000 .153 -3.356 20.967
(J) STATUS
POST
PRE
(I) STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
Univariate  Testsa
1 59.000 2.099 .153
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  STATUS. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
3. PHYSCD * STATUSa
84.571 11.969 59.000 60.622 108.521
84.607 14.339 59.000 55.914 113.300
31.424 11.025 59.000 9.363 53.485
49.000 13.209 59.000 22.570 75.430
STATUS
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
2
9
6
 
       
Test 10: Mixed Model Analysis (Post Hoc ORHS Years 1 and 5) 
Model Dimensiona
1 1
2 1
2 1
4 1
2 Unstructured 3 PHYSID 38
11 7
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PHYSCD * STATUS
Fixed Ef fects
STATUSRepeated Ef fects
Total
Number
of  Levels
Covariance
Structure
Number of
Parameters
Subject
Variables
Number of
Subjects
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Inform ation Crite riaa
687.520
693.520
693.873
703.350
700.350
-2 Restric ted Log
Likelihood
Akaike's Information
Criterion (AIC)
Hurvich and Tsai's
Criterion (AICC)
Bozdogan's Criterion
(CAIC)
Schw arz's Bayesian
Criterion (BIC)
The information criteria are displayed
in smaller-is-better forms.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
2
9
7
 
       
Fixed Effects 
 
Type III Tests of Fixed Effectsa
1 36 59.318 .000
1 36 1.107 .300
1 36.000 3.781 .060
1 36.000 6.944 .012
Source
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PHYSCD * STATUS
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Estimates  of Fixed Effectsb
36.684211 6.569994 36.000 5.584 .000 23.359645 50.008776
-4.263158 9.291374 36 -.459 .649 -23.106939 14.580623
0a 0 . . . . .
-21.6316 6.680042 36.000 -3.238 .003 -35.179332 -8.083826
0a 0 . . . . .
24.894737 9.447006 36.000 2.635 .012 5.735321 44.054153
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
Parameter
Intercept
[PHYSCD=1]
[PHYSCD=3]
[STATUS=0]
[STATUS=1]
[STATUS=0] *
[PHYSCD=1]
[STATUS=1] *
[PHYSCD=1]
[STATUS=0] *
[PHYSCD=3]
[STATUS=1] *
[PHYSCD=3]
Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
This  parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
2
9
8
 
       
 
Covariance Parameters 
Estimates  of Covariance  Parametersa
753.8626 177.6871
363.0789 144.3465
820.1316 193.3069
Parameter
UN (1,1)
UN (2,1)
UN (2,2)
Repeated
Measures
Estimate Std. Error
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. PHYSCD 
Estimatesa
34.053 5.501 36 22.895 45.210
25.868 5.501 36 14.711 37.026
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
2
9
9
 
       
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
8.184 7.780 36 .300 -7.595 23.963
-8.184 7.780 36 .300 -23.963 7.595
(J) PHYSCD
3
1
(I) PHYSCD
1
3
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
Univariate  Testsa
1 36 1.107 .300
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  PHYSCD. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
2. STATUS 
Estimatesa
25.368 4.454 36.000 16.335 34.402
34.553 4.646 36 25.131 43.975
STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 30
0
 
       
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
-9.184 4.724 36.000 .060 -18.764 .395
9.184 4.724 36.000 .060 -.395 18.764
(J) STATUS
POST
PRE
(I) STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
Univariate  Testsa
1 36.000 3.781 .060
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  STATUS. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
3. PHYSCD * STATUSa
35.684 6.299 36.000 22.909 48.459
32.421 6.570 36.000 19.096 45.746
15.053 6.299 36.000 2.278 27.828
36.684 6.570 36.000 23.360 50.009
STATUS
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 30
1
 
       
Test 11:  Mixed Model Analysis (Post Hoc FHS Year 1 versus 5) 
Model Dimensiona
1 1
2 1
2 1
4 1
2 Unstructured 3 PHYSID 40
11 7
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PHYSCD * STATUS
Fixed Ef fects
STATUSRepeated Ef fects
Total
Number
of  Levels
Covariance
Structure
Number of
Parameters
Subject
Variables
Number of
Subjects
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Inform ation Crite riaa
795.388
801.388
801.741
811.218
808.218
-2 Restric ted Log
Likelihood
Akaike's Information
Criterion (AIC)
Hurvich and Tsai's
Criterion (AICC)
Bozdogan's Criterion
(CAIC)
Schw arz's Bayesian
Criterion (BIC)
The information criteria are displayed
in smaller-is-better forms.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
3
0
2
 
       
Fixed Effects 
Type III Tests of Fixed Effectsa
1 38.933 38.772 .000
1 38.933 5.069 .030
1 34.011 .464 .500
1 34.011 .004 .947
Source
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PHYSCD * STATUS
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Estimates  of Fixed Effectsb
44.278938 18.626352 39.634 2.377 .022 6.622856 81.935020
45.746617 25.998667 38.728 1.760 .086 -6.852452 98.345687
0a 0 . . . . .
-6.728938 13.064333 34.013 -.515 .610 -33.278491 19.820615
0a 0 . . . . .
1.203383 17.983389 34.011 .067 .947 -35.342827 37.749592
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
Parameter
Intercept
[PHYSCD=1]
[PHYSCD=3]
[STATUS=0]
[STATUS=1]
[STATUS=0] *
[PHYSCD=1]
[STATUS=1] *
[PHYSCD=1]
[STATUS=0] *
[PHYSCD=3]
[STATUS=1] *
[PHYSCD=3]
Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
This  parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
 
3
0
3
 
       
Covariance Parameters 
Estimates  of Covariance  Parametersa
3332.683 764.5699
3428.983 936.0983
6427.207 1496.553
Parameter
UN (1,1)
UN (2,1)
UN (2,2)
Repeated
Measures
Estimate Std. Error
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. PHYSCD 
Estimatesa
87.263 14.479 38.285 57.960 116.566
40.914 14.633 39.574 11.331 70.498
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
3
0
4
 
       
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
46.348* 20.585 38.933 .030 4.709 87.988
-46.348* 20.585 38.933 .030 -87.988 -4.709
(J) PHYSCD
3
1
(I) PHYSCD
1
3
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
The mean dif ference is  s ignif icant at the .05 level.*. 
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
Univariate  Testsa
1 38.933 5.069 .030
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  PHYSCD. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
2. STATUS 
Estimatesa
61.025 9.128 38.000 42.547 79.503
67.152 12.999 38.728 40.853 93.452
STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
3
0
5
 
       
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
-6.127 8.992 34.011 .500 -24.400 12.146
6.127 8.992 34.011 .500 -12.146 24.400
(J) STATUS
POST
PRE
(I) STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
Univariate  Testsa
1 34.011 .464 .500
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  STATUS. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
3. PHYSCD * STATUSa
84.500 12.909 38.000 58.368 110.632
90.026 18.138 37.760 53.299 126.752
37.550 12.909 38.000 11.418 63.682
44.279 18.626 39.634 6.623 81.935
STATUS
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 30
6
 
       
Test 12: Mixed Model Analysis (Post Hoc Aggregate Years 1 and 2 versus 4 and 5) 
Model Dimensiona
1 1
2 1
2 1
4 1
2 Unstructured 3 PHYSID 61
11 7
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PHYSCD * STATUS
Fixed Ef fects
STATUSRepeated Ef fects
Total
Number
of  Levels
Covariance
Structure
Number of
Parameters
Subject
Variables
Number of
Subjects
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Inform ation Crite riaa
1456.411
1462.411
1462.622
1473.723
1470.723
-2 Restric ted Log
Likelihood
Akaike's Information
Criterion (AIC)
Hurvich and Tsai's
Criterion (AICC)
Bozdogan's Criterion
(CAIC)
Schw arz's Bayesian
Criterion (BIC)
The information criteria are displayed
in smaller-is-better forms.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
3
0
7
 
       
Fixed Effects 
Type III Tests of Fixed Effectsa
1 59.000 57.656 .000
1 59.000 7.111 .010
1 59.000 .158 .692
1 59.000 1.509 .224
Source
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PHYSCD * STATUS
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Estimates  of Fixed Effectsb
107.4848 29.406318 59.000 3.655 .001 48.642941 166.326756
95.336580 43.403680 59.000 2.197 .032 8.486016 182.187144
0a 0 . . . . .
-16.2121 13.511760 59.000 -1.200 .235 -43.249090 10.824848
0a 0 . . . . .
24.497835 19.943337 59.000 1.228 .224 -15.408689 64.404360
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
Parameter
Intercept
[PHYSCD=1]
[PHYSCD=3]
[STATUS=0]
[STATUS=1]
[STATUS=0] *
[PHYSCD=1]
[STATUS=1] *
[PHYSCD=1]
[STATUS=0] *
[PHYSCD=3]
[STATUS=1] *
[PHYSCD=3]
Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
This  parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
 
3
0
8
 
       
Covariance Parameters 
Estimates  of Covariance  Parametersa
23787.58 4379.648
23149.49 4537.424
28536.14 5253.930
Parameter
UN (1,1)
UN (2,1)
UN (2,2)
Repeated
Measures
Estimate Std. Error
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. PHYSCD 
Estimatesa
206.964 29.674 59.000 147.586 266.342
99.379 27.334 59.000 44.684 154.074
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
3
0
9
 
       
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
107.585* 40.345 59.000 .010 26.856 188.315
-107.585* 40.345 59.000 .010 -188.315 -26.856
(J) PHYSCD
3
1
(I) PHYSCD
1
3
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
The mean dif ference is  s ignif icant at the .05 level.*. 
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
Univariate  Testsa
1 59.000 7.111 .010
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  PHYSCD. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
2. STATUS 
Estimatesa
151.190 19.814 59.000 111.542 190.838
155.153 21.702 59.000 111.728 198.578
STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
3
1
0
 
       
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
-3.963 9.972 59.000 .692 -23.916 15.990
3.963 9.972 59.000 .692 -15.990 23.916
(J) STATUS
POST
PRE
(I) STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
Univariate  Testsa
1 59.000 .158 .692
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  STATUS. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
3. PHYSCD * STATUSa
211.107 29.147 59.000 152.784 269.430
202.821 31.924 59.000 138.941 266.701
91.273 26.848 59.000 37.549 144.996
107.485 29.406 59.000 48.643 166.327
STATUS
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
3
1
1
 
       
Test 13: Mixed Model Analysis (Post Hoc ORHS Years 1 and 2 versus 4 and 5) 
Model Dimensiona
1 1
2 1
2 1
4 1
2 Unstructured 3 PHYSID 38
11 7
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PHYSCD * STATUS
Fixed Ef fects
STATUSRepeated Ef fects
Total
Number
of  Levels
Covariance
Structure
Number of
Parameters
Subject
Variables
Number of
Subjects
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Inform ation Crite riaa
805.811
811.811
812.164
821.641
818.641
-2 Restric ted Log
Likelihood
Akaike's Information
Criterion (AIC)
Hurvich and Tsai's
Criterion (AICC)
Bozdogan's Criterion
(CAIC)
Schw arz's Bayesian
Criterion (BIC)
The information criteria are displayed
in smaller-is-better forms.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
3
1
2
 
       
Fixed Effects 
Type III Tests of Fixed Effectsa
1 36.000 54.812 .000
1 36.000 .259 .614
1 36.000 .084 .773
1 36.000 3.278 .079
Source
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PHYSCD * STATUS
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Estimates  of Fixed Effectsb
81.105263 15.068567 36.000 5.382 .000 50.544793 111.665733
-5.473684 21.310172 36.000 -.257 .799 -48.692716 37.745347
0a 0 . . . . .
-13.7895 12.825989 36.000 -1.075 .289 -39.801786 12.222838
0a 0 . . . . .
32.842105 18.138688 36.000 1.811 .079 -3.944859 69.629070
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
Parameter
Intercept
[PHYSCD=1]
[PHYSCD=3]
[STATUS=0]
[STATUS=1]
[STATUS=0] *
[PHYSCD=1]
[STATUS=1] *
[PHYSCD=1]
[STATUS=0] *
[PHYSCD=3]
[STATUS=1] *
[PHYSCD=3]
Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
This  parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
 
3
1
3
 
       
Covariance Parameters 
Estimates  of Covariance  Parametersa
6052.728 1426.642
3620.643 1043.785
4314.173 1016.860
Parameter
UN (1,1)
UN (2,1)
UN (2,2)
Repeated
Measures
Estimate Std. Error
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. PHYSCD 
Estimatesa
85.158 15.221 36.000 54.288 116.028
74.211 15.221 36 43.340 105.081
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
10.947 21.526 36.000 .614 -32.710 54.604
-10.947 21.526 36.000 .614 -54.604 32.710
(J) PHYSCD
3
1
(I) PHYSCD
1
3
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
3
1
4
 
       
Univariate  Testsa
1 36.000 .259 .614
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  PHYSCD. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
2. STATUS 
Estimatesa
81.000 12.621 36.000 55.404 106.596
78.368 10.655 36.000 56.759 99.978
STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
2.632 9.069 36.000 .773 -15.762 21.025
-2.632 9.069 36.000 .773 -21.025 15.762
(J) STATUS
POST
PRE
(I) STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
3
1
5
 
       
Univariate  Testsa
1 36.000 .084 .773
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  STATUS. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
3. PHYSCD * STATUSa
94.684 17.848 36.000 58.486 130.882
75.632 15.069 36.000 45.071 106.192
67.316 17.848 36 31.118 103.514
81.105 15.069 36.000 50.545 111.666
STATUS
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
3
1
6
 
       
Test 14: Mixed Model Analysis (Post Hoc FHS Years 1 and 2 versus 4 and 5) 
 
Model Dimensiona
1 1
2 1
2 1
4 1
2 Unstructured 3 PHYSID 40
11 7
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PHYSCD * STATUS
Fixed Ef fects
STATUSRepeated Ef fects
Total
Number
of  Levels
Covariance
Structure
Number of
Parameters
Subject
Variables
Number of
Subjects
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Inform ation Crite riaa
935.287
941.287
941.621
951.279
948.279
-2 Restric ted Log
Likelihood
Akaike's Information
Criterion (AIC)
Hurvich and Tsai's
Criterion (AICC)
Bozdogan's Criterion
(CAIC)
Schw arz's Bayesian
Criterion (BIC)
The information criteria are displayed
in smaller-is-better forms.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
3
1
7
 
       
Fixed Effects 
Type III Tests of Fixed Effectsa
1 38.000 41.372 .000
1 38.000 6.025 .019
1 38.000 .600 .443
1 38.000 .076 .785
Source
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PHYSCD * STATUS
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Estimates  of Fixed Effectsb
100.3000 38.082943 38.000 2.634 .012 23.205113 177.394887
111.8000 53.857414 38.000 2.076 .045 2.771365 220.828635
0a 0 . . . . .
-13.6500 18.396565 38.000 -.742 .463 -50.891900 23.591900
0a 0 . . . . .
7.150000 26.016672 38.000 .275 .785 -45.518000 59.818000
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
Parameter
Intercept
[PHYSCD=1]
[PHYSCD=3]
[STATUS=0]
[STATUS=1]
[STATUS=0] *
[PHYSCD=1]
[STATUS=1] *
[PHYSCD=1]
[STATUS=0] *
[PHYSCD=3]
[STATUS=1] *
[PHYSCD=3]
Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
This  parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
 
3
1
8
 
       
Covariance Parameters 
Estimates  of Covariance  Parametersa
18562.61 4258.556
20400.08 5012.075
29006.21 6654.481
Parameter
UN (1,1)
UN (2,1)
UN (2,2)
Repeated
Measures
Estimate Std. Error
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. PHYSCD 
Estimatesa
208.850 33.236 38.000 141.568 276.132
93.475 33.236 38.000 26.193 160.757
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
3
1
9
 
       
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
115.375* 47.002 38.000 .019 20.224 210.526
-115.375* 47.002 38.000 .019 -210.526 -20.224
(J) PHYSCD
3
1
(I) PHYSCD
1
3
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
The mean dif ference is  s ignif icant at the .05 level.*. 
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
Univariate  Testsa
1 38.000 6.025 .019
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  PHYSCD. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
2. STATUS 
Estimatesa
146.125 21.542 38.000 102.515 189.735
156.200 26.929 38.000 101.686 210.714
STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
3
2
0
 
       
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
-10.075 13.008 38.000 .443 -36.409 16.259
10.075 13.008 38.000 .443 -16.259 36.409
(J) STATUS
POST
PRE
(I) STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
Univariate  Testsa
1 38.000 .600 .443
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  STATUS. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
3. PHYSCD * STATUSa
205.600 30.465 38.000 143.926 267.274
212.100 38.083 38.000 135.005 289.195
86.650 30.465 38.000 24.976 148.324
100.300 38.083 38.000 23.205 177.395
STATUS
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
3
2
1
 
       
Test 15: Mixed Model Analysis (Post Hoc ORHS Insurance Year 1 versus 5) 
 
Model Dimensiona
1 1
2 1
2 1
3 2
4 1
6 2
6 2
12 2
6 Unstructured 21 PHYSID 38
42 33
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PAYCD
PHYSCD * STATUS
PHYSCD * PAYCD
STATUS * PAYCD
PHYSCD * STATUS
* PAYCD
Fixed Effects
WAVERepeated Effects
Total
Number
of  Levels
Covariance
Structure
Number of
Parameters
Subject
Variables
Number of
Subjects
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Inform ation Crite riaa
1484.566
1526.566
1531.329
1618.447
1597.447
-2 Restric ted Log
Likelihood
Akaike's Information
Criterion (AIC)
Hurvich and Tsai's
Criterion (AICC)
Bozdogan's Criterion
(CAIC)
Schw arz's Bayesian
Criterion (BIC)
The information criteria are displayed
in smaller-is-better forms.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
3
2
2
 
       
Fixed Effects 
Type III Tes ts of Fixed Effectsa
1 36.000 59.318 .000
1 36.000 1.107 .300
1 36.000 3.781 .060
2 36.000 17.115 .000
1 36.000 6.944 .012
2 36.000 2.597 .088
2 36.000 1.557 .225
2 36.000 3.735 .034
Source
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PAYCD
PHYSCD * STATUS
PHYSCD * PAYCD
STATUS * PAYCD
PHYSCD * STATUS
* PAYCD
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
 
3
2
3
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Estimates  of Fixed Effectsb
4.473684 2.262240 36.000 1.978 .056 -.114351 9.061719
-.578947 3.199290 36.000 -.181 .857 -7.067408 5.909514
0a 0 . . . . .
-4.210526 2.253515 36.000 -1.868 .070 -8.780867 .359815
0a 0 . . . . .
18.473684 5.424501 36.000 3.406 .002 7.472287 29.475082
4.789474 3.366959 36.000 1.422 .163 -2.039035 11.617983
0a 0 . . . . .
.842105 3.186952 36.000 .264 .793 -5.621333 7.305544
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
.210526 7.671402 36.000 .027 .978 -15.347799 15.768852
-2.736842 4.761599 36.000 -.575 .569 -12.393812 6.920128
0a 0 . . . . .
0a 0 . . . . .
0a 0 . . . . .
0a 0 . . . . .
-6.210526 5.609208 36.000 -1.107 .276 -17.586528 5.165476
-2.789474 3.085750 36.000 -.904 .372 -9.047665 3.468717
0a 0 . . . . .
0a 0 . . . . .
0a 0 . . . . .
0a 0 . . . . .
21.473684 7.932619 36.000 2.707 .010 5.385588 37.561781
.894737 4.363909 36.000 .205 .839 -7.955682 9.745155
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
0
a
0 . . . . .
Parameter
Intercept
[PHYSCD=1]
[PHYSCD=3]
[STATUS=0]
[STATUS=1]
[PAYCD=0]
[PAYCD=1]
[PAYCD=2]
[PHYSCD=1] *
[STATUS=0]
[PHYSCD=1] *
[STATUS=1]
[PHYSCD=3] *
[STATUS=0]
[PHYSCD=3] *
[STATUS=1]
[PHYSCD=1] * [PAYCD=0]
[PHYSCD=1] * [PAYCD=1]
[PHYSCD=1] * [PAYCD=2]
[PHYSCD=3] * [PAYCD=0]
[PHYSCD=3] * [PAYCD=1]
[PHYSCD=3] * [PAYCD=2]
[STATUS=0] * [PAYCD=0]
[STATUS=0] * [PAYCD=1]
[STATUS=0] * [PAYCD=2]
[STATUS=1] * [PAYCD=0]
[STATUS=1] * [PAYCD=1]
[STATUS=1] * [PAYCD=2]
[PHYSCD=1] *
[STATUS=0] * [PAYCD=0]
[PHYSCD=1] *
[STATUS=0] * [PAYCD=1]
[PHYSCD=1] *
[STATUS=0] * [PAYCD=2]
[PHYSCD=1] *
[STATUS=1] * [PAYCD=0]
[PHYSCD=1] *
[STATUS=1] * [PAYCD=1]
[PHYSCD=1] *
[STATUS=1] * [PAYCD=2]
[PHYSCD=3] *
[STATUS=0] * [PAYCD=0]
[PHYSCD=3] *
[STATUS=0] * [PAYCD=1]
[PHYSCD=3] *
[STATUS=0] * [PAYCD=2]
[PHYSCD=3] *
[STATUS=1] * [PAYCD=0]
[PHYSCD=3] *
[STATUS=1] * [PAYCD=1]
[PHYSCD=3] *
[STATUS=1] * [PAYCD=2]
Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
This  parameter is set to zero because it is  redundant.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
       
Covariance Parameters 
Estimates  of Covariance Parametersa
727.9854 171.5878
2.866959 15.795963
12.327485 2.905616
.267544 6.015679
2.745614 .906736
1.789474 .421783
297.6754 107.2867
-.396199 12.378928
-.736842 4.717908
447.4883 105.4740
80.884503 50.388991
25.121345 7.579459
2.200292 2.434964
87.384503 40.757123
116.5731 27.476543
-45.5775 44.988982
2.638889 5.787077
1.269006 2.208652
-7.176901 34.786594
-.790936 17.744972
97.236842 22.918943
Parameter
UN (1,1)
UN (2,1)
UN (2,2)
UN (3,1)
UN (3,2)
UN (3,3)
UN (4,1)
UN (4,2)
UN (4,3)
UN (4,4)
UN (5,1)
UN (5,2)
UN (5,3)
UN (5,4)
UN (5,5)
UN (6,1)
UN (6,2)
UN (6,3)
UN (6,4)
UN (6,5)
UN (6,6)
Repeated
Measures
Estimate Std. Error
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
 
 
 
3
2
5
 
       
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. PHYSCD 
Estimatesa
11.351 1.834 36.000 7.632 15.070
8.623 1.834 36.000 4.904 12.342
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
2.728 2.593 36.000 .300 -2.532 7.988
-2.728 2.593 36.000 .300 -7.988 2.532
(J) PHYSCD
3
1
(I) PHYSCD
1
3
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
 
3
2
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Univariate  Testsa
1 36.000 1.107 .300
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  PHYSCD. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
2. STATUS 
Estimatesa
8.456 1.485 36.000 5.445 11.467
11.518 1.549 36.000 8.377 14.658
STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
-3.061 1.575 36.000 .060 -6.255 .132
3.061 1.575 36.000 .060 -.132 6.255
(J) STATUS
POST
PRE
(I) STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
 
3
2
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Univariate  Testsa
1 36.000 3.781 .060
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  STATUS. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
3. PAYCD 
Estimatesa
23.132 3.413 36.000 16.209 30.054
4.539 1.086 36.000 2.338 6.741
2.289 .817 36.000 .632 3.947
PAYCD
COMMERCIAL
MEDICARE
OTHER
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
3
2
8
 
       
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
18.592* 3.253 36 .000 10.424 26.761
20.842* 3.608 36.000 .000 11.782 29.902
-18.592* 3.253 36 .000 -26.761 -10.424
2.250 1.326 36.000 .295 -1.079 5.579
-20.842* 3.608 36.000 .000 -29.902 -11.782
-2.250 1.326 36.000 .295 -5.579 1.079
(J) PAYCD
MEDICARE
OTHER
COMMERCIAL
OTHER
COMMERCIAL
MEDICARE
(I) PAYCD
COMMERCIAL
MEDICARE
OTHER
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
The mean dif ference is  s ignif icant at the .05 level.*. 
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
Univariate  Testsa
2 36.000 17.115 .000
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  PAYCD. This test is based on the
linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among the
estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
3
2
9
 
       
4. PHYSCD * STATUSa
11.895 2.100 36.000 7.636 16.153
10.807 2.190 36.000 6.365 15.249
5.018 2.100 36.000 .759 9.276
12.228 2.190 36.000 7.787 16.670
STATUS
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
5. PAYCD * PHYSCDa
28.526 4.827 36 18.737 38.316
17.737 4.827 36.000 7.947 27.527
3.316 1.535 36.000 .202 6.430
5.763 1.535 36.000 2.649 8.877
2.211 1.156 36.000 -.134 4.555
2.368 1.156 36.000 .024 4.713
PHYSCD
1
3
1
3
1
3
PAYCD
COMMERCIAL
MEDICARE
OTHER
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
3
3
0
 
       
6. PAYCD * STATUSa
23.500 4.377 36.000 14.623 32.377
22.763 3.432 36.000 15.804 29.723
1.474 .570 36.000 .319 2.629
7.605 1.751 36.000 4.053 11.157
.395 .217 36.000 -.045 .835
4.184 1.600 36.000 .940 7.428
STATUS
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PAYCD
COMMERCIAL
MEDICARE
OTHER
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
7. PAYCD * PHYSCD * STATUSa
34.474 6.190 36 21.920 47.027
22.579 4.853 36.000 12.737 32.421
12.526 6.190 36.000 -.027 25.080
22.947 4.853 36.000 13.105 32.790
.684 .805 36.000 -.949 2.318
5.947 2.477 36.000 .924 10.971
2.263 .805 36.000 .630 3.897
9.263 2.477 36.000 4.240 14.287
.526 .307 36.000 -.096 1.149
3.895 2.262 36.000 -.693 8.483
.263 .307 36.000 -.359 .886
4.474 2.262 36.000 -.114 9.062
STATUS
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PHYSCD
1
3
1
3
1
3
PAYCD
COMMERCIAL
MEDICARE
OTHER
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
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Test 16: Mixed Model Analysis (Post Hoc ORHS Insurance Years 1 and 2 versus 4 and 5) 
 
Model Dimensiona
1 1
2 1
2 1
3 2
4 1
6 2
6 2
12 2
6 Unstructured 21 PHYSID 38
42 33
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PAYCD
PHYSCD * STATUS
PHYSCD * PAYCD
STATUS * PAYCD
PHYSCD * STATUS
* PAYCD
Fixed Effects
WAVERepeated Effects
Total
Number
of  Levels
Covariance
Structure
Number of
Parameters
Subject
Variables
Number of
Subjects
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
Inform ation Crite riaa
1846.266
1888.266
1893.029
1980.146
1959.146
-2 Restric ted Log
Likelihood
Akaike's Information
Criterion (AIC)
Hurvich and Tsai's
Criterion (AICC)
Bozdogan's Criterion
(CAIC)
Schw arz's Bayesian
Criterion (BIC)
The information criteria are displayed
in smaller-is-better forms.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
3
3
2
 
       
Fixed Effects 
Type III Tes ts of Fixed Effectsa
1 36.000 54.812 .000
1 36.000 .259 .614
1 36.000 .084 .773
2 36.000 18.939 .000
1 36.000 3.278 .079
2 36.000 2.771 .076
2 36.000 4.339 .020
2 36.000 2.234 .122
Source
Intercept
PHYSCD
STATUS
PAYCD
PHYSCD * STATUS
PHYSCD * PAYCD
STATUS * PAYCD
PHYSCD * STATUS
* PAYCD
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
 
 
 
3
3
3
 
       
Covariance Parameters 
Estimates  of Covariance Parametersa
4577.269 1078.873
203.6257 170.3151
219.0819 51.638092
94.581871 171.7631
214.9401 51.802508
230.0819 54.230817
2463.759 709.3102
155.4576 129.1581
105.5848 130.8589
2630.880 620.1044
497.2749 245.3875
268.0219 67.444358
258.5789 67.370703
486.1418 192.9419
419.5643 98.892260
-269.466 216.5427
49.502924 47.072953
91.929825 49.903754
-83.5892 161.2024
52.846491 64.736542
352.9298 83.186357
Parameter
UN (1,1)
UN (2,1)
UN (2,2)
UN (3,1)
UN (3,2)
UN (3,3)
UN (4,1)
UN (4,2)
UN (4,3)
UN (4,4)
UN (5,1)
UN (5,2)
UN (5,3)
UN (5,4)
UN (5,5)
UN (6,1)
UN (6,2)
UN (6,3)
UN (6,4)
UN (6,5)
UN (6,6)
Repeated
Measures
Estimate Std. Error
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
 
 3
3
4
 
       
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. PHYSCD 
Estimatesa
28.386 5.074 36.000 18.096 38.676
24.737 5.074 36.000 14.447 35.027
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
3.649 7.175 36.000 .614 -10.903 18.201
-3.649 7.175 36.000 .614 -18.201 10.903
(J) PHYSCD
3
1
(I) PHYSCD
1
3
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
Univariate  Testsa
1 36.000 .259 .614
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  PHYSCD. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
3
3
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2. STATUS 
Estimatesa
27.000 4.207 36.000 18.468 35.532
26.123 3.552 36.000 18.920 33.326
STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
.877 3.023 36.000 .773 -5.254 7.008
-.877 3.023 36.000 .773 -7.008 5.254
(J) STATUS
POST
PRE
(I) STATUS
PRE
POST
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
Univariate  Testsa
1 36.000 .084 .773
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  STATUS. This test is based on
the linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
3
3
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3. PAYCD 
Estimatesa
61.750 8.935 36.000 43.628 79.872
10.513 2.780 36.000 4.875 16.151
7.421 2.246 36.000 2.866 11.976
PAYCD
COMMERCIAL
MEDICARE
OTHER
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
Pairw ise  Com parisonsb
51.237* 8.361 36.000 .000 30.242 72.231
54.329* 9.322 36.000 .000 30.921 77.736
-51.237* 8.361 36.000 .000 -72.231 -30.242
3.092 2.280 36.000 .550 -2.632 8.816
-54.329* 9.322 36.000 .000 -77.736 -30.921
-3.092 2.280 36.000 .550 -8.816 2.632
(J) PAYCD
MEDICARE
OTHER
COMMERCIAL
OTHER
COMMERCIAL
MEDICARE
(I) PAYCD
COMMERCIAL
MEDICARE
OTHER
Mean
Dif ference
(I-J) Std. Error df Sig.
a
Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval for
Dif ference
a
Based on estimated marginal means
The mean dif ference is  s ignif icant at the .05 level.*. 
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.a. 
Dependent Variable: REFNO.b. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
3
3
7
 
       
Univariate  Testsa
2 36.000 18.939 .000
Numerator df
Denominator
df F Sig.
The F tests the ef fect of  PAYCD. This test is based on the
linearly independent pairw ise comparisons among the
estimated marginal means.
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
4. PHYSCD * STATUSa
31.561 5.949 36.000 19.495 43.627
25.211 5.023 36.000 15.024 35.397
22.439 5.949 36.000 10.373 34.505
27.035 5.023 36.000 16.848 37.222
STATUS
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PHYSCD
1
3
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
5. PAYCD * PHYSCDa
73.000 12.636 36.000 47.372 98.628
50.500 12.636 36.000 24.872 76.128
6.632 3.931 36.000 -1.342 14.605
14.395 3.931 36.000 6.421 22.368
5.526 3.177 36.000 -.916 11.969
9.316 3.177 36.000 2.873 15.758
PHYSCD
1
3
1
3
1
3
PAYCD
COMMERCIAL
MEDICARE
OTHER
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
3
3
8
 
       
 
6. PAYCD * STATUSa
69.211 10.975 36.000 46.952 91.469
54.289 8.321 36.000 37.414 71.165
6.526 2.401 36.000 1.657 11.396
14.500 3.323 36.000 7.761 21.239
5.263 2.461 36.000 .273 10.254
9.579 3.048 36.000 3.398 15.760
STATUS
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PAYCD
COMMERCIAL
MEDICARE
OTHER
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
7. PAYCD * PHYSCD * STATUSa
88.474 15.521 36.000 56.995 119.952
57.526 11.767 36.000 33.661 81.391
49.947 15.521 36.000 18.469 81.426
51.053 11.767 36.000 27.188 74.918
3.053 3.396 36.000 -3.834 9.939
10.211 4.699 36.000 .680 19.741
10.000 3.396 36.000 3.113 16.887
18.789 4.699 36.000 9.259 28.320
3.158 3.480 36.000 -3.900 10.215
7.895 4.310 36.000 -.846 16.636
7.368 3.480 36.000 .311 14.426
11.263 4.310 36.000 2.522 20.004
STATUS
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PHYSCD
1
3
1
3
1
3
PAYCD
COMMERCIAL
MEDICARE
OTHER
Mean Std. Error df Low er Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interval
Dependent Variable: REFNO.a. 
 
 
3
3
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